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INTRODUCTION
Modern thinking has often lost its way by separating the problem
of truth from the problem of living, cognition from [the total human]
situation.... Reflection alone will not procure self-understanding.
The human situation is disclosed in the thick of living.
- Abraham Heschel1
Should law school classes cultivate professional skills or
should they advance a broad intellectual agenda? This question
has remarkable staying power in ongoing debates about the
crux of a legal education.2 The form of the inquiry presumes a
1. A. HESCHEL, WHO Is MAN? 94 (1965).
2. See, e.g., Barnhizer, The University Ideal and Clinical Legal Educa-
tion, 35 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 87, 92-93 (1990) ("American law schools are still
caught astride a chasm that separates the Scylla of the academic university
from the Charybdis of the practicing profession.... American law faculty
have long been caught between the demands created by the seeming incompat-
ibility of the basic visions and functions of the university and those of educat-
ing aspiring lawyers."); Janus, Clinics and "Contextual Integration". Helping
Law Students Put the Pieces Back Together Again, 16 WM. MTCHELL L. REv.
463, 464 (1990) (describing the "non-academic," "anti-intellectual" flavor of the
former curriculum chosen by William Mitchell College of Law to train practic-
ing lawyers). See generally White, The Study of Law as an Intellectual Activ-
ity, 32 J. LEGAL EDUC. 1 (1982) (arguing that the study of law is not so much
the acquisition of information as learning to "think like a lawyer"); The Amer-
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distinction between legal theory and legal practice.
This Article concerns the relationship between theory and
practice in legal academia.3 In particular, it examines the rela-
tionship between theory and practice from the standpoint of
two movements within law's academy: clinical education and
feminist jurisprudence. 4 Although the former is often thought
of as a practical movement,5 and the latter a theoretical move-
ment,6 I hope to demonstrate the fundamental methodological
similarity of the two movements, and hence, the problematic
nature of the theory-practice label. Ironically, the methodologi-
cal similarity of the two movements is found in their responses
to the problematic nature of the theory-practice relationship.
7
This Article also examines the ethical impulse that sparks
clinical education and feminism. I suggest that each move-
ican Bar Association's National Conference on Professional Skills and Legal
Education, 19 N.M.L. REV. 1 (1989) (the primary goal of the October 1987 con-
ference in Albuquerque was to provide a forum for law schools to discuss ap-
proaches to professional skills education). Although White's article and the
symposium articles do not present stark antagonistic positions, the common
perception that they are advocating different approaches is part of the prob-
lem that I am addressing here.
3. By "theory" we commonly mean a set of general propositions
used as an explanation. Theory has to be sufficiently abstract to be
relevant to more than just particularized situations. By "practice" we
commonly mean the doing of something. Practice also is associated
with the idea of repetition; therefore, practice sometimes is equated
with the gaining of skills because one gains skills by repetition.
Spiegel, Theory and Practice in Legal Education: An Essay on Clinical Educa-
tion, 34 UCLA L. REV. 577, 580 (1987) (footnotes omitted). For purposes of
this Article, I will adopt the preliminary definitions of theory and practice of-
fered by Professor Spiegel, although as he explains, these terms are much less
distinctive than our facile use of them sometimes suggests. Id. at 595; see infra
notes 60-73, 92-96 and accompanying text.
4. Frequently throughout this Article, I discuss the themes and methods
of "feminism" rather than "feminist jurisprudence." The former refers to
cross-disciplinary feminist thinking applicable to many fields, including law,
and the latter to the specific applications of these themes and methods within
the discipline of law.
5. See, e.g., Ferren, Goals, Models and Prospects for Clinical-Legal Educa-
tion, in CLINICAL EDUCATION AND THE LAW SCHOOL OF THE FUTURE 94, 94-95
(E. Kitch ed. 1970); see also Spiegel, supra note 3, at 589-91 (the label "clinical
education" suggests doing, concern with particulars rather than the general,
and a focus on "practical ends rather than abstract knowledge").
6. See, e.g., MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: An
Agenda for Theory, 7 SIGNs 515 (1982); MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism,
Method and the State: Toward Feminist Jurisprudence, 8 SIGNS 635 (1983).
7. For a general discussion of the problematic nature of the the-
ory/practice label in legal education, see Spiegel, supra note 3. See also D.
SCHON, EDUCATING THE REFLECTIVE PRACTITIONER 3-12 (1987) (exploring the
link between theory and practice in various professions).
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ment's perceptions of the theory-practice relationship are em-
bedded in ethical concerns and have far-reaching ethical
implications." The recognition that the theory-practice rela-
tionship has profound ethical dimensions explains why a
scholar and theologian such as Abraham Heschel, neither a
feminist nor a clinical educator, has insights important to the
feminist and clinical projects.9
The ethical import of the theory-practice relationship also
explains why works of classical literature can contribute to an
understanding of the feminist and clinical enterprises.1 0 Sec-
tion I of this Article begins with the reading of a text, Sopho-
cles' Antigone,n' from the perspective of each of these
8. See infra notes 188-95, 258-84, 317-21, 398-404 and accompanying text.
9. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
10. See C. LARMORE, PAWrrENS OF MORAL CoMPLEXITY 21 (1987) ('The-
ory can carry us only so far in our attempt to grasp the nature of moral judg-
ment. To go further, we must turn above all to the great works of imaginative
literature."). Cora Diamond writes:
It is part of the concept of a human being that an immense amount of
what being human is for us can be present in a look that passes be-
tween two people; it is part of the concept that all that can equally be
denied in a look. Novelists and other writers can put before us and
develop our concept of a human being by giving us scenes of such rec-
ognition or denial of recognition, by showing us, reminding us, that
this is what it is like to recognize another human being, and that this
is what it is like to fail to accord such recognition, to refuse it....
The work of imaginative writers like Tolstoy or Levi illuminates for
us the concept of a human being and at the same time can elaborate
and deepen it .... [G]rasping a concept (even one like that of a
human being...) is not a matter just of knowing how to group things
under that concept; it is being able to participate in life-with-the-con-
cept .... To be able to use the concept "human being" is to be able to
think about human life and what happens in it.
Diamond, Losing Your Concepts, 98 ETmcs 255, 264-66 (1988) (emphasis in
original).
Drucilla Cornell suggests that Diamond's observation is particularly true
for the concept of "woman," due to the untenable position of women in a
world of gender hierarchy. See Cornell, The Doubly-Prized World: Myth, Al-
legory and the Feminine, 75 CORNELL L. REv. 644 (1990). Drawing from a pas-
sage in Emily Bronte's journal - "this world is hopeless without, the world I
doubly prize" - Cornell implores feminists to look to myths and allegories in
developing an "ethical feminism." Id. at 645. In her words
the world "stranger than the facts"... opens us to the possibility of a
new choreography of sexual difference, through an allegorical account
of the Feminine as beyond any of our current stereotypes of Woman.
We also need to prize the Feminine, in and for itself, through the re-
telling of the myths of the Feminine as an imaginative universal.
Both myth and allegory are necessary, indeed unavoidable, in feminist
theory.
Id.
11. SOPHOCLES, Antigone, in THE THEBAN PLAYS 126 (E.F. Watling trans.
1962).
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FEMINISM AND CLINICAL EDUCATION
intellectual movements. Which aspects of this Greek drama
draw a feminist thinker's particular attention? To which as-
pects would a legal clinician pay special notice? The responses
to these questions are obviously different. A feminist's reading
would center on issues of gender; the focus of a clinician's read-
ing is not immediately apparent.
Despite this difference, I have chosen to begin in this fash-
ion in order to test - or more accurately, because I will declare
the outcome of the test, to demonstrate - my claim of method-
ological similarity between the two movements. If the two
have similarity, their approach to a situation in context will
likely reveal it. I have chosen the text of Antigone as the con-
text, in preference to a hypothetical constructed specifically for
my purposes, because of its likely familiarity,12 its rich interpre-
tive landscape, its ethical significance, and its ultimate episte-
mological message which foreshadows the themes of this
Article.'2 I have also chosen it because of the powerful human
conflict it describes. If the methods of feminism and clinical
education are sound - that is, if they have breadth and depth
- they will apply to any human conflict, not just human con-
flicts ordained as legal conflicts. Moreover, if the medium is at
least part of the message, then delving deeply into a particular
context to extract and examine a more general idea is an appro-
priate way to manifest my primary contention: that the two
readings converge in their shared challenge to the popular un-
derstanding of theory and practice as separate undertakings.
Following the readings of Antigone, I explore possible rea-
sons for the methodological relationship between clinical legal
education and feminist jurisprudence. But relationship does
not mean identity. Although each set of methods is compatible,
the movements have worked independently, not collabora-
tively. Accordingly, the sets of methods contain variations, and
each movement uses distinct terminology to describe and jus-
tify its methods. Section II examines more specifically the re-
spective ways that feminist and clinical educators describe and
justify their choice of methods. Section III surveys the similari-
ties and the differences between the methodologies of the two
movements. This leads, in Section IV, to an analysis of the im-
plications for clinical education if it drew more explicitly from
feminist methods, the implications for feminist jurisprudence if
12. One commentator claims that the number of versions of the fre-
quently told story is beyond inventory. G. STEINER, ANTIGONES 199 (1984).
13. See infra notes 69-72 and accompanying text.
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it drew more explicitly from clinical methods, and the implica-
tions for legal education if it drew more explicitly from each.
Section IV concludes with an exploration of how recasting our
understanding of the theory-practice relationship also recasts
our understanding of ethics and ethical inquiry.
All of the methods described in this Article have an ideal-
ized ring. I have done this deliberately, for even if these meth-
ods, when implemented, sometimes diverge from the versions
delineated in my text, these versions accurately describe the
methods as designed and intended. Moreover, the idealized un-
derstandings constitute the ever-present aspirations against
which feminists and clinical educators measure the sometimes
deficient reality. In this sense, the aspirational descriptions
represent the truest single account of these sets of methods
that I could supply.14
My motives in examining the methodological linkages of
feminism and clinical education are, in part, personal. This
writing project has helped me, as someone involved in both
fields, to repair some of the fragmenting of my intellectual en-
ergy and to improve my sense of professional integration.' 5
Perhaps reading this may do so for others, 16 and I encourage
14. See White, Doctrine in a Vacuum: Reflections on What a Law School
Ought (And Ought Not) To Be, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 155, 156 (1986) (explaining
how caricatures of legal education set up common expectations and are there-
fore "real").
15. I was tempted to use Kimberle Crenshaw's language of "intersection-
ality" to describe the integration of the parts of myself devoted to feminism
and clinical education. See Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of
Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine,
Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 CHI. LEGAL F. 139. I have re-
sisted the temptation because I have concluded that use of her language would
constitute an appropriation, in a pejorative sense of the term. Crenshaw has
deployed the word "intersectionality" to describe strategies for culturally rec-
ognizing the inseparability of race and gender in the experience of black wo-
men. The culture's insistence on treating race and gender separately,
including the legal culture's insistence on distinguishing claims of race and
gender discrimination, generates intersectionality problems of a more funda-
mental variety and a far greater magnitude than those created for me by the
cultural separation of feminism and clinical education.
Moreover, my application of Crenshaw's terminology to my dramatically
different situation would imply that what is useful about other people's con-
cepts is how they illuminate our own situations, rather than how they illumi-
nate theirs. This is a dangerous and regressive message, replicating the
myopia that gave rise to the need for new concepts. Not only have I resisted
the temptation to borrow Crenshaw's term, I have also resisted the temptation
to delete this footnote, because these thoughts may be instructive to others
concerned about issues of appropriation.
16. According to Professor Emma Coleman Jordan, 40% of clinical law
1604 [Vol. 75:1599
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these readers to further discussion by altering or elaborating
the ideas proposed here.
I wish to precipitate discussion of how feminism and
clinical education might draw more directly on the strengths of
the other, because I suspect that such cross-fertilization would
enhance the quality and contribution of each. Even more
fondly, I wish to urge law schools to draw more directly on the
strengths of both, for I believe that doing so would invigorate
legal education. Furthermore, I believe that incorporating the
lessons of feminism and clinical education into the law school
curriculum would enrich the study of ethics and would help
bring ethical reflection into the center of lawyers' everyday
activities.
Because feminists and clinical educators recognize the in-
terlacing of theory and practice, they view this Article's open-
ing question - whether law school classes should cultivate
professional skills or advance a broad intellectual agenda - as
an unintelligible inquiry. An explicit recognition of the theory-
practice relationship by all legal educators would shift their fo-
cus to the inquiry that preoccupies clinical and feminist legal
educators: how can legal education more effectively illuminate
the ethical dimensions of daily life and work, and how can it
better inculcate in students a sense of moral responsibility for
professional and personal choices? The pervasiveness of injus-
tice in our world, and the power of lawyers to aggravate or alle-
viate it, makes this an urgent inquiry. I hope this Article
teachers are women. E. Jordan, Appointments, Promotion, and Tenure:
Shadow Tracks and Obstacle Courses 5, materials prepared for The Voices of
Women: A Conference of Women in Legal Education (Apr. 21, 1990) (unpub-
lished conference materials on file with author). Prominent among women
identified at least to some extent with both feminism and clinical legal educa-
tion are Professors Jane Aiken, Katharine Bartlett, Karen Czapanskiy, Mary
Jo Eyster, Naomi Kahn, Lisa Lehrmann, Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Nancy Poli-
koff, Susan Ross, Suellyn Scarnecchia, Elizabeth Schneider, Ann Shalleck,
Louise Trubeck, and Lucie White, although there are many others as well. At
the law schools of Georgetown University and American University respec-
tively, Professors Ross and Shalleck direct clinics that focus on the relation-
ship of women to law.
Louise Trubeck has reminded me of the problem of "serial marginaliza-
tion." Feminists and clinicians in legal education may choose not to work to-
gether, and professors may choose not to be identified with both movements,
in order to avoid being doubly marginalized. Letter from Louise G. Trubeck to
author (Dec. 5, 1991) (on file with author). For a discussion of the similar
problems of marginalization faced by each movement, see supra notes 76-91
and accompanying text. My contention here is that dialogue between both
movements, as well as dual loyalties, would strengthen each voice. Sections
IV. A. and IV. B., respectively, develop these contentions.
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represents a step toward encouraging all legal educators to ac-
knowledge and address this crucial question.
I. READING ANTIGONE
The universe is made of stories, not of atoms.
- Muriel Rukeyser 1 7
Sophocles' Antigone opens in the midst of crisis.' 8 Antig-
one and her older sister Ismene have suffered the loss of their
brothers, Polynices and Eteocles, who have killed one another
while fighting for the throne of Thebes.' 9 Having assumed the
throne, their uncle Creon has issued an edict declaring that
Eteocles, the ruler whom the Theban people had favored,
would be given an honorable state funeral, while Polynices,
who had returned from expulsion to forcibly seize the throne,
would be denied all last rites. 20 The edict forbade anyone to
17. M. RUKEYSER, The Speed of Darkness, in THE COLLECTED POEMS OF
MURIEL RUKEYSER 486 (1978).
18. The events that triggered the crisis have transpired in the two previ-
ous plays: King Oedipus and Oedipus at Colonus. Antigone is the third play
of the trilogy. Antigone and her siblings are the children of Oedipus, King of
Thebes until his banishment.
19. SOPHOCLES, supra note 11, at 126-27; see also Ismene's description of
her brothers' deaths:
And now our brothers, both in a single day
Fallen in an awful exaction of death for death,
Blood for blood, each slain by the other's hand.
Id at 128.
20. Creon justifies his edict in the following fashion:
No man who is his country's enemy
Shall call himself my friend. Of this I am sure -
Our country is our life; only when she
Rides safely, have we any friends at all.
Such is my policy for our common weal.
In pursuance of this, I have made a proclamation
Concerning the sons of Oedipus, as follows:
Eteocles, who fell fighting in defence of the city,
Fighting gallantly, is to be honoured with burial
And with all the rites due to the noble dead.
The other - you know whom I mean - his brother Polynices,
Who came back from exile intending to burn and destroy
His fatherland and the gods of his fatherland,
To drink the blood of his kin, to make them slaves -
He is to have no grave, no burial,
No mourning from anyone; it is forbidden.
He is to be left unburied, left to be eaten
By dogs and vultures, a horror for all to see.
I am determined that never, if I can help it,
Shall evil triumph over good. Alive
Or dead, the faithful servant of his country
Shall be rewarded.
1d. at 131-32. Antigone protests the edict when she reports to Ismene:
1606 [V/ol. 75:1599
1991] FEMINISM AND CLINICAL EDUCATION
bury Polynices on pain of death.21
As the curtain lifts, Antigone is informing Ismene that she
has decided to defy Creon's edict.22 In a previous conversation
in which Antigone had tried in vain to dissuade Polynices from
doing battle,23 Polynices had asked his sisters to bury him when
0 Ismene, what do you think? Our two dear brothers...
Creon has given funeral honours to one,
And not to the other; nothing but shame and ignominy.
Eteocles has been buried, they tell me, in state,
With all honourable observances due to the dead.
But Polynices, just as unhappily fallen - the order
Says he is not to be buried, not to be mourned;
To be left unburied, unwept, a feast of flesh
For keen-eyed carrion birds. The noble Creon!
Id. at 127.
21. In Antigone's words:
It is against you and me [Creon] has made this order.
Yes, against me. And soon he will be here himself
To make it plain to those that have not heard it,
And to enforce it. This is no idle threat;
The punishment for disobedience is death by stoning.
1d.
22. Id. at 126-28.
23. Antigone: 0 Polynices,
Do this one thing for me.
Polynices: What, dear Antigone?
Antigone: Order your army back to Argos; now,
Before it is too late, to save yourself
And our city from destruction.
Polynices: That is impossible.
If I cry off this time, how can I ever
Lead them to battle again?
Antigone: Again? But why?
Why need you fight again? What use is it
To make your home a ruin?
Polynices: Am I to endure
The insult of exile, and the mockery of a younger brother?
Antigone: 0 my brother!
Polynices: Don't weep for me.
Antigone: What can I do but weep,
Seeing you go like this to certain death?
Polynices: If certain, I must meet it.
Antigone: Is there no other?
Polynices: No other way that's right.
Antigone: I cannot bear it!
To lose you!
Polynices: That must be as Fate decides.
Well... May the gods be good to you. God knows
You have deserved it.




he met his death.24 Antigone now declares that her obligation
lies with her dead brother and with the holiest laws of the gods
which impose an obligation to bury one's deceased kin,as not
with the law of the king.26 Frightened by Antigone's defiance,
Ismene insists that because they are only women, they are too
weak to resist men and the state.27 When Ismene refuses to as-
sist Antigone in defying the decree, informing her that she is
"bound to fail, '28 Antigone speaks harshly to her.2 Ismene re-
sponds by assuring Antigone that she loves her.30
24. For the first time since the banishment of Oedipus from Thebes, Poly-
nices visits his father, who is accompanied by Ismene and Antigone, to seek
the patronage of Oedipus for Polynices' assault on Thebes to seize the throne.
I&. at 110-11. Not only does Oedipus refuse to give his blessing to the revolt,
blaming Polynices and Eteocles for allowing his banishment, but he prophesies
both their deaths in the battle. Id at 112-13. Upon hearing the prophecy, Pol-
ynices beseeches his sisters to honor him in his death, just as they have served
their father in his exile:
But 0 my sisters, if all these pitiless curses
Which you have heard, fulfil themselves in act,
And if you ever come again to Thebes,
By all the gods, remember me with kindness.
Give me a grave, and reverent offices.
So to the commendation which you earn
For faithful service here, more may be added
By what you do for me.
Id at 114.
25. See M. NUSSBAUM, THE FRAGILITY OF GOODNESS: LucK AND ETHICS IN
GREEK TRAGEDY AND PHILOSOPHY 55, 66, 437 n.14 (1986) (describing the classi-
cal Greeks' familial and religious obligations to bury the dead, and explaining
that the obligation is altered, though not avoided, when one's kin is a traitor).
26. I will bury my brother;
And if I die for it, what happiness!
Convicted of reverence - I shall be content
To lie beside a brother whom I love.
We have only a little time to please the living,
But all eternity to love the dead.
There I shall lie for ever. Live, if you will;
Live, and defy the holiest laws of heaven.
SOPHOcLES, supra note 11, at 128.
27. 0 think, Antigone; we are women; it is not for us
To fight against men; our rulers are stronger than we,
And we must obey in this, or in worse than this.
May the dead forgive me, I can do no other
But as I am commanded; to do more is madness.
... I cannot act
Against the State. I am not strong enough.
Id-
28. Id at 129.
29. Id ("Oh, I shall hate you if you talk like that!").
30. Id ("Go then, if you are determined, to your folly. But remember that
those who love you... love you still."). As Martha Nussbaum notes, Ismene
appears to be motivated by genuinely felt emotions, Antigone by a deeply held
sense of duty. M. NUSSBAUM, supra note 25, at 64. Antigone's motivation is
1608 [Vol. 75:1599
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This conversation shapes Antigone's central conflict, and
the drama unfolds towards its somber conclusion. Among its
many themes, the play seeks to unravel the complex relation-
ship between law and morality. This philosophical inquiry is
captured in the struggles of its characters. Antigone elevates
her religious responsibility to her deceased brother over her re-
sponsibility to obey the law. Polynices' rejection of Antigone's
pleas that he not go to war has not affected the primacy of her
responsibility to their relationship.3 ' This choice is consistent
with her previous behavior in insisting on the primacy over her
own life of her responsibility to her relationship with her ex-
iled father Oedipus,32 whom she had cared for until his death.33
In contrast stands Creon's insistence until near the play's end
that his duty to consistently apply law and policy outweighed
his familial relationships with Polynices or Antigone.
A. A FEMINIST'S READING
A feminist reader of Antigone might note that, although
only Ismene explicitly evokes gender to support her stance, ty-
ing her refusal to resist the state to her womanhood,35 the gen-
not inconsistent with that of several female respondents in Carol Gilligan's
moral development research. C. GILLIGAN, IN A DIsTERENT VOICE: PSYCHO-
LOGICAL DEVELOPMENT AND MORAL THEORY (1982). These respondents lo-
cated the moral injunction to act not so much in their feelings for others, but
in their awareness of others' need. Id. at 54.
31. See supra note 23.
32. Oedipus blinded himself following the suicide of his wife Jocasta. The
discovery that Oedipus had unwittingly killed his father and married his
mother provoked these acts. SOPHOCLES, King Oedipus, in THE THEBAN
PLAYs 25, 60-61 (E.F. Watling trans. 1962). Antigone, like her brothers and sis-
ter, was both the child of Oedipus and his sibling.
33. Oedipus dies near the end of Oedipus at Colonus. No longer needed to
care for him in exile, Antigone and Ismene return to Thebes. See SOPHOCLES,
supra note 23, at 124.
34. Creon relents only when the blind prophet Teiresias informs him that
his own son Haemon, Antigone's betrothed, would die in return for Creon's re-
fusal to arrange the burial of Polynices and for ordering Antigone to be sealed
in a cave where she would slowly die. SOPHOCLES, supra note 11, at 154-55.
Creon then reverses himself, burying Polynices and ordering Antigone's re-
lease, but his reversal comes too late to avert further tragedy. Id. at 155. An-
tigone has already hung herself in the cave and Haemon, upon finding her
body, has stabbed himself. Id at 159. Creon's wife, Eurydice, also commits su-
icide upon learning of Haemon's death. Id. at 160. Creon blames his "stubborn
will" for causing the deaths of his wife and son. Id.
35. See supra note 27. Although Creon does not tie his stance directly to
his gender, he does express gender-conscious views. For example:
Therefore, I hold to the law,
And will never betray it - least of all for a woman.
1609
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ders of the other characters are more than incidental features.
In staking out their positions, Antigone and Creon are evoca-
tive of Amy and Jake, the eleven-year-old representatives of
the two distinct modes of moral reasoning explored by Carol
Gilligan in In a Different Voice:36 a morality based on respon-
sibility and care in relationships versus a morality based on a
logical hierarchy of rights and principles.37 Through Amy and
Jake, Gilligan sought to demonstrate that in a world where
males and females are socialized differently, and arrive at
adulthood with different interpersonal orientations and a dif-
ferent set of social experiences, gender can influence the pro-
cess of moral reasoning.38
Gilligan sees different partial truths in these different
moral ideologies and recognizes a need for dialogue between
them.39 Antigone supports Gilligan's view by revealing the dis-
astrous folly of both Creon's and Antigone's rigid morality, dis-
played in their mutual refusal to consider the merits of each
other's position.40 At the same time, however, the play chal-
Better be beaten, if need be, by a man,
Than let a woman get the better of us.
SOPHOCLES, supra note 11, at 144.
36. See C. GILLIGAN, supra note 30.
37. Id. at ch. 2. The citation to Gilligan's work brings with it a virtually
obligatory footnote to the feminist criticisms of her work, which, by now, are
legion. These criticisms focus primarily on Gilligan's inattentiveness to catego-
ries of race and class, and her disregard of the historical, social, and political
context of the development and use of the ethic of care. See generally Kerber,
Greeno & Maccoby, Luria, Stack & Gilligan, On In A Different Voice: An In-
terdisciplinary Forum, 11 SIGNS 304 (1986) (a "cross-disciplinary dialogue" on
Gilligan's work); Nails, Social-Scientific Sexism: Gilligan's Mismeasure of
Man, 50 Soc. RES. 643 (1983) (criticizing Gilligan for her generalizations and
suggesting that such generalizations may very likely be used as evidence that
women are inferior); Walker, In a Diffident Voice: Cryptoseparatist Analysis
of Female Moral Development, 50 Soc. RES. 665 (1983) (arguing that accepting
Gilligan's conclusions will lead to the continued oppression of women).
Despite these criticisms, the analogy to Amy and Jake as representatives
of two distinct modes of moral reasoning is too apt for my purposes to ignore.
Antigone and Creon certainly represented two distinct modes of moral reason-
ing. Antigone, like Amy, focused on her obligations in relationships, and
Creon, like Jake, on abstract moral principles.
38. C. GILLIGAN, supra note 30, at 11. Although Gilligan says that the as-
sociation of different voices with gender is not absolute, id. at 2, she speaks
throughout the book as if the alternative voice she describes was, indeed, a wo-
man's voice. See Broughton, Women's Rationality and Men's Virtues: A C-i-
tique of Gender Dualism in Gilligan's Theory of Moral Development, 50 Soc.
RES. 597, 600-03 (1983).
39. See C. GILLIGAN, supra note 30, at 165, 167.
40. Nussbaum joins in this interpretation of Antigone. See M. NUSSBAUM,
supra note 25, at 65-66. Such an interpretation dovetails with the view of trag-
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lenges the possibility of transforming moral discourse by in-
cluding both voices when the power to declare truth is so
unevenly distributed. Because Creon commanded the force of
law, his truth could officially annihilate Antigone's truth, cast-
ing it as deviant and dangerous.4 1 If not for the depths of trag-
edy that befell his family, Creon was unlikely to have
recognized the partiality of his view.42 Antigone, then, under-
scores the reasons that feminists value double vision: they ac-
knowledge the need for genuine dialogue across differences
while remaining sharply cognizant of the societal structures
that impede its accomplishment. 43
A feminist reader might also note that although, as a wo-
man, Antigone was an outsider to the political machinations of
her male relatives,44 the course of her life was determined by
her male relatives, particularly by their moral choices. In King
edy as a refusal of the mutual acknowledgment that humans must have to
thrive. See S. CAvEI4 The Avoidance of Love: A Reading of King Lear, in
MUST WE MEAN WHAT WE SAY? 267 (1976), cited in Minow, The Supreme
Court, 1986 Term - Foreword: Justice Engendered, 101 HARV. L. REV. 10
(1987); see also Cornell, The Poststructuralist Challenge to the Ideal of Commu-
nity, 8 CARDOzO L. REV. 989, 1018 (1987) ('"The danger of certainty is that it
turns against the generous impulse to open oneself up to the other, and to
truly listen, to risk the chance that we might be wrong.").
41. As Catharine MacKinnon has stated: "Power is socially constructed
such that if Jake simply chooses not to listen to Amy, he wins; but if Amy sim-
ply chooses not to listen to Jake, she loses. In other words, Jake still wins be-
cause that is the system." MacKinnon, Feminist Discourse, Moral Values and
the Law - A Conversation, 34 BUFFALO L. REV. 11, 74 (1985). Likewise, Vir-
ginia Woolf has observed that while the values of men and women differ, "it is
the masculine values that prevail." V. WOOLF, A ROOM OF ONE'S OWN 77
(1963); see also K. FERGUSON, THE FEMINIST CASE AGAINST BUREAUCRACY 169-
70 (1984) (criticizing Gilligan's failure to discuss the extent to which the inclu-
sion of both voices depends on political struggle).
MacKinnon's critique is even sharper. She resists calling the alternative
voice a woman's voice because "his foot is on her throat." MacKinnon, supra,
at 74-75. The alternative voice is the voice of the powerless under conditions
of inequality, MacKinnon believes, and we do not know how a woman would
speak under conditions of equality. Id; see also C. MACKINNON, TOWARD A
FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 51, 52 (1989) (elaborating this contention).
42. For a description of how crisis can precipitate developmental growth,
see generally R. COLES, CHILDREN OF CRISIS (1964).
43. For a discussion of related observations focused more specifically on
minorities, see Matsuda, When the First Quail Calls: Multiple Consciousness
as Jurisprudential Method, 11 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 7 (1989).
44. The cultural views of Antigone's male relatives, Creon's in particular,
helped to keep Antigone and Ismene as outsiders to politics by defining their
appropriate place as inside the home. In Creon's words:
Take them, and keep them within -
The proper place for women.
SOPHOCLES, supra note 11, at 142.
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Oedipus,45 the first play of the Sophocles trilogy, Antigone's
fate is set in motion by Oedipus' violence - his slaying of a
man after a quarrel,4 and his self-mutilation, resulting in
blindness, on the discovery of his father's and mother's true
identity (his father the man he had slain, his mother the
mother of his children)4 7 - Creon's banishment of Oedipus for
his unintended offenses of incest and patricide,48 and Antig-
one's brothers' approval of their father's banishment stirred by
their desire for the throne.49 These acts lead Antigone to sacri-
fice her own needs and desires5° to care for her father as he
wanders in exile,5 1 shunned by all who learn his identity.5 2
Later, her brothers' violence against one another 3 provokes
Creon's edict against Polynices' burial" which, in turn, leads to
her disobedience of the edict, 5 and inevitably to Creon's vio-
lence when he orders her death as the price of her
disobedience.-
Lacking the political or social power exercised at various
times by the men in her family, but directly affected by the
manner in which they exercised their power, Antigone's expe-
rience of the state was undoubtedly different from that of her
father, uncle, and brothers.5 7 Although she chose her course of
45. SOPHOCLES, supra note 32.
46. Id at 48.
47. Id. at 60-61.
48. Id at 68.
49. SOPHOCLES, supra note 23, at 112-13.
50. Gilligan examines conventions of female self-abnegation and self-sac-
rifice as part of the ethic of care for others. C. GILLIGAN, supra note 30, ch. 3.
In Gilligan's view, self-development requires considering one's own needs as
part of moral deliberation, not just the needs of others. Id at 85, 122, 129, 149.
51. SOPHOCLEs, supra note 23, at 71-75.
52. Id at 78.
53. SOPHOCLES, supra note 11, at 124-27.
54. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
55. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
56. SOPHOCLES, supra note 11, at 147. Unfortunately, variations of the
plot of Antigone are still being reenacted. For example, in Ramirez Rivas v.
INS, 899 F.2d 864 (9th Cir. 1990), the court found that a Salvadoran woman
seeking asylum in the United States had a well-founded fear of death despite
her absence of political involvement because she had, among other things, vis-
ited her male relatives, who were guerillas, in prison. An expert testified that
Salvadoran security forces, or "death squads," maintain prison visitation lists.
Id at 866. I am grateful to Deborah Anker for calling my attention to this
case.
57. See Elshtain, Antigone's Daughters, in FREEDOM, FEMINISM AND THE
STATE 61 (W. McElroy ed. 1982), stating that:
The question of female identity and the state looks very different
if one picks up the thread of woman's relationship to public power
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action pre-reflectively, had she elaborated the moral reasoning
process by which she confronted her perceived legal, filial, and
religious responsibilities, 58 she might have asked herself a ver-
sion of the questions Catharine MacKinnon asks in her recent
book, Toward A Feminist Theory of the State:
What is state power? Where, socially, does it come from? How do
women [in my situation and in other situations] encounter it? What is
the law for women [in my situation and in others]? How does law
work to legitimate the state, [privileged] male power, itself? Can it do
anything for women [in my situation and in others]? Can it do any-
thing about... [the] status [of women in my situation and in others]?
Does how the law is used matter?
59
from the standpoint of an Antigone; if one adopts the sanctioned
viewpoint of the handful of thinkers whose works comprise the canon
of the Western political tradition; or if one tells the tale through the
prism of unchecked realpolitik, from astride the horse of the warrior,
or from the throne of the ruler.
1d. at 70 (emphasis in original). Elshtain suggests that women adopt "social
feminism," the standpoint of Antigone, viewing the concrete and particular
world of everyday reality from their traditional social location rather than
adopting the impersonal, abstract, bureaucratic standards that constitute the
"ways of acting of the powerful." Id, at 67-68. Her prescription is for a way of
acting in the world that challenges the authority of the state to override
deeply rooted human values such as family, loyalty, and community, id, at 69,
serving as a reminder, like Antigone, of the real human impact of public poli-
cies, id. at 75. David Barnhizer might call this social location one of "speaking
truth to power." See Barnhizer, The University Ideal and the American Law
School, 42 RUTGERS L. REV. 109, 113 (1989).
Other writers from groups who lack political and social power have de-
scribed the influence of their societal position on their perceptions and exper-
iences of state power. See, e.g., Davis, Law as Microaggression, 98 YALE L.J.
1559 (1989) (explaining the source and strength of the conviction on the part of
many African-Americans that courts and other social institutions are biased
and unfair).
58. According to Nussbaum, Antigone held so rigidly to an overly simpli-
fied set of views that she was unlikely to engage in reflective moral reasoning.
M. NUSSBAUM, supra note 25, at 63. For example, Nussbaum views Antigone's
refusal to see any moral distinction between the brother who died protecting
Thebes and the brother who died attacking it as a decision not to take seri-
ously the values of others in considering her own perspective. Id. at 63-64.
Elshtain, on the other hand, seems to interpret Antigone's reflective char-
acter more generously when she holds Antigone up as a model. She views An-
tigone as the guardian of deeply significant values against the arrogance of
power. See Elshtain, supra note 57, at 70-71. If one views Antigone as a meta-
phor for defending one's unassailable bedrock commitments rather than as a
character who rigidly refuses to examine her commitments, then Elshtain's
proposition becomes more appealing.
59. C. MAcKiNNON, supra note 41, at 159. I have modified MacKinnon's
questions because her phrasing implies that all women are similarly situated
with respect to the social power of the state. This is false because many wo-
men also experience inequality due to their race, class, sexual orientation, or
bodily condition, changing the forms of the inequality that they experience on
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Thinkers addressing questions such as these are developing a
feminist theory of the state that "comprehend[s] how law
works as a form of state power in a social context in which
power is gendered."6 0
Antigone, or any number of other lived or vicariously lived
situations, readily provide the impetus for such a theoretical
project. Feminist theorizing begins with the concrete exper-
iences of particular women, such as Antigone, whose situations
crystallize the relationship of their needs and interests as they
view them to state authority as they encounter it. These exper-
iences are then questioned, probed, examined, explored, and
analyzed, a process that produces tentative theoretical concep-
tions. Once formulated, these theories are continually held up
to the light of new experiences for evaluation, refinement,
modification, and development.6 1 In short, feminist thinkers
view concrete situations as containing strong theoretical poten-
tialities. Theory then circles back to guide future behavioral
choices which, in turn, test and reshape theory. This method of
analysis is an essential feature of feminism.62
Elaborating a comprehensive feminist analysis of Antigone
is a project far larger than intended or necessary here.63
Rather, my intention is simply to illuminate aspects of Antig-
one to which a feminist reader might specially attend and de-
scribe how she might attend to them. I have done so for
purposes of comparison with the reading that follows.
the basis of gender. For a critique of MacKinnon's implicit and explicit claims
as to the unitary position of all women, see Harris, Race and Essentialism in
Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581 (1990).
Antigone is not well-positioned, unless she seeks out stories of and infor-
mation about a diverse group of women, to help in the development of multi-
ple theories that express the vantage points on state power of women situated
in different socializing categories. MacKinnon's questions, however, are useful
to Antigone when they are particularized to account for women's
heterogeneity.
60. See C. MACKINNON, supra note 41, at 159; see also idL at 114 ("If the
sexes are unequal, and perspective participates in situation, there is no un-
gendered reality or ungendered perspective.").
61. For a contextual description of how this process works, see Schneider,
The Dialectics of Rights and Politics: Perspectives From the Women's Move-
ment, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 589 (1986).
62. For an elaboration of feminist methods, see infra Section II. A.
63. Of the many interpretations of Antigone, one that examines gender
roles is C. SEGAL, TRAGEDY AND CIVILIZATION: AN INTERPRETATION OF SOPHO-
CLES (1981). See also Elshtain, supra note 57. A comprehensive feminist anal-
ysis of Antigone would also examine the effect of Sophocles' gender identity
on his depiction of characters and events in the play.
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B. A CLINICIAN'S READING
Examining whether a clinical educator would bring any
special perspective to a reading of Antigone is an effort less ob-
vious than the above. Legal clinicians, having drawn in the past
on a variety of theoretical foundations for their work,6 are
likely to have a more diffused focus than feminist readers fo-
cused on gender. Nevertheless, clinicians might find in Antig-
one a justification of clinical methods. They might compare the
possibilities for insight immanent in study and deliberation
alone with the possibilities for insight immanent in Antigone's
situation.
Some teachers are drawn to clinical settings due to a
deeply-held belief that experiencing a conflict between one's
personal morality and a prescription of law or law practice pro-
vides a bone-deep entryway into exploring the relationship be-
tween law and morality, or constructing a theory of state power
and how it operates. 65 Confronting such a situation, clinicians
believe, brings the values at stake and the potential conse-
quences of various courses of action into sharp relief. Thus, a
person facing an actual conflict is more likely to notice and con-
template the breadth and depth of the concrete consequences
that may flow from the situation. Experience strengthens the
motivation for inquiry, enlivens the critical issues, and provides
a sound basis for examination and analysis.66 Theory forged in
experience is likely to be thick and rich, and to relate directly
to the important features of that experience. In other words,
clinical education is rooted in the notion that theory formed
through a clinical process is more likely to be useful and more
likely to be right.67
The stories underlying the cases that find their way into
law school clinics may resemble Greek tragedies: their charac-
ters confronting trying circumstances and behaving wisely or
64. For a typology of lawyering theories, drawn from sociology, psychol-
ogy, anthropology and philosophy, that clinical educators have developed and
applied, see Menkel-Meadow, The Legacy of Clinical Education: Theories
about Lawyering, 29 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 555 (1980).
65. See, e.g., Condlin, "Tastes Grea4 Less Filling" The Law School Clinic
and Political Critique, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 45, 66-67 (1986).
66. See, e.g., Bellow, On Teaching the Teachers: Some Preliminary Reflec-
tions on Clinical Education as Methodology, in CLINICAL EDUCATION FOR THE
LAw STUDENT 374, 383-84 (1973).
67. See, e.g., M. NUSSBAUM, supra note 25, at 69 ("[C]orrect choice (or good
interpretation) is, first and foremost, a matter of keenness and flexibility of
perception, rather than of conformity to a set of simplifying principles.").
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foolishly, nobly or ignobly. The complexity, richness, and tex-
ture of these cases do not easily lend themselves to simply
stated understandings or moral summaries. Clinic students, as
well as clients, may find themselves standing in Antigone's po-
sition, experiencing distaste, perhaps even a powerful visceral
resistance, toward the prescribed form or custom of law prac-
tice. They may also find themselves standing in Creon's posi-
tion, uncritically accepting the practices of law without
attention to consequences. Alternatively, they may feel, like Is-
mene, a deep ambivalence about their personal and civic re-
sponsibilities. The value of clinical methods depends on using
Antigone's, Creon's, Ismene's, and others' standpoints as start-
ing points for inquiry.
A clinician might observe that Antigone's starting point
was all too literally her ending point as well. Antigone had
neither the inclination nor the opportunity to examine her ex-
perience, both internal and external, to consider the full range
of alternative courses of action available, to assess carefully the
competing perspectives implicated in her situation, and then to
elaborate the principles that would guide her. On the other
hand, Creon's simple starting theories are dramatically altered
by the play's end. Reflection on his tragic experiences leads
Creon to reconsider the principles of living that he once firmly
held and to recognize a "more complicated deliberative
world."68 This interaction between theory and experience, ena-
bled by conscientious reflective practices, is the epistemological
model that animates clinical education.
Ultimately the play Antigone supports such an epistemol-
ogy. Had Antigone adopted such a model, or had Creon
adopted it sooner, perhaps tragedy could have been averted. As
Martha Nussbaum observes, the play is "unusually full of
words for deliberation, reasoning, knowledge and vision, '69
equating flexibility with good deliberation,7 0 and concluding
68. See id at 60. Nussbaum states that Creon is "determined to conceal
from deliberative view the claims of both familial and affective ties, at least
insofar as they clash with civic interest." Id at 57. He makes "all values com-
mensurable in terms of a single coin." I& at 58. Ultimately, his "love for his
dead son, a love that can no longer be either denied or accommodated within
the framework of the civic theory of the good, forces him to reject this the-
ory." Id at 62. Creon regrets that the narrowness of his deliberations "left
things of genuine worth on the outside." Id
69. See id. at 51.
70. As Haemon urges his father:
Let not your first thought be your only thought.
Think if there cannot be some other way.
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with the assertion that wisdom is the most important compo-
nent of happiness. 71 Creon learns a hard-won lesson about
"changing one's vision of the world, about losing one's grip on
what looked like secure truth and learning a more elusive kind
of wisdom." 72 Antigone, then, subtly advocates a process of
continuous attention to, and reflection on, the particularities of
a situation as the route to the interpretations and reinterpreta-
tions that are the source of wisdom. This theme embodies a
clinical perspective on the role of concrete experiences and
practices in the process of making and remaking theory.
C. WHY THE READINGS CONVERGE
Despite differences in content, both the feminist and
clinical readings adopt a similar approach to the theoretical en-
terprise. Both feminist theorists and clinical educators see ex-
periences like Antigone's and Creon's as containing, among
other things, powerful theoretical possibilities. Both move-
ments also see theory as containing powerful practical possibili-
ties for informing future behavior and experience. This
ongoing feedback relationship suggests that what has appeared
dichotomous is actually dialectic. The theory-practice split is
really a theory-practice spiral.
Clearly, clinical education and feminist theory demonstrate
not the inherent separation between theory and practice, but
the eternal interplay of good theory and good practice. In fact,
clinicians and feminists share concerns about the soundness of
theory uninformed by, and untested in, the bright light of the
real-world, as well as the soundness of practice unshaped by,
and unattached to, the firm roots of consciously-developed
theory.73
Surely, to think your own the only wisdom,
And yours the only word, the only will,
Betrays a shallow spirit, an empty heart.
It is no weakness for the wisest man
To learn when he is wrong, know when to yield.
So, on the margin of a flooded river
Trees bending to the torrent live unbroken,
While those that strain against it are snapped off.
SoPHocLEs, supra note 11, at 145.




72. M. NussBAUM, supra note 25, at 52.
73. See supra text accompanying notes 61-62, 66-67. Robert Coles explains
that the word "theory" derives from the Greek root theamai, meaning "I be-
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Is the feminist theorists' and the clinical educators' shared
stance toward the theory-practice relationship simply a matter
of happenstance? Does their similarity flow from a scenario in
which two movements following distinctly different courses ac-
cidentally cross paths on their way to scattered destinations?
Surely, accident is a more likely explanation than appropria-
tion.74 Appropriation requires conscious borrowing. Given the
dearth of literature applying feminist theory to clinical educa-
tion, or vice versa, such a deliberate exchange appears rela-
tively implausible as an explanation.75
I would locate the source of the similarity somewhere be-
tween conscious appropriation and casual accident. Although I
have not detected sufficient prior borrowing by either move-
ment from the other to frame a shared approach to the theory-
practice spiral,76 I have found sufficient similarity in the histor-
ical status of clinical education and the historical status of wo-
men to account for their independent arrivals at the same view
of the theory-practice relationship. Stated simply, the status of
clinical education in law schools is not unlike the status of wo-
men in society. Although many perceive both as making a spe-
cial and essential contribution to the collective enterprise, each
hold." He asserts that this derivation expresses a view of theory as "an en-
largement of observation." R. COLFS, THE CALL OF STORIES 20 (1989).
74. Edward Said describes the manner in which ideas "travel":
Like people and schools of criticism, ideas and theories travel - from
person to person, from situation to situation, from one period to an-
other. Cultural and intellectual life are usually nourished and often
sustained by this circulation of ideas, and whether it takes the form of
acknowledged or unconscious influence, creative borrowing, or whole-
sale appropriation, the movement of ideas and theories from one place
to another is both a fact of life and a usefully enabling condition of
intellectual activity.
E. SAID, Traveling Theory, in THE WORLD, THE TEXT, AND THE CRrTc 226
(1983).
75. I have located one article that centers an analysis of the marginality of
clinical education on its association with the characteristics of women.
Tushnet, Scenes from the Metropolitan Underground: A Critical Perspective
on the Status of Clinical Education, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 272 (1984).
Although some authors have noted the relationship between feminism and
clinical education, see, e.g., Menkel-Meadow, Durkheimian Epiphanies and the
Importance of Engaged Social Science in Legal Studies, 18 FLA. ST. U.L. REV.
91, 106-08 (1990) [hereinafter Menkel-Meadow, Durkheimian Epiphanies], or
discussed the impact of women on the legal profession, see, e.g., Menkel-
Meadow, The Comparative Sociology of Women Lawyers: The "Feminization"
of the Legal Profession, 24 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 897 (1986), I have uncovered no
other article focusing specifically and principally on the relationship of femi-
nist theory to clinical legal education.
76. See supra note 75.
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operates largely outside the main arena. Viewed from the main
arena, both women 77  and law school clinics 78  constitute
outsiders.
Of course, the term "outside" can be understood only in a
relative, not an absolute sense, acquiring its meaning only in
contrast to a concept of "inside. '79 A comprehensible definition
of the "periphery" is entirely interdependent on a shared un-
derstanding of the "core." 80 The insight that these concepts are
77. See, eg., West, Jurispudence and Gender, 55 U. Cm. L. REv. 1, 3-4
(1988) (arguing that leading jurisprudential theorists define "human being" in
a way that excludes much of women's experience, and therefore, women
themselves); see also C. GILLIGAN, supra note 30, ch. 1 (explaining how women
fall outside the developmental accounts of leading thinkers such as Freud,
Piaget, Erickson, and Kohlberg); Minow, supra note 40, at 61 & n.241 (describ-
ing the work of feminists in law, political theory, science, social science, and
other fields in exposing the unstated assumptions that take men as the refer-
ence point and see women as "'other,' 'different,' 'deviant,' 'exceptional,' or
'baffling' "); Scales, Surviving Legal De-Education: An Outsider's Guide, 15
VT. L. REV. 139 (1990) (describing the particular challenges of law school for
those who are not white men).
Of course, women are not the only outsiders. People of color, for exam-
ple, have written eloquently of their exclusion from society and social theory.
See, e.g., Delgado, The Imperial Scholar: Reflections on a Review of Civil
Rights Literature, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 561 (1984) (examining the exclusion of
non-whites from prestigious civil rights scholarship); Homer & Schwartz, Ad-
mitted But Not Accepted: Outsiders Take an Inside Look at Law School, 5
BERKELEY WOMEN's L.J. 1 (1990) (describing the impact on outsiders in law
school of the absence of diversity); Matsuda, Affirmative Action and Legal
Knowledge: Planting Seeds in Plowed-Up Ground, 11 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 1
n.2 (1988) (defining "outsiders" as those who are not white males and who are
historically underrepresented in institutions like law schools); Matsuda, Public
Response to Racist Speech. Considering the Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L. REV.
2320, 2323 (1989) [hereinafter Matsuda, Victim's Story] (describing the "out-
sider jurisprudence" of women and people of color).
78. See, e.g., Cribbet, President's Message, AALS NEwSL., Feb. 1979,
quoted in Spiegel, supra note 3, at 577 n.2 ("I am not opposed to limited
clinical programs... but I do believe these programs are an important side
show - the main action is in another tent."). My experience of the curricula
of several law schools is that the curricular structure supports Cribbet's view
of the peripheral nature of clinical education and the centrality of traditional
class room education. See also Kennedy, Legal Education as Training for Hi-
erarchy, in THE POLrIcs OF LAw 40 (D. Kairys ed. 1982) (describing the ideo-
logical content of the structure of the law school curriculum).
79. See generally K. ERIKsON, WAYWARD PuRTANs (1966) (examining
how people, exemplified by the Puritans, used the concept of outside - devi-
ance - to shape the identity and boundaries of the inside - the community);
see also Minow, supra note 40, at 13, 32-33 (explaining that differences are
meaningful only as comparisons).
80. Supra note 79; see also Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and
Others: A Plea for Narrative, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2411 (1989) (describing "out-




inextricably intertwined has led many commentators to link
the construction of outsider status in contemporary culture to
the structuralist tendency in Western thought to view the
world in bipolar categories: e.g., masculine/feminine, white
skin/black skin, reason/emotion, culture/nature, mind/body,
objective/subjective, public/private, substance/procedure, the-
ory/practice.8 ' The categories are oppositional and hierarchical,
such that the first term of the pair is not only different from,
but superior to, the second.8 2 Hence, the first term becomes
dominant and the second term subordinate. If this analysis of
Western cultural thought processes is correct, we delineate the
boundaries of our valued concepts by developing lower-status
oppositional concepts that lie outside the boundary, and then
attaching a cluster of associations to each oppositional term as a
way of simplifying our understanding of a reality that is much
more shifting, porous, and complex.
Professor Tushnet has explored the way in which the bi-
nary structure of Western thinking links the status of law
school clinics with current forms of gender hierarchy.8 3 The
legal work of a clinic arises from real people with all of their
unpredictability, from the confusion of the unstructured exper-
81. See, e.g., Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARv. L. REV. 1057
(1980); Olsen, Feminism and Critical Legal Theory: An American Perspective,
18 INT'L J. SOCIoLoGY L. 199 (1990); cf Balkin, The Crystalline Structure of
Legal Thought, 39 RUTGERS L. REv. 1 (1987) (arguing that legal and moral
thought are bipolar, but not irrational).
82. Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment. Transformation and Le-
gitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1373 n.155
(1988) ("Otherness is a corollary to the bipolar conceptualizations that charac-
terize structuralist analysis of Western thought."); Olsen, supra note 81, at 200
("[O]ne side of the dualism dominates and defines the other."). Legal theorists
have drawn these insights primarily from the work of philosopher Jacques
Derrida:
Western thought... has always been structured in terms of dichoto-
mies or polarities .... These polar opposites do not, however, stand as
independent and equal entities. The second term in each pair is con-
sidered the negative, corrupt, undesirable version of the first .... In
other words, the two terms are not simply opposed in their meanings,
but are arranged in a hierarchical order which gives the first term
priority ....
J. DERRIDA, DISSEMINATION viii, 1373 (B. Johnson trans. 1981) (emphasis in
original); see also Eisenstein, Introduction, in THE FUTURE OF DIFFERENCE
xvii, xxiii (H. Eisenstein & A. Jardine eds. 1980) ("Feminist analysis had re-
vealed that the traditional celebration of women's 'difference' from men con-
cealed a conviction of women's inferiority .... The defining of difference has
traditionally been linked to the exercise of power, to those who have been in a
position to say who is 'different,' and should therefore be subordinate.").
83. Tushnet, supra note 75.
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iences of real life, and from the particular problems of impover-
ished client populations - all of which generate strong
emotions. According to Professor Tushnet, these characteris-
tics - taking care of needy people in an unstructured setting
that evokes powerful feelings - are associated with femaleness
in our culture.84 Stated another way, these features, like
femaleness, occupy the less powerful half of all of the antino-
mies in which they occur: rational/irrational, predict-
able/unpredictable, rich/poor, and reason/emotion. 5  By
contrast, the traditional law school classroom concerns, at least
in caricature, abstract or hypothetical parties (most of whom
are not constructed as impoverished), highly structured learn-
ing situations, and analytical reasoning. These features dwell in
the dominant half of their respective antinomies.8 6 Thus, the
traditional law school classroom, like maleness, constitutes the
norm, and the clinic, 7 like femaleness,8 8 the deviation.
As feminists and other thinkers have demonstrated, what
one sees often depends on where one stands.8 9 Given this in-
84. Id at 274.
85. Fran Olsen would state it differently. She would say that our culture
"sexualizes" all of the antinomies, identifying men with the first side of each,
and projecting the other side onto women. Olsen, supra note 81, at 199.
86. Tushnet, supra note 75, at 275. As Tushnet indicates, these characteri-
zations are overdrawn and false.
87. These structuralist observations may help explain why, as Mark Spie-
gel has observed, the historical shift in justifying the use of the case method in
the traditional law school classroom from discovering legal principles to learn-
ing legal analysis could have been, but was not, perceived as a shift from the-
ory to practice. Spiegel, supra note 3, at 583. That this did not happen may
offer some confirmation of insights concerning the hierarchizing of the binary
categories of our culturally-embedded thought structure. To have seen the
case method as "practice" would have diminished its importance relative to
"theory," its oppositional superior. The case method had to retain its theoreti-
cal label to maintain its stature. The relationship between power and knowl-
edge, between politics and perceptions, required that the dominant approach
to legal pedagogy remain in the dominant category of dualistic thought. Like-
wise, because clinical education is not the dominant approach to legal
pedagogy, it would be incongruous, even psychologically dissonant, to perceive
it in the dominant category of "theory." The coherence of our tacit cognitive
systems compels a view of clinical education as "practice."
88. See D. McCLELLAND, PowER: THE INNER EXPERIENCE 81 (1975) (as-
serting that psychologists "have tended to regard male behavior as the 'norm'
and female behavior as some kind of deviation from that norm"); Minow,
supra note 40, at 35-36 (asserting that "a difference 'discovered' is more aptly a
statement of a relationship, expressing one person's deviation from an un-
stated norm assumed by the other").
89. MacKinnon articulates this insight as follows: "Mind and world, as a
matter of social reality, are taken as interpenetrated. Knowledge is neither a
copy nor a miscopy of reality, neither representative nor misrepresentative as
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sight, Professor Tushnet's observations help to explain how the
location of the characteristics of law school clinics, along with
femaleness, in the less powerful half of the dichotomies in
which they are often found, produces a parallel perspective on
the methodological issues that each confronts. In a significant
way, feminist thinkers and clinicians share a similar "stand-
point" with respect to their oppositional counterpartse ° As a
the scientific model would have it, but a response to living in it." C. MACKIN-
NON, supra note 41, at 98; see also Haraway, Situated Knowledges: The Science
Question in Feminism and the Privilege of Partial Perspective, 14 FEMINIST
STUD. 575 (1988). That things look different when viewed from different loca-
tions is a simple understanding of the term "perspective." For a definition of
"perspective," see WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1687
(1986) ("a picture or figure that looks distorted except when viewed from
some particular point"). Social theorists have long accepted that differently
situated people view the world differently. See, e.g., P. BERGER & T.
LUCKMANN, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF REALrrY (1966); A. SCHUTz & T.
LUCKMANN, THE STRUCTURES OF THE LIFE-WORLD (1973); see also W. JAMES,
On a Certain Blindness in Human Beings, in ON SOME OF LIFE'S IDEA S 46
(1912), quoted in Minow, supra note 40, at 49 ("[E]ach observer gains a partial
superiority of insight from the peculiar position in which he stands.").
Feminists have often claimed a distinctive perspective on law, theory, and
social life based on experiences tied to the social location of some women. See,
e.g., C. GILLIGAN, supra note 30; W. LEACH, TRUE LOvE AND PERFECT UNION:
THE FEMINIST REFoRM OF SEx AND SOCIETY (1980); Karst, Woman's Constitu-
tion, 1984 DUKE L.J. 447, 480; Menkel-Meadow, Portia in a Different Voice:
Speculations on a Woman's Lawyering Process, 1 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 39
(1985).
Many other writers have described their perspectives as shaped by the ex-
periences of their particular social location. See B. HOOKS, FEMINIST THEORY:
FROM MARGIN TO CENTER ix (1984) (arguing that life on the margins creates a
particular way of seeing reality, looking both "from the outside in and from
the inside out"); W. DUBOIS, SOULS OF BLACK FOLK 3 (1903) (describing the
double consciousness of American blacks who must look at themselves as
others look at them); HOME GIRLS: A BLACK FEMINIsT ANTHOLOGY (B. Smith
ed. 1983) (describing black feminist perspectives); WITH WINGS: AN ANTHOL-
OGY OF LITERATURE BY AND ABOUT WOMEN WITH DISABILITIES (M. Saxton & F.
Howe eds. 1987) [hereinafter WITH WINGS] (writings of the special experiences
and perspectives of physically disabled women); Collins, Learning from the
Outsider Within: The Sociological Significance of Blaclc Feminist Thought, 33
SOC. PROBS. 514 (1986) (arguing that the "outsider within" status of black fe-
male intellectuals reflects a special standpoint that uses marginality cre-
atively); Matsuda, supra note 43 (suggesting that the multiple consciousness of
minorities provides a unique way of seeing that can be applied creatively to ju-
risprudence); Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Rep-
arations, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323 (1987) (arguing that the perspectives
of minorities provide special normative insights); cf. Kennedy, Racial Critiques
of Legal Academia, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1745 (1989) (contesting the racial dis-
tinctiveness of minority perspectives).
90. See, e.g., S. HARDING, THE SCIENCE QUESTION IN FEMINISM 136-62
(1986); Hartsock, The Feminist Standpoint. Developing the Ground for a Spe-
cifwally Feminist Historical Materialism, in DISCOVERING REALITY: FEMINIST
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result, each deployed similar methods in developing their re-
spective alternatives to traditional legal education. These
methods, designed to nourish critical insights, are especially
suited to the outsider's viewpoint.91
One response to finding oneself relegated to the less pow-
erful half of a dichotomy is to challenge the structural ten-
dency in our culturally-embedded thought processes to
privilege one side of each dichotomy relative to the other. Fem-
inists and clinical educators have independently fashioned simi-
lar methods of critiquing this tendency. For example, each has
sought to elevate notions of the practical, the concrete, and the
experiential, such that one cannot easily disdain them as unin-
formed interlopers in the academy.92 Another related strategy
is to show the undesirable aspects of viewing the dominant cat-
egories such as "theory" or "masculinity" as operating in isola-
tion from, and independent of, their respective oppositional
terms. One manner of accomplishing this "status adjustment"
is to reconstruct the subordinate category - such as "practical"
or "feminine" - to include many of the characteristics encom-
passed by the dominant category.93 Such a process would oper-
ate in the reverse direction as well.
Feminists have most frequently directed this style of cri-
tique at the masculine/feminine dichotomy and clinicians have
directed it at the intellectual/practical dichotomy. Nothing,
however, prevents its employment toward an understanding of
other categorical systems. Although feminist theory provides a
PERSPECTIVES ON EPISTEMOLOGY, METAPHYSICS, METHODOLOGY, AND PHILOSO-
PHY OF SCIENCE 283 (1983).
Feminist standpoint epistemologies have been criticized for their exclu-
sions. See B. HOOKS, AIN'T I A WOMAN: BLACK WOMEN AND FEMINISM 194-95
(1981); Omolade, Black Women and Feminism, in THE FUTURE OF DIFFER-
ENCE, supra note 82, at 247.
91. Sandra Harding suggests that the dichotomous thinking responsible
for various kinds of domination has produced similar ontologies, epistemolo-
gies, and moralities across various oppressed groups. Consequently, Harding
argues for embedding gender difference along with other group differences in
a "unified field theory" of oppression. See Harding, The Curious Coincidence
of Feminine and African Moralities: Challenges for Feminist Theory, in WO-
MEN AND MORAL THEORY 296 (1987) [hereinafter MORAL THEORY]. Although
clinical legal educators do not constitute an oppressed group within society as
a whole, their outsider status within American legal education - as well as
their representation of underclasses - helps explain their intellectual affilia-
tion with groups oppressed by larger social forces.
92. Olsen calls this "rejecting hierarchization." See Olsen, supra note 81,
at 203.
93. See supra notes 61-62, 66-67 and accompanying text; see also Olsen,
supra note 81, at 204.
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way of seeing men and women and clinical theory provides a
way of seeing ideas and techniques, each also provides, more
broadly, a way of seeing.9 4 Clearly, their style of critique repre-
sents a challenge to dualistic thinking generally, to the tradi-
tional notion of binary oppositions as separable ideas.95
94. See supra notes 81-93 and accompanying text; see also Crenshaw,
supra note 82 (applying the critique to the ideology of black/white race rela-
tions); Freeman & Mensch, The Public-Private Distinction in American Law
and Life, 36 BUFFALo L. REv. 237 (1987) (applying the critique to the pub-
lic/private dualism); Henderson, The Dialogue of Heart and Head, 10 CARDozo
L. REV. 123 (1988) (applying the critique to the traditional dichotomy of pas-
sion and reason).
95. In other words, the project involves "deconstructing" binary opposi-
tions. The philosophy of Derrida, as applied to literary criticism, has spawned
a genre of legal literature involving the deconstruction of legal texts. See
Balkin, Deconstructive Practice and Legal Theory, 96 YALE L.J. 743 (1987);
Dalton, An Essay in the Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine, 94 YALE L.J. 997
(1985); Hegland, Goodbye to Deconstruction, 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 1203 (1985);
Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV.
1685 (1976); Spann, Deconstructing the Legislative Veto, 68 MINN. L. REV. 473
(1984); Tushnet, Critical Legal Studies and Constitutional Law: An Essay in
Deconstruction, 36 STAN. L. REV. 623 (1984). Many of these authors aim to ex-
pose contradictions in liberal theory, or explain how doctrine is used to medi-
ate the contradictions.
For my purposes, the best definition of deconstruction is Anthony Cook's:
"By deconstruction, I mean the technique of exposing hierarchical oppositions
and demonstrating their difference and mutual dependence for purposes of il-
lustrating the ideological basis of privileging one opposite over the other."
Cook, Beyond Critical Legal Studies: The Reconstructive Theology of Dr. Mar-
tin Luther King, Jr., 103 HARv. L. REv. 985, 987 n.5 (1990); see also Balkin,
supra, at 746-47 (describing how Derrida's technique of inverting hierarchies
promises intellectual discovery by wrenching us from our accustomed modes
of thought); Minow, supra note 40, at 43 n.155 (describing the technique of
looking at female experience as central and male experience as different or
deviant, not to substitute views but to reveal the power of unstated reference
points). These deconstructive practices are "postmodern" in their effort to in-
duce skepticism concerning prevailing constructions of reality. See, e.g., Flax,
Postmodernism and Gender Relations in Feminist Theory, 12 SIGNs 621, 624
(1987).
In levelling this broad critique of dualistic thinking, it is troubling to con-
tinue to use, as I have, the familiar binary labels of dualistic categories, for
then the alternative conception risks replicating, by its structure of argument,
the very problem it is critiquing. Nevertheless, this is a risk one sometimes
assumes to be comprehensible within the linguistic and conceptual structure of
a particular culture. See, e.g., Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L.
REV. 829, 835 (1990) ("[F]eminists must use presently understandable catego-
ries, even while maintaining a critical posture toward their use."); Dalton,
supra note 95, at 1113 n.507 (urging self-consciousness about use of categories
in recognition of the limits of culture and the difficulty of transcending cur-
rent categories for organizing experience). Although mindful of the risks of
distortion and oversimplification, I have chosen, in the interests of coherence,
to retain somewhat imprecise labels such as "theory" and "practice," and to
try to infuse these traditional labels with richer and more relational meanings.
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Moreover, the feminists' and clinical educators' recognition that
a theory-practice critique is inherent in their methodologies
obliges them to remain faithful to this critique in the further
development of their methodologies. In the next section, I ex-
amine more closely the methods that feminist thinkers and
clinical educators have developed and used - and developed by
use.
II. EXAMINING THE THEORY-PRACTICE SPIRAL
A. FEMINIST METHODS, FEMINIST THEORY
The Sophoclean soul is . .. a spider sitting in the middle of its web,
able to feel and respond to any tug in any part of the complicated
structure. It advances its understanding of life and of itself... by
hovering in thought and imagination around the enigmatic complexi-
ties of the seen particular... seated in the middle of its web of con-
nections, responsive to the pull of each separate thread.
- Martha Nussbaum9
6
None of the methods described in this section are uniquely
used by women or by feminists. Nor would every feminist sub-
scribe to them or to the artificial but heuristically useful cate-
gorization of methods presented here. Neither have feminist
thinkers alone constructed these methods. Although once
again mindful of the potentially misleading nature of labels, I
believe that this set of methods is properly designated "femi-
nist" because its contents have been collected, developed and
endorsed by a considerable number of feminists engaged in an
effort to understand and undermine gender hierarchy.97
No feminist method is grounded explicitly in the estab-
lished methodology of a particular discipline. Although femi-
nists have chosen to avoid the confines of a single disciplinary
approach, they have often borrowed helpful approaches from
other disciplines. Feminist methodology is deliberately eclectic,
discouraging artificial separations of related ideas and promot-
ing cross-disciplinary thinking that furthers its animating val-
ues.98 I urge readers, regardless of any preconceptions about
96. See M. NUSSBAUM, supra note 25, at 69 (footnotes omitted). The image
is from Heraclitus. 1d, Martha Minow describes it as "a vivid image of respon-
siveness to complexity in a world of practical choice." Minow, supra note 40,
at 91 n.382.
97. See Bartlett, supra note 95, at 833-36 (defending a feminist label for
practices with roots in other traditions).
98. See Sherwin, Philosophical Methodology and Feminist Methodology:
Are They Compatible?, in FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES: PHILOsOPHICAL ESSAYS ON
METHOD AND MoRALS 13, 20 (1988).
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the substantive goals of various activities identified as feminist,
to evaluate each method that feminists have adopted on its own
merits. I have attempted to make the descriptions that follow
vivid enough to permit such evaluation.
1. Consciousness-Raising
Any description of contemporary feminist practice must
begin with reference to consciousness-raising, the preeminent
method of the movement.99 As a method, consciousness-raising
developed organically from women's coming together, drawn by
a shared sense of need, to describe their lives' experiences to
one another-0° Through the collaborative telling of and listen-
ing to individual women's experiences, many participants
noticed similarities and repetitions. 101 As story-patterns began
to form, the collective nature of their various situations
99. [Groups were] one medium and forum central to [consciousness
raising's] development as a method of analysis, mode of organizing,
form of practice, and technique of political intervention. The charac-
teristic structure, ethic, process, and approach to social change which
mark such groups as a development in political theory and practice
are integral to many of the substantive contributions of feminist the-
ory. The key to feminist theory consists in its way of knowing. Con-
sciousness raising is that way.
C. MACKINNON, supra note 41, at 84 (emphasis in original).
100. Springing up spontaneously in the context of friendship, net-
works, colleges and universities, women's centers, neighborhoods,
churches, and shared work or workplaces, they were truly grassroots.
Many aimed for diversity in age, marital status, occupation, education,
physical ability, sexuality, race and ethnicity, class, or political views.
Others chose uniformity on the same bases. Some groups proceeded
biographically, each woman presenting her life as she wished to tell it.
Some moved topically, using subject focuses such as virginity crises,
relations among women, mothers, body image, and early sexual ex-
periences to orient discussion. Some read books and shared literature.
Some addressed current urgencies as they arose, supporting women
through difficult passages or encouraging them to confront situations
they had avoided. Many developed a flexible combination of formats.
Id. at 84-85. For historical consideration of consciousness-raising in the wo-
men's movement in America, see C. HYMowrz & M. WEISSMAN, A HISTORY
OF WOMEN IN AMERICA 351-55 (1978); G. LERNER, THE MAJORITY FINDS ITS
PAST: PLACING WOMEN IN HISTORY 42-44 (1979), cited in Bartlett, supra note
95, at 863 n.139.
101. Concretely, consciousness-raising groups often focused on specific
incidents and internal dialogue: what happened today, how did it
make you feel, why did you feel that way, how do you feel now? ...
Restrictions, conflicting demands, intolerable but necessarily tolerated
work, the accumulation of constant small irritations and indignities of
everyday existence have often been justified on the basis of sex. Con-
sciousness raising coheres and claims these impressions.
C. MACKINNON, supra note 41, at 85, 87.
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emerged. 0 2 Once having glimpsed "the social dimension of in-
dividual experience and the individual dimension of social ex-
perience,"1 0 3 their reactions to their experiences took the shape
of structural critique.1° 4
Consciousness-raising is a collective, interpersonal, reflec-
tive method aimed at articulating and advancing authentic ways
of understanding and interpreting lived experiences.10 5 The co-
operative nature of the exploration discourages hierarchical ar-
rangements within the group that would reproduce, in part, the
problem generating the need for gathering.106 Stated differ-
ently, feminist method incorporates an understanding of inter-
personal relationships as revealing and expressing political
content.
One should not misread the summary nature of this de-
scription as underplaying the difficulty and the power of con-
sciousness-raising as a form of emancipatory struggle enacted in
language. 10 7 Participating in consciousness-raising is not a sim-
102. [A] woman embodies and expresses a moment-to-moment concept
of herself in the way she walks down the street, structures a house-
hold, pursues her work and friendships, shares her sexuality - a cer-
tain concept of how she has survived and who she survives as. A
minute-by-minute moving picture is created of women becoming, re-
fusing, sustaining their condition.... Sexism is seen to be .. .so
much a part of the omnipresent background of life that a massive ef-
fort of collective concentration is required even to discern that it has
edges. Consciousness raising is such an effort.
Id. at 89, 90; see also Bender, A Lawyer's Primer on Feminist Theory and Tort,
38 J. LEGAL EDuc. 3, 9 (1988) ("What were experienced as personal hurts indi-
vidually suffered reveal themselves as a collective experience of oppression.").
103. Schneider, supra note 61, at 603.
104. See, e.g., MacKinnon's description of the group questioning that might
follow from a woman's mentioning of the way a man looked at her on the sub-
way. By scrutinizing their everyday experiences and their reactions to those
experiences, MacKinnon states that women discover that the "structure of
sexual domination, the tacit relations of deference and command, can be pres-
ent in a passing glance." C. MAcKINNON, supra note 41, at 89.
105. Id at 101 ("Seen as method, this process gives the resulting analysis its
ground as well as its concreteness, specificity, and historicity."); cf. Colker,
Feminism, Sexuality and Serf" A Preliminary Inquiry into the Politics of Au-
thenticity (Book Review), 68 B.U.L. REV. 217, 253-54 (1988) (expressing con-
cerns that the malleability of the consciousness-raising method can promote
women's inauthentic expressions).
106. C. MACKINNON, supra note 41, at 86-87 (describing the process of con-
sciousness-raising as reflecting a commitment to confronting inequality and
exclusion).
107. MacKinnon describes the emancipatory potential of consciousness-
raising in this way: "Women [through consciousness-raising groups] exper-
ienced the walls that have contained them as walls - and sometimes walked
through them." Id at 91; see also White, Subordination, Rhetorical Survival
Skills, and Sunday Shoes: Notes on the Hearing of Mrs. G., 38 BUFFALO L.
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ple matter of speaking one's thoughts, but of discovering one's
thoughts with the support and assistance of the other partici-
pants' tentative reports and statements. To know one's pain
and one's experience, and to trust what one knows sufficiently
to name it, in a culture that has never recognized the existence
of such pain or the validity of such experience, is an extraordi-
nary feat, involving a long process of grappling to find language
that can facilitate and express that understanding. 0 8 The
method depends on "train[ing] ourselves to respect our feelings
and to transpose them into a language so they can be
shared." 0 9
Catharine MacKinnon has been a leading proponent of
consciousness-raising as feminist method."0° Unfortunately, she
writes as if the outcome of the method is foreordained, as
though the consciousness-raising process will allow participants
REV. 1, 50 (1990) ("[Wjomen have evaded complete domination through their
practice of speaking... from their own intuitions and their own experience."
(emphasis in original)).
108. See, e.g., West, The Difference in Women's Hedonic Lives: A Phenom-
enological Critique of Feminist Legal Theory, 3 Wis. WOMEN'S L.J. 81, 81-82
(1987) ("[W]omen suffer in ways which men do not, and... the gender-specific
suffering that women endure is routinely ignored or trivialized in the larger
(male) legal culture."); White, supra note 107, at 50-51 n.160 ("Consciousness
raising places new demands on the language because, through it, women grope
to share feelings that have previously gone unnamed."). White's is a powerful
epistemological point, more fully developed in Diamond, supra note 10. Writ-
ing about the paradoxical position of those of us who are "lacking words that
enable us to recognize ourselves," id at 275, Diamond states:
[Tihe deprivation of not being able to name things properly (with its
result, that one's thoughts cannot properly be thought, are misex-
pressed or not expressed at all) - that deprivation is tied to lack of
connection with cultural traditions. It appears, though, that the very
fact that [some people] have experiences and commitments which re-
quire for their expression a vocabulary which they lack depends on
their retaining some connection with those traditions.
Id. at 259 (emphasis in original). I read Cornell as asserting that myth and al-
legory are a form of consciousness-raising that help women find that vocabu-
lary. Cornell, supra note 10.
109. A. LORDE, Poetry is not a Luxury, in SIsTER OuTsIDER 36, 37 (1984);
see also Diamond, supra note 10, at 270 ("A great good to be done them would
be to find them the right words: words which can express their aspirations, on
the one hand, and 'words which express the truth of their affliction,' on the
other." (quoting S. WEIL, Human Personality, in SELECTED ESSAYS, 1934-43, at
23-24 (R. Rees ed. and trans. 1962))).
110. Christine Littleton sees the articulation of the feminist consciousness-
raising method as the premier contribution of MacKinnon's work. See Lit-
tleton, Feminist Jurisprudence: The Difference Method Makes (Book Re-
view), 41 STAN. L. REV. 751, 753-54 (1989).
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to discover "the unity and primacy of women's experience.""'
As Angela Harris writes:
[S]ome feminists, notably feminists of color, are unhappy with the no-
tion that their woman self is even separate from, let alone more pri-
mary than, their other parts of self. The focus of consciousness
raising on the unity and primacy of women's experience thus distorts
the experience of women who simultaneously move within other rela-
tions of domination. Once the moment of consciousness raising is
past, the repeated invocation of unity and primacy does not heal these
very real and deeply felt divisions among feminist women.
112
One need not read Harris's powerful critique of MacKin-
non's writing as a critique of the consciousness-raising method,
when honestly and openly undertaken, because nothing intrin-
sic to the consciousness-raising method requires that it yield, as
MacKinnon implies, an essentialist view of women." 3 Rather,
through consciousness-raising practices, especially when com-
bined with storytelling practices'' 4 and exclusion questions," 5 a
heterogeneous group of women may discover not only points of
surprising commonality but a bundle of surprising differences.
This discovery likely will engender not an encompassing theory
of women's lot, but multiple theories of their diverse
situations.n 6
Much of the content of many feminist theories is derived
from these experiences of sharing experiences, 1 7 as is the femi-
111. See Harris, Categorical Discourse and Dominance Theory (Book Re-
view), 5 BERKELEY WOMEN's L.J. 181, 186 (1990).
112. Id.; see also Flax, supra note 95, at 633 ("[W]ithin feminist theory a
search for a defining theme of the whole or a feminist viewpoint may require
the suppression of the important and discomforting voices of persons with ex-
periences unlike our own.").
113. An essentialist view of women is one that ascribes an essential mean-
ing to being a woman in society, a meaning that transcends race, class, age,
sexual preference, and all other boundaries. For a powerful critique of gender
essentialism, see E. SPELMAN, INESSENTIL WOMAN: PROBLEMS OF EXCLUSION
IN FEMINIST THOUGHT (1988); Kristeva, Woman Can Never Be Defined, in
NEw FRENCH FEMINISMS 137 (1980). For a critique of the essentialist messages
of MacKinnon's work, see Harris, supra note 59.
114. See infra notes 122-35 and accompanying text.
115. See infra notes 136-44 and accompanying text.
116. See Harris, supra note 111, at 195-96 ("Perhaps the answer lies not in
trying to construct a single Grand Theory, a single feminist myth, but in tell-
ing many different stories.").
117. See C. MACKINNON, supra note 41, at 86 ('"The technique explores the
social world each woman inhabits through her speaking of it, through compar-
ison with other women's experiences, and through women's experiences of
each other in the group itself."). Commenting on MacKinnon's elaboration of
the consciousness-raising technique, Christine Littleton writes:
Shared experience, the substance of which consciousness raising is the
method, is more than the aggregate of individual experiences, differ-
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nist theory of theory: that theory is a practice, that it must
emerge from an understanding of diverse lived realities and be
tested against those realities.118 Experience and theory fold
into one another in a dialectical fashion,"19 revealing the polit-
ical quality of personal life. 2 0 In other words, the dialectical
relationship between experience and theory is rooted in the di-
alectical relationship between the individual and society.121
2. Storytelling
Storytelling, a concept much in vogue in academic circles
generally,122 is a specific form of consciousness-raising that
serves as corrective. Speaking one's experiences can disrupt
theory through the power of personal stories for which the the-
ent in kind from their overlap. There is, in addition to the recognition
of diversity and regularity, the experience of shared experience. This
second level, or meta-experience, is what constructs women as an op-
positional class. This class makes no claim to authenticity or to an es-
sential feminism. Its authority to speak for and as women is based
solely on its experience of consciously sharing women's lot.
Littleton, supra note 110, at 784 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis in original).
118. See Schneider, supra note 61, at 602.
119. Id at 601.
120. MacKinnon elegantly articulates the interplay of the political and the
personal, after describing consciousness-raising discussions about women's inti-
mate relationships:
When shared with other women, one's most private events often came
to look the most stereotypical.... The personal as political is not a
simile, not a metaphor, and not an analogy. It does not mean that
what occurs in personal life is similar to, or comparable with, what oc-
curs in the public arena.... It means that women's distinctive experi-
ence as women occurs within that sphere that has been socially lived
as the personal - private, emotional, interiorized, particular, individ-
uated, intimate - so that what it is to know the politics of woman's
situation is to know women's personal lives ....
C. MACKINNON, supra note 41, at 94, 119-20. Although not all feminists would
agree that women have "distinctive experience as women," most of them
would recognize the close relationship between the personal and the political
in women's varied lives.
121. See Schneider, supra note 61, at 603.
122. See, e.g., Legal Storytelling, 87 MIcH. L. REv. 2073 (1989); Pedagogy of
Narrative: A Symposium, 40 J. LEGAL EDUC. 1 (1990); Symposium: Law and
Literature, 39 MERCER L. REV. 739 (1988); Symposium Law and Literature,
60 TEX. L. REv. 373 (1982), all full issues of journals devoted to the topic of
storytelling in law and legal education. Some of the literature inspiring the
legal storytelling movement includes J.B. WHITE, HERACLES' Bow: ESSAYS ON
RHETORIc AND POETICS OF THE LAW (1985) [hereinafter HERACLES' Bow]; J.B.
WHITE, WHEN WoRDs LOSE THEIR MEANING (1984); J.B. WHITE, THE LEGAL
IMAGINATION (1973); Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601 (1986);
Cover, The Folktales of Justice: Tales of Jurisdiction, 14 CAP. U.L. REV. 179
(1985); Cover, The Supreme Court 1982 Term - Foreword Nomos and Narra-
tive, 97 HARv. L. REV. 4 (1983). A voluminous bibliography of literature on
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ory cannot account. Many have challenged theories of law and
other dominant social theories through this process of "narra-
tive critique."l' e It is also a process through which women of
color, lesbians, poor women, and disabled women have con-
fronted feminist theories of women's situation that did not ac-
count for them.124  Not surprisingly, feminists advocate
narrative closes the symposium issue of the Journal of Legal Education. El-
kins, A Bibliography of Narrative, 40 J. LEGAL EDuC. 203 (1990).
For academic treatment of issues of narrative in fields other than law, see,
e.g., D. CARP, Tm, NARRATIVE AND HISTORY (1986); F. KERMODE, THE GENF,
SIS OF SECRECY: ON THE INTERPRETATION OF NARRATIVE (1979); ON NARRA-
TIVE (W.J.T. Mitchell ed. 1980); SCRPTURAL AUTHORITY AND NARRATIVE
INTERPRETATION (G. Green ed. 1987). Edward Said writes that "[n]arrative has
now attained the status in the human and social sciences of a major cultural
convergence." Said, Representing the Colonized" Anthropology's Interlocutors,
15 CRITICAL INQUIRY 205, 221 (1989).
123. One form of narrative critique involves the use of creative language
practices - poetry, parables, allegories, metaphors - to express more wholly
and eloquently than authoritative analytic discourse can the realities of the ex-
perience of oppression. See D. BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE
QUEST FOR RACIAL JUSTICE (1987); P. WILLIAMS, THE ALcHEmy OF RACE AND
RIGHTS: DIARY OF A LAW PROFESSOR (1991) [hereinafter RACE AND RIGHTS];
Bell, The Supreme Cour4 1984 Term - Foreword:- The Civil Rights Chroni-
cles, 99 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1985); Williams, On Being The Object of Property, 14
SIGNS 5 (1988); see also A. LORDE, supra note 109.
For a compelling discussion of the constrictions of dominant language
practices and the need and prospect for subordinated peoples to develop
emancipatory practices to truly articulate their situation, see White, supra
note 107. For a discussion of transformative uses of stories, see Delgado, supra
note 80; Matsuda, Victim's Story, supra note 77; West, Jurisprudence as Nar-
rative: An Aesthetic Analysis of Modern Legal Theory, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 145
(1985); Winter, The Cognitive Dimension of the Agon Between Legal Power
and Narrative Meaning, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2225 (1989); Bartlett, Storytelling
(Book Review), 1987 DUKE L.J. 760.
124. See, e.g., Cain, Feminist Jurisprudence: Grounding the Theories, 4
BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 191 (1990) (exclusion of lesbians' experiences); Cren-
shaw, supra note 15 (exclusion of black women's experiences); Harris, supra
note 59 (same); Leonard, A Missing Voice in Feminist Legal Theory: The Het-
erosexual Presumption, 12 WOMEN'S RTs. L. REP. 39 (1990) (exclusion of lesbi-
ans' experiences); WITH WINGs, supra note 89 (exclusion of disabled women's
experiences).
Omitted from this list is a challenge to feminist theory from poor women
themselves. Unfortunately, as Cora Diamond discusses, one of the conse-
quences of class oppression can be the "deprivation of being unable to put ex-
perience" - the things one knows, or might know - "into thoughts one can
think." Diamond, supra note 10, at 269. Given rates of illiteracy among the
poor, and limited access to authorized vehicles for disseminating knowledge,
those who are not poor generally write on poor women's behalf. See, e.g.,
White, supra note 107. Poor women, like Mrs. G., tend to articulate their situ-
ations and challenges in settings other than those prescribed for academic
style discourse. See id. For two articles describing uses of drama by
subordinated persons to express their social situation, see White, To Learn and
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storytelling as, among other things, an antidote to the applica-
tion of preconceived rules to ritualized stories consisting of
spare, refined facts - a practice privileged by some sectors of
academic law.' 5
The narratives offered as consciousness-raising, especially
when articulated by the excluded, hold possibilities for chang-
ing the listeners' consciousness through empathetic under-
standing. 12 6 Stories, whether real or potentially real, provide
to Teach: Lessons from Driefontein on Lawyering and Power, 1989 Wis. L.
REv. 699, and White, Mobilization on the Margins of the Lawsuit Making
Space for Clients to Speak, 16 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 535 (1987-88).
125. See, e.g., Finley, Breaking Women's Silence in Law: The Dilemma of
the Gendered Nature of Legal Reasoning, 64 NoTRE DAME L. REV. 886 (1989)
(decrying the abstract, dispassionate, historical "male" voice of legal language,
while recognizing its contextual possibilities); Henderson, Legality and Empa-
thy, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1574, 1575 (1987) ("[Ihe ideological structures of legal
discourse and cognition block affective and phenomenological argument.");
Massaro, Empathy, Legal Storytelling, and the Rule of Law: New Words, Old
Wounds?, 87 McH. L. REv. 2099 (1989) (noting legal scholars' complaints
about the abstract, acontextual focus of legal discourse, while also noting law's
contextual possibilities).
For suggestions that storytelling is intrinsic to lawyering, see Lopez, Lay
Lawyering, 32 UCLA L. REv. 1 (1984) (illustrating how we constantly use
storytelling to do "lay lawyering," helping others solve everyday, concrete
problems); Elkins, From the Symposium Editor, 40 J. LEGAL EDuc. 1 (1990).
Elkins states that:
When we think of law as narrative we think of law differently than
we do when we conceive of law as a system of rules or as an adver-
sarial contest or game. Law may indeed be a system of rules, a means
of conflict solution, a game, a form of rhetoric and argument, or a dis-
course, but it is also a vast reservoir of stories ....
Id. at 1.
126. In Richard Delgado's words:
It is through [the narrative] process that we can overcome ethnocen-
trism and the unthinking conviction that our way of seeing the world
is the only one - that the way things are is inevitable, natural, just,
and best - when it is, for some, full of pain, exclusion, and both petty
and major tyranny.
Listening to stories makes the adjustment to further stories eas-
ier; one acquires the ability to see the world through others' eyes....
Shared words can banish sameness, stiffness, and monochromaticity
and reduce the felt terror of otherness when hearing new voices for
the first time.
If we would deepen and humanize ourselves, we must seek out
storytellers different from ourselves and afford them the audience
they deserve. The benefit will be reciprocal.
Delgado, supra note 80, at 2439-40 (footnotes omitted); see also Diamond,
supra note 10. In Robin West's words: "Literature helps us understand
others. Literature helps us sympathize with their pain, it helps us share their
sorrow, and it helps us celebrate their joy. It makes us more moral. It makes
us better people." West, Economic Man and Literary Woman: One Contrast,
39 MERCER L. REV. 867, 878 (1988). Compare, for example, the extent to which
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listeners with the vivid historical detail necessary for a vicari-
ous experience that may awaken empathy.M They also allow
the storyteller to explore and develop a sense of identity and
subjectivity, elusive capacities under social conditions which
widely objectify her. 28 Drawing on the storyteller's exper-
iences and feelings, narratives can move listeners emotionally
and intellectually. This emotional and intellectual engagement
can contribute to careful interpretation and analysis of the
story's data, promoting a fuller human understanding than
analytic reasoning alone can sometimes provide.129 Under con-
ditions of openness, theory can be built through the conscious-
ness-raising practice of storytelling, disrupted by the same
practice, then reconstructed.
Like much of feminist method, both consciousness-raising
and storytelling have antecedents elsewhere and contemporary
proponents identified with other groups. Indeed, these meth-
ods are reminiscent of Edmund Husserl's "phenomenology," a
philosophy of experience that calls for a return to the "things
themselves."' 30 Specifically, Husserl proposed that thinkers
should ground in experience the conceptual apparatus of all
you were moved by the story of Antigone and developed an understanding of
Antigone's pain, as well as the pain of the other characters in the play, by vir-
tue of reading excerpts from the play itself - which, given the conventions of
law review style, were contained here in the footnotes - than by reading my
cursory textual characterizations of the play.
127. Other writings linking legal storytelling to empathy include HERA-
CLES' Bow, supra note 122; Henderson, supra note 125; Yudof, "Tea at the Pal-
ace of Hoon'" The Human Voice in Legal Rules, 66 TEx. L. REv. 589 (1988).
The term empathy can be misused if it is not joined by a genuine effort to
take others' perspectives seriously. See, e.g., C. GEERTz, LOCAL KNOWLEDGE:
FURTHER ESSAYS iN INTERPRETIvE ANTHROPOLOGY 59 (1983), cited in Minow,
supra note 40, at 81 n.334 ("Rather than attempting to place the experience of
others within the framework of [Western conceptions of self] which is what
the extolled 'empathy' in fact usually comes down to, understanding them de-
mands setting that conception aside and seeing their experiences within the
framework of their own idea of what selfhood is."); Delgado, supra note 80, at
2440 n.87 ("[Tihe hearer may consciously or unconsciously reinterpret the new
story, in light of the hearer's own belief system and inventory of stock stories,
so as to blunt, or even reverse its meaning.").
128. See White, supra note 107, at 50-51; see also Delgado, supra note 80, at
2437-38.
129. See Minow & Spelman, Passion for Justice, 10 CARDOzO L. REv. 37,
43-44 (1988) ("[Ihe introjection of passion into a system [of reasoning] could
also be called the introjection of careful thinking."); C. MACKiNNON, supra
note 41, at 81 (" 'We reason deeply, when we forcibly feel.'" (quoting Mary
Wollstonecraft)).




fields.131 Building on Husserl and spurred by an existentialist
commitment, Jean Paul Sartre sought to situate reasoning and
the reasoning subject in political and historical events.132 The
goal of these and other phenomenologists was a fuller picture
of what we might already know, with experience confirming
the truth of the method1as Husserl, working primarily in the
sciences, believed that intensive empiricism would reveal the
essences of things.1 m On the other hand, feminists, and others
who are doing similar work, hope to discover the absences of
things - the exclusion of a variety of perspectives from law
and other disciplines that subvert what we can know.1'
3. Exclusion Questions
In a recent article, Katharine Bartlett has named and de-
scribed methods related to consciousness-raising and story-
telling that feminists have added to the standard array of
approaches to legal reasoning.136 One of these methods she
calls "asking the woman question" (or "asking the exclusion
question"). 13 7 Exclusion questions help feminists develop struc-
tural theory from the narratives of experience explored in con-
sciousness-raising. Asking such questions entails asking about
the exclusion of various women's needs, perspectives, and
experiences from law itself or from other social and political in-
stitutions. Storytelling and consciousness-raising provide par-
ticipants with the basis for knowing how different women
131. E. HUSSERL, IDEAS: GENERAL INTRODUCTION TO PURE PHENOMENOL-
OGY 84 (W.R. Boyce Gibson trans. 1962).
132. See generally J. SARTRE, SEARCH FOR A METHOD (H. Barnes trans.
1968).
133. Id
134. E. HUSSERL, supra note 131, ch. 1.
135. See Williams, The Obliging-Shel: An Informal Essay on Formal
Equal Opportunity, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2128 (1989). Williams states that:
We live in an era in which women and people of color compose
and literally define both this society's underclass and its most under-
served population. Remedying this therefore ought to be, must be,
this society's most pressing area of representational responsibility, not
only in terms of fairly privatized issues like "more pro bono," or more
lawyers taking on more cases of particular sorts, but in really examin-
ing the ways in which the law operates to omit women and people of
color at all levels, including the most subtle - to omit them from the
literature of the law, from the ranks of lawyers, and to omit them
from the numbers of those served by its interests.
I&. at 2128 (emphasis in original).
136. Bartlett, supra note 95.
137. Id at 831. As Bartlett notes, "A question becomes a method when it is
regularly asked." Id at 837.
1634 [Vol. 75:1599
1991] FEMINISM AND CLINICAL EDUCATION
understand and report their needs, perspectives, and exper-
iences, such that participants can identify institutional forms
excluding various women. Understanding the commonalities
and differences of many women is a necessary aspect of discov-
ering the mismatch between them, or particular groups of
them, and cultural institutions. And understanding how vari-
ous women experience institutions precedes discovery of how
institutions respond to or ignore various women's interests.
Critical theory develops from analyzing the perceived reasons
for, and implications of, women's exclusion, and the conse-
quences of their imagined inclusion.13s
Nothing can limit these methods to use in women's explo-
ration of the workings of a gender system. Indeed, one cannot
understand the gender system in isolation from other social
structures, because women come in a full complement of races,
classes, cultures, sexual orientations, and physical abilities, all
of which affect the meaning, the quality, and the security of
their lives in a multitude of daily ways. To speak of one's expe-
rience as a woman is to speak of one's experience in a society
which makes gender, and all of these other categories as well,
such powerful socializing forces that they simultaneously influ-
ence one's identity, treatment, and opportunity. Any structural
critique that emerges from viewing women as a diverse class
must reflect their multiple identities and their multiple and va-
ried experiences in the social world. As pure method, asking a
genuine and inclusive woman question always means asking a
broader question about exclusion across all of the strata in
which women, and many men, are found.139
Of course, feminists can confine the exclusion question to
gender analysis if only class-privileged, heterosexual, able-bod-
ied white women who relate to subordination solely in terms of
gender are asking the question. 140 Historically, this has hap-
pened. As a result, feminists' structural critique, replicating
the errors of much of the dominant social theory shaped largely
138. Bartlett elaborates these points more systematically. Id. at 837-43; see
also Wishik, To Question Everything: The Inquiries of Feminist Jurispru-
dence, 1 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 64, 72-77 (1985) (describing a series of ques-
tions that feminists ask about women's exclusion, and the possibilities for their
inclusion).
139. For a powerful statement of this contention, see E. SPELMAN, supra
note 113; see also Lewin, Feminist Scholars Spurring a Rethinking of Law,
N.Y. Times, Sept. 30, 1988, at B9, col. 3 ("In Gilligan's terms, it's not just one
'different voice' we've been ignoring, it's many." (quoting Mary Joe Frug)).
140. See Bartlett, supra note 95, at 847-48.
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by privileged men, has unwittingly claimed the perspective of
some women as universal for all women.1 1 But, the value of
the methods described above is that, if practiced earnestly, if
the theories generated are persistently examined, then the dis-
tortions of overstated claims are likely to emerge, as they have
among feminists.14 2 I am not suggesting that feminists have
easily recognized the solipsism problem 143 or that they have ea-
gerly received suggestions for its cure; territoriality and defen-
siveness can plague even those who espouse good methods. In
the wake of a perceived solidaristic challenge, however, a com-
mitment to disciplined reappraisal, with the assistance of per-
spectives elaborated by many previously excluded women, has




In my reading of Bartlett's taxonomy, the methods of con-
sciousness-raising, including storytelling and asking the woman
(exclusion) question, each represent moments in a process that
she terms "feminist practical reasoning."'145 Bartlett views this
form of reasoning as the joining of an Aristotelian-style practi-
cal deliberation,14 6 as developed by many thinkers,' 47 with the
consideration of multiple perspectives 48 The hallmark of fem-
inist practical reasoning is its emphasis on context:' 49 on un-
141. See Minow, supra note 40, at 62-65.
142. Id. at 64 ("Ihe method of consciousness-raising - personal reporting
of experience in communal settings to explore what has not been said - en-
ables self-criticism among feminists even about feminism itself.").
143. A. RICH, Disloyal to Civilization: Feminism, Racism, Gynphobia, in
ON LIES, SECRETS, AND SILENCES 299 (1979).
144. See supra note 124.
145. Bartlett, supra note 95, at 849-63.
146. Aristotle termed "practical wisdom" the capacity of reasoning from
particulars to equitable results, while weighing but not exclusively relying on
general rules and principles in reaching a decision. ARISTOTLE, Nicomachaean
Ethics, in THE BASIC WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 1027-28 (1941). Aristotle recom-
mends practical wisdom as a way of making moral judgments in the face of
competing and incommensurable values. See A. RoRTY, MIND IN ACTION: Es-
SAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF MIND 272 (1988) (describing Aristotelian practical
reasoning as deliberation about appropriate ends).
147. See, e.g., T. NAGEL, The Fragmentation of Value, in MORTAL QUES-
TIONS 134 (1979); Hampshire, Public and Private Morality, in PUBLIC AND PRI-
VATE MORALITY 23 (1978); Postema, Moral Responsibility in Professional
Ethics, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 63, 67-68 (1980); Bartlett, supra note 95, at 850 n.79
(sources cited).
148. Bartlett, supra note 95, at 850.
149. This emphasis has a normative as well as an epistemological dimen-
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derstanding the intricate details of complex human situations
that give rise to legal or other conflicts and, with the aid of
prior wisdom and experience, using this understanding to find
solutions that are tailored to the particularities of the
situation.1 5o
The value of all the feminist methods described here is
their capacity to expand context. Faithfulness to these meth-
ods requires vigilance in searching for and carefully attending
to perspectives and interests often overlooked because they are
unfamiliar to the reasoner. 51 The following example illus-
trates how these features of feminist practical reasoning, as de-
scribed by Bartlett, can affect the legal decisionmaking process.
Consider the prosecution of a battered woman who uses a
weapon against her batterer during a period of quiescence in
the abuse cycle.15 2 She claims self-defense, but the prosecution
insists that the charged acts constitute excessive force in viola-
tion of the duty to retreat.1su A court applying self-defense doc-
trine to these circumstances will likely consider the state's
policy interests in excluding excessive force and including a
duty to retreat in the construction of self-defense. The court
sion, because "reasoning from context allows a greater respect for difference."
Id at 849.
150. I& at 851 ('"Themselves generative, new situations give rise to 'practi-
cal' perceptions and inform decisionmakers about the desired ends of law.");
see also M. NUSSBAUM, supra note 25, at 300-01 (ethical choice must confront
"the situation itself, by a faculty that is suited to confront it as a complex
whole").
151. Taking minority perspectives seriously calls for a process of dia-
logue in which the listener actually tries to reach beyond the assump-
tion of one reality, one version of the truth. There is no neutrality, no
escape from choice. But it is possible to develop better abilities to
name and grasp competing perspectives, and to make more knowing
choices thereafter.
Minow, supra note 40, at 69-70.
152. I have chosen this example with the aid of a paper written by Barbara
Siegel, a student in my course on Feminism and Jurisprudence in Spring, 1988.
See B. Siegel, Reasonable Men and Crazy Women: Re-thinking the Battered
Women's Self-Defense Cases (1988) (unpublished paper on file with author).
Her superb treatment of the issues made elaboration of the example in this
section quite easy. Katharine Bartlett's use of an example of a marital rape
case to illuminate the working of feminist practical reasoning, Bartlett, supra
note 95, at 858-62, also aided the development of this example, drawn, like
hers, from a substantive field - criminal law - in which I teach.
153. According to the traditional doctrine of self-defense, the use of deadly
force is justified only where an actor has been attacked with deadly force and
reasonably believes that he or she is in imminent danger of death or serious
bodily harm. The imminence requirement implies a duty to retreat when seri-




also may consider the common law interpretations of what con-
stitutes excessive force and the duty to retreat. As in any pros-
ecution, the court also would likely consider the interests of the
person harmed, the man who has been assaulted in this in-
stance, and others like him, as well as the reasons for, and in-
terests of, the defendant in claiming self-defense.
A feminist decisionmaker employing contextual reasoning
would consider all of the information above, but also would
stretch the scope of the context by including the "stories" and
perspectives of these litigants, and others who are involved in
battering relationships. The decisionmaker might consider wo-
men's typical size and strength disadvantages; their absence of
training, such as in the military and on football teams, in physi-
cal protection; 5 4 the extent to which their physical efforts to
defend themselves are met with increased violence immediately
or later; 55 and data about battered women whose batterers se-
riously injured or killed them without using weapons, for pur-
poses of evaluating whether a woman's use of a weapon is truly
excessive.'5 6 Sensitized by this context, the reasoner would lis-
ten to the story of this battered woman and try to take her per-
spective,'5 7 evaluating her story by paying special attention to
its similarities to, and its differences from, important features
of the collected stories. 58 The reasoner also would inquire
about the defendant's perceptions of the imminence of her dan-
ger in light of the past patterns of her abuse and her under-
standing of these patterns. 5 9 Additionally, the decisionmaker
would seek to understand the perspective of the man who has
154. See C. MACKINNON, Women, SeZ-Possession, and Sport, in FEMINISM
UNMODIFIED 117, 121 (1987) (discussing women's socialization to avoid using
physical force, whereas men use athletics as "a form of combat"); MacKinnon,
Toward Feminist Jurisprudence (Book Review), 34 STAN. L. REv. 703, 731-32
(1982) (noting that the case law upholding Women's exclusion from combat in
the military both reflects and creates the circumstances whereby women gen-
erally lack the means to repel a male assailant). I am grateful for these exam-
ples to B. Siegel, supra note 152, at 13.
155. See Crocker, The Meaning of Equality for Battered Women Who Kill
Men in Self-Defense, 8 HARv. WOMEN's L.J. 121, 134-35 (1985).
156. The cause of death for most women killed by their batterers is kicking
or beating. A. JONES, WOMEN WHO KILL 300 (1980). Particularly in an en-
counter involving persons mismatched as to physical training and strength, the
hands and feet of the physically abler opponent can be deadly weapons.
157. See, e.g., Minow, supra note 40, at 60 ("The process of looking through
other perspectives does not itself yield an answer, but it may yield an answer
different from the one that the judge would otherwise have reached.").
158. Id. at 92 ("The choice from among principles ... implicates choices
about which differences, and which similarities, should matter.").
159. See A. BROWNE, WHEN BATTERED WOMEN KILL 172 (1987) (indicating
1638 [Vol. 75:1599
1991] FEMINISM AND CLINICAL EDUCATION
been assaulted in these circumstances.1c6 Contextual reasoning
dictates that the decisionmaker weigh this welter of complex
information before making the legal and moral choice about
how to apply notions of self-defense in this case.'
6
'
Opening up the actual circumstances of the battering expe-
rience and the social and psychological conditions under which
it occurs may generate insights that aid in the resolution of
cases involving battering, insights that would remain sub-
merged in a purely logical analysis of the meaning of self-de-
fense. Moreover, the decisionmakers in such cases may find
themselves moved by the process of plumbing human misery so
directly. Feminists would urge them to reflect on these feel-
ings, and not suppress any influence these feelings have on
their understanding of the real human consequences of legal
judgments.8 2
Obviously, contextual reasoning cannot and does not re-
that studies find battered women able to detect subtle changes in their batter-
ers' behavior that signal increased violence).
160. Feminists urge judges to pay special attention to the perspectives of
those who historically have been outsiders to jurisprudence, because these are
the stories most easily overlooked and misunderstood without extraordinary
effort. See Matsuda, Victim's Story, supra note 77, at 2321. But the perspec-
tives of all relevant persons, even those already overrepresented in doctrine,
see Finley, supra note 125, at 892, must be taken seriously in the judging pro-
cess. See Bartlett, supra note 95, at 882 (arguing that feminist methods require
feminists to try to understand, for example, the perspectives of those who op-
pose abortion and of those potential or actual "date-rapists" whose social con-
ditioning leads them to interpret certain women's actions as inviting sexual
encounter); Minow & Spelman, supra note 129, at 61-65 (critiquing the
Supreme Court's majority and dissenting opinions in a case involving censor-
ship of a high school newspaper for failing to consider the perspectives of all
parties).
161. See Minow, supra note 40, at 92 ("[Immersion in particulars does not
require the relinquishment of general commitments .... These are moral
choices, choices about which voices should persuade those who judge. Even
when we understand them, some voices will lose.").
162. [Ihe task of human judgment is not to transcend the self or
human nature, but to use all helpful aspects of it; not to close off reac-
tions but to reflect upon them; not to give in to all intuitions but to
test them, and then test the tests, against their meanings in the actual
lives of others.
Minow & Spelman, supra note 129, at 48. Martha Minow and Elizabeth Spel-
man wrote this article in response to Justice William Brennan in Brennan,
Reason, Passion, and the "Progress of Law," 10 CARDOZO L. REV. 3 (1988)
(printing Brennan's remarks at the forty-second annual Benjamin N. Cardozo
Lecture delivered Sept. 17, 1987). Justice Brennan argued that passion, de-
fined as "the range of emotional and intuitive responses to a given set of facts
or arguments, responses which often speed into our consciousness far ahead of
the lumbering syllogisms of reason," are an important and inevitable feature
of the process of judging. Id- at 9. He urges judges to avoid operating "on the
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quire attention to every concrete detail of every context. As
Bartlett has carefully demonstrated, pre-existing generaliza-
tions about what is relevant will bring only some of the details
to the surface. 163 Contextual reasoning merely suggests that
decisionmakers view the scope of legal relevance quite broadly
and remain open to persuasion about the relevance of novel
facts and the insights they can spawn.L64 Decisionmakers need
not ignore the prevailing rules potentially applicable to the
case. As Bartlett explains, rules distill prior knowledge about
the best response to a particular situation. These rules, how-
ever, are limited to the extent that the rulemakers can antici-
pate future situations.165 Decisionnakers thus cannot ignore
the power of unusual and changing circumstances to suggest
new interpretations of rules.'6 Because feminists have recog-
nized the plurality of perspectives, and the historical exclusion
of particular perspectives from legal decisionmaking, they often
value rules that offer flexibility in responding to the complex-
ity and diversity of human conflict.167
Such a highly contextualized approach to legal decision-
basis of reason alone" so as not to cut themselves off from "the wellspring
from which concepts such as dignity, decency, and fairness flow." Id. at 22.
163. Bartlett, supra note 95, at 856 ("Generalizations identify what matters
and draw connections to other cases. I abstract whenever I fail to identify
every fact about a situation, which, of course, I do always.").
164. For feminists, practical reasoning and asking the woman question
may make more facts relevant or "essential" to the resolution of a
legal case than would more nonfeminist legal analysis. For example,
feminist practical reasoning deems relevant facts related to the wo-
man question - facts about whose interests particular rules or legal
resolutions reflect and whose interests require more deliberate atten-
tion.... Feminist practical reasoning assumes that no a priori reasons
prevent one from being persuaded that a fact that seems insignificant
is significant .... Likewise, although generalizations that render de-
tail irrelevant require examination, they are not a priori unacceptable.
Id. at 856-57 (emphasis in original).
165. Id, at 852 ("Rules represent accumulated past wisdom, which must be
reconciled with the contingencies and practicalities presented by fresh facts.
Rules provide signposts for the appropriate purposes and ends to achieve
through law.") (footnote omitted).
166. Ideally, however, rules leave room for the new insights and per-
spectives generated by new contexts.... [Tihe practical reasoner be-
lieves that the specific circumstances of a new case may dictate novel
readings and applications of rules, readings and applications that not
only were not, but could not or should not have been determined in
advance.
Id. at 853 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).
167. Id. at 832; cf. RACE AND RIGHTS, supra note 123, at 146-65 (describing
how, in a context of racial hierarchy, operating by formal rules often provides
greater protection and autonomy for blacks than do informal arrangements).
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making - involving a careful interest analysis of the litigants,
the state, and any other relevant persons or communities, and
explicit consideration of the social contexts that give rise to
these interests 6 - requires decisionmakers to wrestle with
their decisions out loud. They must elaborate fully the actual
thinking processes that they have undertaken and the goals
that they have sought to achieve in upholding certain principles
over others.16 9 Simply offering some justificatory rhetoric for
the eventual outcome is not sufficient.170 Such a process of dis-
ciplined reflection and conscious accountability is likely to im-
prove the quality of thinking.' 7 1 Moreover, this decisionmaking
process respects those whom the decision affects and thus may
help avoid the reenactment of Antigone's and Creon's tragic in-
abilities to take a conflicting viewpoint seriously.17 2 This pro-
cess also may help litigants and observers to appreciate, and
perhaps accept, a decision's reasonableness even when its effect
on them is adverse.173 Only in this way can law and other insti-
tutions truly respond to real people, real problems, and the real
interests at stake. 74
168. See, e.g., Kennedy, McCleskey v. Kemp: Race, Capital Punishmen
and the Supreme Court, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1388, 1391-93 (1988) (arguing that a
case involving disproportionate application of the death penalty to those who
murder whites rather than blacks involves the interests of the defendants and
the judge as well as the black and white communities in determining the value
of the loss of the lives of black murder victims).
169. "A judge decides for ten reasons/nine of which nobody knows." Win-
ter, supra note 123, at 2225 (citing a Chinese proverb). Several authors urge
candor about judicial reasoning as a value in itself and as clarification of the
values at stake in the cases decided. See Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1985
Term - Foreword: Traces of Self-Government, 100 HARv. L. REv. 4, 30-31
(1986); Minow & Spelman, supra note 129, at 54-56; Singer, The Player and the
Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 YALE L.J. 1, 32 (1984). For a general
scholarly treatment of the subject, see Shapiro, In Defense of Judicial Candor,
100 HARV. L. REV. 731 (1987).
170. Minow & Spelman, supra note 129, at 67 ("Otherwise, judicial opin-
ions risk becoming ritualized recitations of the talismanic phrases that are
compatible with the result announced, or cleverly edited statements from
prior judicial conversations removed from their original contexts and bearing
dubious relationships to the case at hand.").
171. Id. at 55 ("[I]f the judge cannot join the official statement of reasons
for a decision with its sources in the judge's own action, the judge loses the
chance, and slackens the discipline, to use words and concepts to frame and
improve judgment - to combine 'reason' and 'passion' in a process of con-
scious reflection.").
172. See M. NUSSBAUM, supra note 25, at 54-67.
173. See Minow & Spelman, supra note 129, at 68 (arguing that judges' fail-
ure to acknowledge the difficulty of their choices undermines the persuasive-
ness of opinions to those who disagree).
174. 1d. at 44, 60 (arguing that careful judicial thinking requires a "respon-
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5. Epistemological and Ethical Questions
The narrative and consciousness-raising methods that un-
cover a range of perspectives, when combined with exclusion
questions and contextual reasoning, have helped feminists to
develop a powerful epistemological critique of law and other
disciplines. 75 By using their experiences in general and their
experiences of legal institutions in particular, feminists have
shown that doctrinal categories presented as neutral and objec-
tive often exclude the perspectives of many while enshrining a
particular point of view.176 For example, when courts faced
with the issue of self-defense ruled that a repeatedly battered
woman's use of a weapon against her batterer during a lull in
the abuse cycle constituted excessive force in violation of a duty
to retreat, many women realized that the law of self-defense
captured the imagery of two men of comparable size, strength,
and physical training engaged in a single confrontation. 177
Not surprisingly, those whose experiences are reflected in
the law of self-defense are likely to view the law as neutral, ob-
jective, and sound.178 Those whose experiences are at odds
siveness to common humanity" and a "flexibility and sensitivity to new cir-
cumstances" that encourages "a direct human gaze between those exercising
power and those governed by it"); see also Goldfarb, When Judges Abandon
Analogy: The Problem of Delay in Commencing Criminal Prosecutions, 31
WM. & MARY L. REV. 607 (1990) (arguing for a contextual reasoning approach
to address genuine problems and interests at stake in the context of a particu-
lar criminal procedural issue).
175. In fact, as MacKinnon says, feminism's epistemology is its politics. C.
MACKINNON, supra note 41, at 120. A feminist epistemological approach as ap-
plied to law is perhaps best articulated in Minow, supra note 40, on which I
rely heavily in this Section.
176. See Minow, supra note 40, at 32, 69, stating that:
[T]ypically we adopt an unstated point of reference when assessing
others. From the point of reference of this norm, we determine who
is different and who is normal.... The unstated point of comparison
is not neutral, but particular, and not inevitable, but only seemingly
so when left unstated.... Thus, theorists in many fields have at-
tempted to identify suppressed cultures aAd voices that represent po-
tential and actual points of resistance to dominant cultural forms.
Id.
177. See B. Siegel, supra note 152, at 12-13; see also Schneider, Equal Rights
to Trial For Women: Sex Bias in the Law of Self-defense, 15 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 623, 644 (1980) (urging recognition of self-defense in battered women's
assaults of batterers).
178. See Minow, supra note 40, at 57-58, 73 (noting that unstated norms
embedded in law entrench one point of view as natural and that "[t]he more
powerful we are, the less we may be able to see that the world coincides with
our views precisely because we shaped it in accordance with those views").
Because privileged men can constitute reality as they apprehend it, MacKin-
non observes that they have "Cartesian doubt for good reason." C. MAcKIN-
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with the dominant position embedded in the doctrine can see
more easily the particularity and partiality of the law and its
implicit assumptions about how the world works and about
whose perspectives count.179 Accordingly, if those whose per-
spectives are reflected in the structures and institutions of dom-
inant legal culture hold exclusive official authority to judge
others, and if they exercise that judgment without self-reflec-
tion or criticism, then those who differ from the dominant
norms will look not only deficient but deviant.180 To render
fairer judgments,181 decisionmakers must seriously consider the
multiplicity of perspectives. 8
2
Martha Minow has elegantly elaborated the epistemologi-
cal challenge of feminist theory expressed in its insistence on
the link between power and knowledge.183 She demonstrates
how feminists try to disentangle uses of power from judgments
of quality and confront standards of quality constructed on
images of privileged males.184 Minow views feminist work as
NON, supra note 41, at 122. Women, she says, have a problem opposite to
Descartes'. Id at 123.
179. MacKinnon writes of the challenge that a "dissident reality" can pose
to the prevailing system:
The point of view of a total system emerges only when confronted, in
a way it cannot ignore, by a demand from another point of view. This
is why epistemology must be controlled for ontological dominance to
succeed, and why consciousness raising is subversive. It is also why,
when law sides with the powerless, as it occasionally has, it is said to
engage in something other than law - politics or policy or personal
opinion - and to delegitimate itself. When seemingly ontological
conditions are challenged from the standpoint of a dissident reality,
they become visible as epistemological. Dominance suddenly appears
no longer inevitable. When it loses its ground it loosens its grip.
C. MAcKINNON, supra note 41, at 239-40.
180. See supra note 88; see also Minow, supra note 40, at 53 (claiming that a
stance that treats one's own perspectives as unproblematic renders other per-
spectives invisible and beyond discussion).
181. Minow, supra note 40, at 76 ("Mhe solution [to acting ethically] is not
to adopt and cling to some new standpoint, but instead to strive to become and
remain open to perspectives and claims that challenge our own.").
182. Id. at 73-74 ("Mhe more marginal we feel from the world ... the
more likely we are to glimpse a contrast between some people's perceptions of
reality and our own.").
183. Id at 65 (asserting that power is related to knowledge and that the
version of reality with the power to prevail constructs internal scripts about
how to know); Flax, supra note 95, at 633 (explaining that the work of Fou-
cault and others has sensitized us to the connection between knowledge claims
and power).
184. Minow, supra note 40, at 61 (feminism has "named the power of nam-
ing" and "challenged both the use of male measures and the assumption that
women fail by them"); see also C. GILuIGAN, supra note 30, at 69-70 ("[A]s long
as the categories by which development is assessed are derived from research
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exposing the conceptual distortions that can arise from differ-
ential access to knowledge systems and to making meaning in
the world.18 5 The recognition, by Minow and others, that mul-
tiple perspectives exist leads feminists to deny the possibility of
neutrality and objectivity. 8 6 Therefore, feminist lawyers and
law teachers perpetually seek to uncover whose perspectives
and interests are represented in a particular law, case, practice
or institution, and whose are excluded, and how including ex-
cluded viewpoints might reshape the analysis.187 The feminist
methods of storytelling and consciousness-raising, exclusion
questions and contextual reasoning, offer hope that participants
can come to understand that which they have not experienced
and is not in their interests.1 88 In this sense, feminist methods
have ethical substance and feminism constitutes a moral
philosophy. 8 9
Although some may misapprehend it as such, feminism's
moral philosophy is far from moral relativism.L9° The feminist
belief that all persons are situated in their experiences, and
on men, divergence from the masculine standard can be seen only as a failure
of [women's] development.").
185. Those who win a given struggle for control [of definitions of real-
ity] have the best access to the means of producing knowledge, such as
the mass media and schools. Such control may even shape the terms
of access for other points of view, so that exclusions appear neutral,
based on merit or on other standards endorsed even by those who re-
main excluded.
Minow, supra note 40, at 67.
186. Id, at 45-46 ("This aspiration to impartiality, however, is just that -
an aspiration rather than a description - because it may suppress the inevita-
bility of the existence of a perspective and thus make it harder for the ob-
server... to challenge the absence of objectivity.").
187. See supra note 138 and accompanying text; see also Minow, supra note
40, at 86 ("The difficulties each of us has in seeing around the bend of our own
thought can be eased with the help of insights from others who are positioned
differently.").
188. See Bartlett, supra note 95, at 849 ('The difficulty in recognizing op-
pression one has not experienced... makes the necessity of a 'method' all the
more apparent.").
189. Drawing on the insights of postmodernism, Drucilla Cornell has sug-
gested a conception of "ethical feminism" developed, in part, through the re-
telling of myths and allegories of "the Feminine." See Cornell, supra note 10,
at 645.
190. See Bartlett, supra note 95, at 867 ("[I]f being right means that one has
expressed one's personal tastes or interests which have no greater claim to va-
lidity than those of anyone else, being right is a rhetorical device used to assert
one's own point of view, and verification is both impossible and pointless.").
Bartlett explores a range of feminist epistemological stances - rational empir-
icism, standpoint epistemology, postmodernism and positionality. Relativism is
not on the menu.
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that our knowledge is therefore contingent, creates a moral and
political vision that requires each of us to broaden our exper-
iences through consideration of the experiences and perspec-
tives of others with whom we were previously unfamiliar.191
The claim that we cannot surmount subjectivity involves an ob-
ligation always to try.192 We must attempt to understand what
the world looks and feels like to others, and continually to
challenge and revise our own viewpoint in light of heightened
sensitivity to others' experiences. 193 This approach may enable
us to avoid the moral error of assuming that experiences mean
to others what they mean to us.194 To respect others and to
treat them justly requires taking their perspectives seriously.195
These views compel a conception of truth that is, in Bart-
lett's terms, "positional."'19 Positionality means that one can
191. See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
192. This paradox has a corollary. See Minow, supra note 40, at 75 ("Only
by admitting our partiality can we strive for impartiality.").
193. With these observations, we have moved from Husserl's phenomenol-
ogy to Heidegger's hermeneutics. Whereas Husserl believed in objective em-
piricism, see text accompanying note 134, Heidegger, and subsequently
Gadamer, reoriented phenomenology to account for the preconceptions of the
perceiver who is situated in her prior experiences. They suggest that one can
come to understand another's viewpoint by constantly seeking to revise the
distortions of one's pre-understandings through attention to the differences be-
tween one's starting assumptions and another's perspective. Although this
task requires a persistent skepticism about our own judgments, it affords sig-
nificant interpretive achievements - glimpses of truths - however partial.
Although Gadamer focused primarily on textual understandings, Heidegger fo-
cused on understandings of the world as well, for all understanding, he be-
lieved, is fundamentally through language. See H. GADAMER, TRUTH AND
METHOD (1975); M. HEIDEGGER, BEING AND TnE (1962). To this "hermeneu-
tics of tradition" has been added a "hermeneutics of suspicion," with
Habermas and Derrida finding reason for skepticism about the ideology of lan-
guage itself - not merely of those who use it. See Derrida, Three Questions to
Hans-Georg Gadamer, in DIALOGUE AND DECONSTRUCTION: THE GADAMER-
DERRIDA ENCOUNTER 52 (1989); Habermas, A Review of Gadamer's Truth and
Method, in UNDERSTANDING AND SOCIAL INQUIRY 335 (1977). Feminism has
drawn on hermeneutics in developing its eclectic theory of knowing.
194. See Spelman, On Treating Persons as Persons, 88 ETHICS 150, 152
(1978) ("Treating someone as a person ... involves keeping an eye on the ten-
dency to think of others on the models of ourselves.").
195. See id. at 161 ("[Wlhen you recognize and respond to the person I am,
you are treating me as the person I am in a maximal sense."); see also Minow
& Spelman, supra note 129, at 60 (asserting that whether judges acknowledge
the humanity of each litigant before them is a basic question of justice); Mi-
now, supra note 40, at 74 ("We prefer to have our perceptions validated; we
need to feel acknowledged and confirmed. But when we fail to take the per-
spective of another, we deny that very acknowledgment and confirmation in
return.").
196. See Bartlett, supra note 95, at 880-87.
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trust and act on the theories that seem to make the best sense
of one's lived experiences. One can do so, however, only by en-
gaging in an ongoing process of critical reflection, such as that
described above, when shaping the theories, and by seeking to
verify and modify those theories in the crucible of new exper-
iences. 197 Simply stated, what we know depends on what we
do. Good theory requires engagement in a sound theory-gener-
ating practice that can move us toward truths in a gradual, up-
ward spiral.198
B. CLINICAL METHODS, CLINICAL THEORY
A student of philosophy who turns from the discourses of the great
metaphysicians to the oration of the prophets may feel as if he were
going from the realm of the sublime to an area of trivialities. Instead
of dealing with the timeless issues of being and becoming, of matter
and form, of definitions and demonstrations, he is thrown into ora-
tions about widows and orphans, about the corruption of judges and
affairs of the market place. Instead of showing us a way through the
elegant mansions of the mind, the prophets take us to the slums.
- Abraham Heschel1 99
Like feminism, clinical education is not monolithic. Inher-
ent in the term "clinical" is a reference to medical education,
an indication that, as originally conceived, clinical legal educa-
tion involved direct client service.200 Given the diversity of law
school programs now labelled clinical, the medical analogy ob-
scures more information about its legal counterpart than it il-
luminates. For purposes of this Article, I will focus on the
earliest and most common form of clinical education: a setting
in which law students, under supervision, represent indigent
people.201 Yet, even this limitation does not focus my examina-
197. Id. at 884 ("Positionality reconciles the existence of reliable, experi-
ence-based grounds for assertions of truth upon which politics should be based,
with the need to question and improve these grounds.").
198. For a list of theorists who view effort as a component of truthseeking,
see i- at 881 n.229. See also Minow, supra note 40, at 74 (implying that we
move toward truth by deliberately engaging "other people's truths").
199. A. HEsCHEL, THE PROPHESs 3 (1962).
200. See, e.g., Creger & Glaser, Clinical Teaching in Medicine: Its Rele-
vance for Legal Education, in CLINICAL EDUCATION AND THE LAw SCHOOL OF
THE FUTURE 77 (E. Kitch ed. 1970).
201. Bob Condlin describes this clinical model as primum inter paria. See
Condlin, supra note 65, at 46. In a previous article, Condlin attributes the rise
of this model of clinical education to the priorities of the Council on Legal Ed-
ucation for Professional Responsibility, clinical education's early benefactor.
See Condlin, Socrates' New Clothes: Substituting Persuasion for Learning in
Clinical Practice Instruction, 40 M.D. L. REv. 223, 223-24 n.2 (1981) [hereinafter
Condlin, Socrates' New Clothes].
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tion on a single entity, for various clinical programs subsumed
in this description conduct and defend themselves in a variety
of ways. Inevitably, then, my descriptions will capture and en-
dorse particular versions and visions of clinical education.
I present below a taxonomy of clinical methods that I have
distilled from the clinical literature. As in the taxonomy of
feminist methods, the categorical divisions are somewhat artifi-
cial and overlap considerably, acquiring their full meaning only
with reference to one another. Moreover, although some clinics
may employ all of these methods, I know of no clinic that em-
phasizes all of them equally.20 2 Nevertheless, the list is not
constructed hierarchically, for - in my view - the ideal clinic,
when operating in highly favorable circumstances, would pro-
mote all of the learning methods described.203 I do not suggest
that most clinics approach the ideal, but offer this taxonomy as
aspiration and inspiration.
1. Learning from Experience
Clinical education offers law students a method. In an in-
fluential essay, Gary Bellow described this method as involving
the students' assumption of recognized roles in the legal sys-
tem, the use of the students' experiences in performing these
202. See Condlin, supra note 65, at 47 ("Usually, clinical teachers have fa-
vorites among these objectives and shape their programs to emphasize one or
two in a sustained and systematic way.").
203. The curriculum of the Boston College Criminal Process Clinic, which
I direct, is designed to promote all of the learning methods described, although
constraints of time, personnel, and funding have limited more effective accom-
plishment of some of these methods. Developing these learning methods
while providing competent representation, particularly when personal liberty
is at issue, is a precarious pedagogical balancing act, but is fostered by small,
selective caseloads. This is a luxury of clinical programs compared to most
other lawyering settings with primary aims of profit or service and without ac-
ademic affiliations. See Bellow & Kettleson, From Ethics to Politics: Con-
fronting Scarcity and Fairness in Public Interest Practice, 58 B.U.L. REv. 337
(1978); Kettleson, Caseload Control, 34 NLADA BRIEFCASE 111 (1977); Silver,
The Imminent Failure of Legal Services for the Poor: Why and How to Limit
Caseload, 46 U. DET. J. URBAN L. 217 (1969). Each of these articles recognizes
the difficulty while pressing the need to limit caseloads in a legal services con-
text. For a thoughtful discussion of the relationship between caseload and ser-
vice in a legal services setting, see Tremblay, Toward a Community-Based
Ethic for Legal Services Practice, 37 UCLA L. REV. 1101 (1990).
The unusual luxury of limited caseloads in law school clinics creates the
urgency for addressing the enumerated learning needs in these clinics, because
professional life may afford few repeat opportunities. I acknowledge, however,
that the fact that the profession does not come close to meeting the profound
legal needs of the poor renders the tradeoff of caseload for education a particu-
larly tragic one. But see infra note 228 and accompanying text.
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roles as the focus of intellectual inquiry, and the examination
of particular tensions that arise in this process as a source of in-
sight.20 4 The tensions that Bellow identified arose from the
clinical teacher asking students (1) to participate in the legal
environment while observing their own participation, (2) to as-
sume responsibility for cases while refusing, due to the poten-
tially harmful consequences to others, to afford them full
autonomy, and (3) to experience their sometimes conflicting
identities as lawyers and students simultaneously.205 Clinical
pedagogy shares with feminism an emphasis on the examina-
tion of experience - here, a particular set of experiences - as
a source of understanding, and the "continual reconstruction of
knowledge in the light of new experience."2 6
The students' responsibilities, in the colorful and chaotic
clinical environment, create fertile soil for learning. Persons in
this situation must locate signposts and models by which to
steer their course and must develop a conceptual scheme for as-
similating and accommodating their feelings and experiences. 20 7
These motivational conditions are likely to stimulate students
to discuss with their teacher criteria for evaluating lawyers'
performances and theories for explaining the repertoire of pro-
fessional and institutional behaviors that they have observed.
Because students will want to justify the various decisions they
have made in the course of their client representation, they are
likely to feel some personal stake in the standards and theories
of lawyering that form during these discussions.208
204. Bellow, supra note 66, at 379. The belief that experience can be an ef-
fective teacher reflects certain underlying assumptions. In Bellow's words:
Basic to the claims of clinical teaching is the assumption that human
experience involves patterns of meaning and realms of understanding
that can be differentiated from each other, and that exhibit distinctive
and characteristic methods, ideas and structures. That is, the way we
think about and understand objects, life, mind, social reality from an
observational and empirical perspective is very different from the way
we experience the phenomenon aesthetically or as an outgrowth of
subjective self-awareness.
Id at 407 n.17.
205. Id at 390-94.
206. Id at 400.
207. Id at 383 ("The knowledge that one will have to perform tasks in an
unfamiliar environment produces an internally felt need for guidance for some
framework within which he or she can make sense out of the experience, and
cope with the anxiety unfamiliarity generates.").
208. See id. at 384, stating that:
[Students] have confronted in concrete form some of the problems of
choice and judgment basic to the role involved, and they have exper-
ienced the common human need for felt consistency and coherence in
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Students may often represent people who present them
with a melange of legal, personal, and institutional problems in
an unsifted form.20 9 As lawyers, students must identify and an-
alyze these problems, thoroughly consider and evaluate an in-
ventory of possible courses of action, decide on a course of
action under conditions of uncertainty, plan for a variety of
contingencies, and interact throughout the process not only
with teachers and fellow students, but with clients, adversaries,
witnesses, judges, court personnel, and other interested per-
sons.2 10 The success of this endeavor as pedagogy depends on
the employment of a method of careful and sensitive review
throughout the planning and evaluation process.
Such a review should encompass a scrupulous self-assess-
ment to help students understand what has transpired and plan
future conduct. Anthony Amsterdam has suggested that this
self-assessment might involve students asking themselves a lit-
any of questions,211 including:
their behavior. If the class discussion is oriented in these directions,
the instructor will often find a group considerably less willing to ig-
nore the precise applications of the theories and standards being ad-
vanced, and uneasy with explanations of behavior which carry implied
criticisms of their conduct. In both these phenomena, there is consid-
erable potential for the stimulation among students of further
thought, analysis, and investigation.
Id (footnote omitted).
209. See White, supra note 14, at 162, stating that:
The new lawyer is surprised to discover that in practice no case ever
comes to him as a clean-cut paradigmatic case, but always has uncer-
tainties, ambiguities, rough edges and paradoxes built into it. This is
so because the case comes from life, not from the exposition of a the-
ory, and these are the qualities of actual human experience. To deal
with the fact that circumstance and culture constantly change, the
mind must have not a grid of established moves but the capacity to
invent new moves ... the capacities of an Odysseus, confident that he
can meet a new situation with intelligence by focusing on what it ac-
tually is.
Id.
210. See generally Amsterdam, Clinical Legal Education - A 21st-Century
Perspective, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 612 (1984) (proposal for the direction of legal
educational reform in the latter part of the 20th century).
211. Amsterdam views these questions as the "points of entry" to kinds of
reasoning essential to effective lawyering. Id. at 617. He designates three such
kinds of reasoning "ends-means thinking," "hypothesis formulation and test-
ing," and "contingency planning." Id. at 614-15. He also sees these questions
as "the beginning of the students' development of conscious, rigorous self-eval-
uative methodologies for learning from experience - the kind of learning that
makes law school the beginning, not the end, of a lawyer's legal education."
Id. at 617.
Peter Margulies has pointed out that unless students ask themselves a rig-
orous set of questions about their experiences, they may end up learning inap-
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What were my objectives in that performance? How did I define
them? Might I have defined them differently? Why did I define
them as I did? What were the means available to me to achieve my
objectives? Did I consider the full range of them? If not, why not?
What modes of thinking would have broadened my options? How did
I expect other people to behave? How did they behave? Might I have
anticipated their behavior - their goals, their needs, their expecta-
tions, their reactions to me - more accurately than I did? What clues
to these things did I overlook, and why did I overlook them?
Through what kind of thinking, analysis, planning, perceptivity,
might I see them better next time? 212
Such reflection brings into .consciousness the often incho-
ate, pre-conscious theories and principles by which the student
is operating.21 3 Only by bringing into consciousness and mak-
ing explicit those theories that underlie action can the student
observe, evaluate, and improve them.2 1 4 Clinical education thus
propriate and inaccurate lessons from those experiences. Such errors in
judgment arise from the documented tendency for people to draw conclusions
from an events' graphic characteristics that leave emotionally resonant im-
pressions. These conclusions may derive more from prejudices than from gen-
uine insight, because an event's less salient characteristics may often be more
important in shaping careful conclusions. See R. NIsBErr & L. Ross, HUMAN
INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND SHORTCOMINGS OF SOCIAL JUDGMENT (1980),
cited in Margulies, "Who Are You to Tell Me That?" Attorney-Client Deliber-
ation Regarding Nonlegal Issues and the Interests of Nonclients, 68 N.C.L.
REV. 213 (1990).
212. Amsterdam, supra note 210, at 617.
213. Professor Kreiling states that deliberate human behavior is a conse-
quence of a person's "theory of action." Kreiling, Clinical Education and Law-
yer Competency: The Process of Learning to Learn from Experience Through
Properly Structured Clinical Supervision, 40 MD. L. REv. 284, 290 (1981). To
identify problems of effectiveness in professional behavior, persons must artic-
ulate their theories of action, rendering them testable. Id. at 291. By observ-
ing their own behavior, they may discover an inconsistency between their
"espoused theory" and their "theory in use," contributing to the problems of
effectiveness. Id
214. As Kreiling writes:
Unless the professional can analyze his (often tacit) intellectual
framework - can determine why he took such action and what re-
sults were produced by taking such action - he cannot learn signifi-
cantly from his experiences.... The clinical experience provides a
closely supervised setting in which the student can practice making
his "theories of action" explicit. By requiring students to articulate
their "theories of action" in recurring professional situations and by
recording the way they actually behave in those situations, a system
can be established for using the student's experiences to test his pro-
fessional effectiveness.
Once ineffective professional behavior has been identified, there
is strong motivation to learn why it has occurred. The next step in
the process of learning from experience, then, is to determine what
problems caused the ineffectiveness.... [These are] "learning dilem-
man".... The determination as to why professional behavior is inef-
fective is based on exposure to these learning dilemmas.. . . By
1650 [Vol. 75:1599
1991] FEMINISM AND CLINICAL EDUCATION
lays the foundation for lifelong self-education with future ex-
periences providing the grist for inquiry.2 1 5 Professor Kreiling
systematically articulating his proposed "theory of action" in a given
situation, taking action, and then comparing the actual results with
the expected results . . . the identification of inconsistencies among
components of the theory should, under appropriate circumstances,
provide motivation to modify one's "theories of action" and promote
more effective professional behavior.






Id at 294. This appears to be a graphic depiction of what I have designated the
"theory-practice spiral."
215. Id. at 284 ("Clinical education should ... provide the students with a
method for future learning from their experiences."). Some clinical educators
view this clinical method as the skill of evaluation. See, e.g., Tarr, The Skill of
Evaluation as an Explicit Goal of Clinical Training, 21 PAc. L.J. 967 (1990).
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describes the method as:
how to develop theories of problem solving by utilizing established
lawyering theory and by generalizing from experience; how to apply
these theories in the actual performance of lawyering tasks; and how
to analyze the results of performance in order to test the effectiveness
of the action taken and thereby improve one's theory.
216
He then describes the kind of classroom, feedback and supervi-
sory relationship that supports this learning method,217 drawing
on interdisciplinary literature to support his claims.218 Such a
method is intended to develop, in the words of another com-
mentator, a microtheory of lawyering.21 9
As an epistemological matter, a broader and deeper sort of
comprehension may follow from integrating knowledge which
has been absorbed not just through cognition, but through a
jumble of impressions, sensations, feelings, intuitions, and ac-
tions, that are accessible at various levels of awareness. By crit-
ically reflecting on such a complex assortment of phenomena,
as Creon had done by the close of Antigone, a person can come
to a holistic, visceral understanding, a kind of meaning that can
be felt and trusted because it makes good sense of experienced
events.220 To clinical educators, this explains why doing and
knowing are so intimately related.
As in feminist theory, the relationship between doing and
knowing challenges the traditional dichotomy between theory
and practice.221 As Bellow observes, the clinical method:
216. Kreiling, supra note 213, at 288.
217. Id. at 297-336.
218. Kreiling's model of learning from experience is based largely on C.
ARGYRiS & D. SCHON, THEORY IN PRACTICE: INCREASING PROFESSIONAL EF-
FECTIVENESS (1974). His prescriptions for the supervisor-student relationship
rely heavily on C. ROGERS, ON BECOMING A PERSON (1961) and Rogers, The In-
terpersonal Relationship. The Core of Guidance, 32 HARV. EDUC. REV. 416
(1962). He also draws from a wealth of other sources, primarily in the fields of
education and psychology.
219. See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 64, at 558.
220. See, e.g., Bellow, supra note 66, stating that:
[E]xperience produces a qualitative change in the mode and content of
knowing, which cannot be replicated by the transmission of informa-
tion.... The ways in which legal concepts and ideas are understood
after they have been used in an interview or across a bargaining table
"feel" differently in a sense that is not fully explained by the fact that
they are more readily remembered.
Id. at 382.
221. In Bellow's words, clinical education has the "capacity to erode or at
least foster examination of the rigid distinctions between theory and practice,
fact and value, the subjective and the objective, which underlie the dysfunc-
tions of modern social life." Id. at 378; see also D. BELL, THE REFORMING OF
GENERAL EDUCATION 108 (1966) ("[The only knowledge of permanent value is
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assumes that the immediate and the remote, the concrete and the
general are intertwined and can only be understood in human experi-
ence as such .... After graduation our students will be plunged into
a welter of impressions, processes, roles and obligations. The most
important questions they will face will not be concerned with the co-
herence of doctrine or the skills of case analysis, but with making
sense of this experience, of coping with it, understanding it and grow-
ing within it, in the context of the particular professional role they
have chosen to perform. The breadth, depth, and applicability of this
understanding will be a function, in large part, of whether and how
they have learned to learn. 2
Like Bellow, many clinicians see the method of learning from
lawyering, when properly conceived, as a method of learning to
learn from experience.223 Such a method constitutes one of
clinical education's primary substantive goals.2 2
Even if clinicians endorsed the mastery of lawyering arts as
their pedagogical objective, law students could not attain such
mastery during the brief span of a clinical program. Students
do inevitably learn some lawyering skills in the course of a
clinical program, but more importantly, they learn the founda-
tional skills for learning further skills in the future.22 More-
over, the entire enterprise takes place in a client service
context, rendering. law not merely an object of study, but a ve-
hicle for aiding, perhaps even empowering, the often dis-
empowered persons who constitute the clinic's clientele. This
service, in itself, offers a valuable lesson about the promise of
law, even if such service provides means to other educational
ends as well.226 Indeed, the clinic's transmission of a critical
theoretical knowledge; and the broader it is, the greater the chance it will
prove useful in practice."); Frank, A Plea for Lawyer-Schools, 56 YALE L.J.
1303, 1321 (1947) ("An interest in the practical should not preclude, on the
contrary, it should invite, a lively interest in theory. For practices unavoidably
blossom into theories, and most theories induce practices, good or bad.").
222. Bellow, supra note 66, at 394-95.
223. See supra notes 213-16 and accompanying text.
224. I have deliberately confounded the usual distinction between method
and substance. I am not the first to suggest their interconnection. See, e.g.,
Cover, For James Wim. Moore: Some Reflections on a Reading of the Rules, 84
YALE L.J. 718 (1975); Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REv. 693
(1974). For a discussion of the similarities and differences between the mean-
ing of "method" and the meaning of "procedure" in comparison with substance
or substantive law, see Bartlett, supra note 95, at 843-44.
225. See supra note 215 and accompanying text.
226. I have no question about the value of exposing law students,
many of whom have been remarkably insulated from these realities,
to the ravages of class, caste, poverty, and race in our society and its
pervasive relationship to the legal system. Nor is there much to be
said against enlarging, through student practice, the severely limited
opportunities for legal assistance available to low-income people, inso-
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self-reflective model of lawyering precludes the treatment
of cases in a mechanistic, formulaic manner and thus supports
the implicit goal of improved client service by future practition-
ers.227 This clinical model may be especially helpful to students
who subsequently enter public interest settings that are too
constrained and underresourced to provide adequate
training.22s
2. Learning from Synthesis
Just as dissecting the lawyer's role can build clinical the-
ory, so too can clinical theory emerge from examining the law-
yer's role in larger social structures. All clinical learning
occurs in an interpersonal context, against a backdrop of doctri-
nal law and procedure, and within a framework affected by
courts, administrative agencies, or other bureaucracies. The
multidimensionality of the setting requires of students and
teachers a:
demanding synthesis of the personal, professional, subjective and em-
pirical dimensions of lawyer behavior as well as the doctrinal, institu-
tional, and process aspects of the legal system of which it is a part.
[The clinical method] can be used to develop . . . appreciation of the
complex interaction of rule, institution, personnel, process and social
context that constitute the legal system. It can raise some of the most
basic questions about the relation to the legal order of language, sym-
bol, myth, and social consciousness .... 229
Clinical settings, because of their integrative potential, can
enlarge understanding of the traditional subjects of legal educa-
tion: rule, doctrine, policy, and procedure.2 0 The structuring
of the traditional curriculum into an array of doctrinally-de-
far as this effort is not inconsistent with the educational aims of the
program.
The radical potential of the clinic method, however, lies in its ca-
pacity to deal with these problems in a more total way - in its basic
intention to infuse law study with experience and knowledge of the
legal system in operation.
Bellow, supra note 66, at 377-78.
227. Unnecessarily distinguishing between means and ends creates discom-
fort here. Service is both an end of clinical education and its means to other
essential ends. The fact that service serves other ends does not undermine its
importance, although the quantity of immediate service may be circumscribed
by other educational needs. See supra note 203. The hope is that the quality
of future service will be enhanced by the tragic present tradeoff.
228. See Bellow, Turning Solutions Into Problems: The Legal Aid Experi-
ence, 34 NLADA BRIEFCASE 106, 117-21 (1977) (describing the problems of rou-
tinized legal services practice and offering solutions which can be reinforced
by clinical training).
229. Bellow, supra note 66, at 396-97 (footnote omitted).
230. See Janus, supra note 2, at 463 (arguing that clinical education "helps
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fined compartments can mislead students about the entangled
reality of the lawyering process. Because clinics focus on this
reality, a reality which requires knowledge and analysis of
rules, doctrines, policies, and procedures, clinics can help to
cure misunderstandings about the interrelatedness of these
subjects to one another and to other processes. Further, clinics
help to deepen understanding of principles of law and policy by
providing greater insight into how such principles operate. Ob-
serving the relationship of principles-as-conceived to principles-
in-action affords a more profound understanding than one can
attain through, textbook study of principles alone.231
Yet, as the observation quoted above suggests, the scope of
the clinical promise is far broader. The clinic's contextualized
approach to the study of law provides clinical participants with
rich data that makes all manner of theoretical and interdiscipli-
nary inquiry possible. Clinical participants can observe closely
the structures of the legal worlds in which lawyers function,
providing them with a vantage point from which to construct a
macrotheory of lawyers' interactions with the legal system and
with the world. 2 In developing such a theory, participants
would "travel up and down the levels of generalization - mov-
ing from the concrete to the abstract and.., back again."
Such a theoretical project for clinical education illuminates
yet again the intimate relationship between earth and sky.2 4
students integrate the knowledge and skills they have learned in law school
with their own values to become effective, ethically grounded lawyers").
231.
[The clinical method] asks that the student be concerned, with larger
units than typically organize and focus the law school experience.
The student experiences the curriculum as a set of differentiated sub-
jects and planes .... At a deeper level, law is presented as separated
from other bodies of thought - history, philosophy, natural and social
science. Even the affective and cognitive dimensions of knowing seem
to be unconnected in the apparent exclusiveness of our concern with
linguistic manipulation and logical rigor. Never are these aspects of
the legal order and the functioning of human beings within it brought
back into any totality, any sense of the whole. . . . The clinical
method goes considerably further, providing an integrative focus ....
Bellow, supra note 66, at 395-96.
232. See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 64, at 556.
233. See Menkel-Meadow, Two Contradictory Criticisms of Clinical Educa-
tion" Dilemmas and Directions in Lawyering Education, 4 ANTIOCH L.J. 287,
297 (1986) (claiming that clinics have the potential to generate macrotheory,
but that clinicians have not emphasized it sufficiently).
234. I am grateful for this image to Graham Strong, from whom I bor-
rowed it. See G. Strong, Panel on "Learning from Other Disciplines" 79,
Materials Prepared for AALJS Conference on Clinical Legal Education (June
6, 1990) (unpublished conference materials on file with author).
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To truly understand the systemic structures in which lawyers
participate, students would have to confront the "inarticulate
conclusions about the nature of reality, of knowledge, and of
language" that prefigure any legal issue,2 and that reside be-
neath consciousness for many of us. In the words of Bishin and
Stone:
[A]lthough the lawyer may not always be aware of it, in his day-to-day
tasks of counselling, planning and contending, he is engaged in activi-
ties that philosophy - as well as such related disciplines as psychol-
ogy and sociology - has long sought to analyze and illuminate.... In
view of this, it is curious that those concerned with law have not more
fully exploited the wealth of available philosophical - and related
theoretical - literature. 2 3 6
The breadth of the synthesis suggested here, although a
challenging one, is not an impossible dream, especially for
those, like Bishin and Stone, who are attached to the notion
that most persons are theoreticians. 23 7 To articulate and under-
stand the theories on which they operate, such persons need
only become involved in a process, like clinical education, that
helps bring these theories into conscious awareness, where one
can scrutinize them.P8
Supplementing traditional law school education by embed-
ding law in its context, clinics have the potential to transform
the study of law into the study of a culture that deploys law for
various purposes. History, philosophy, literature, and other hu-
manistic disciplines can provide a new angle for viewing the
legal skills employed, the legal order encountered, and the rela-
tionship of each to one another and to the wider social world.
235. W. BIsHIN & C. STONE, LAW, LANGUAGE, AND ETHICS: AN INTRODUC-
TION TO LAW AND LEGAL METHOD vii (1972).
236. id
237. See C. MACKINNON, supra note 41, at 102 (describing as a value of con-
sciousness-raising methods that they make "everyone a theorist"). Gramsci
might call such persons "organic intellectuals," although he did not seem to
disperse the designation as widely as I am suggesting here. A. GRAMSCI, SE-
LECTIONS FROM THE PRISON NOTEBooKs OF ANTONIO GRAmsCI 332-33 (1971).
Kohlberg and Gilligan viewed as philosophers all children and adolescents en-
gaged in developmental struggle to determine how to live their lives. See
Kohlberg & Gilligan, The Adolescent as Philosopher: The Discovery of the Self
in a Postconventional World, 100 DAEDALUS 1051, 1071-72 (1971).
238. Speaking of interdisciplinary education generally rather than clinical
education specifically, James Boyd White observed:
An important consequence of this kind of study is that it would bring
to the center of consciousness, where they could be studied and criti-
cized, the assumptions underlying the culture of law and of our larger
culture; this in turn might enable us better to perform our lawyers'
functions of cultural criticism and transformation.
White, supra note 14, at 165.
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3. Learning from Critique
Clinical education is not just integrative but critical.
Although clinics offer fledgling lawyers the comfort that de-
rives from a growing familiarity with the practice of law, they
also seek to cultivate discomfort with the practice of law, a dis-
comfort that derives from introspection and self-consciousness
about the meaning and consequences of the professional behav-
ior of oneself and others. Clinical educators urge students to
draw on the experience of law practice and the synthesis of law
and other disciplines that creates a larger context for these ex-
periences, so that students, in turn, can take a number of addi-
tional steps: to appraise traditional lawyering practices and the
theories that they embody, to develop normative views about
the relationship of these theories and practices to standards of
justice, and to improve this relationship where possible. These
steps constitute the process of critique.239
Lawyers breathe life into legal rules via formal and infor-
mal means.?A Robert Condlin urges scrutiny of "the low-visi-
239. I have drawn this definition largely from Condlin, supra note 65, at
48-49. Condlin argues that critique is the most important objective of clinical
education. Id. at 47. I have deliberately fudged the issue of whether critique is
method or objective by entitling this section "Learning from Critique" rather
than "Learning Critique," as I have with "Learning from Synthesis," supra
Section H. B. 2., and "Learning from Responsibility," infra Section H. B. 4.
("Learning from Experience," supra Section H. B. 1., has no alternate formu-
lation.) I believe that synthesis, critique and responsibility are rightfully con-
sidered methods rather than objectives, because students learn how to do them
by doing them. What is important about a student's critique is not so much
what it contains, but that a student learns critical habits in the process. Like-
wise, it is important that students learn habits of synthesis and responsibility.
My dispute here is with the distinction between method and objective (or sub-
stance), because the two are so integrally related. See supra notes 224, 227.
Others disagree. See Barnhizer, The Clinical Method of Legal Instruction: Its
Theory and Implementation, 30 J. LEGAL EDuc. 67, 71 (1979) ("[Wlhile this ar-
ticle takes the position that key aspects of the learning of systems of profes-
sional responsibility and lawyer skills are the unique and vital role of the
clinical method, these elements are not part of the definition of that method,
but specific educational goals that can best be achieved through a careful use
of the clinical methodology.").
240. See, e.g., J. Charn & G. Bellow, Memorandum to the Michelman Com-
mittee, Harvard Law School, app. A, at 1 & n. 2 (Oct. 13, 1981), cited in Feld-
man, On the Margins of Legal Education, 13 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE
607, 626 n.56 (1984-85), stating that:
For example, in every field of law, there are processes which nullify
laws, rules and policies, as well as unstated norms and practices (the
unofficial system) which create alternative policies and mandates. In
every transaction - between lawyer and client, client and others,
lawyer and lawyer, there are relationships which further shape and
influence outcomes. Many of these transactions become sufficiently
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bility ways in which lawyers amend, abrogate, and enforce the
law, and in the process, determine much of law's meaning for
persons who come in contact with it." 1 Condlin views critique
as clinical education's raison d'etre,2 and advocates its elabora-
tion as the culmination of a clinical curriculum.2 3  In his
words:
[Lawyer's] practices are amenable to theoretical elaboration, support
multiple research agendas, and can be divided, categorized, and se-
quenced conceptually for purposes of instruction. In addition, they
provide a distinct and relatively unexplored vantage point on the op-
eration of the legal system from which new critical insights about law
may be produced, and these insights in turn will have implications for
the ways in which statutes are drafted and doctrines elaborated. ...
In studying lawyer-skill practices, teachers and students come to see
how the individual actions of lawyers constitute and reconstitute legal
rules, and how the legal system's kantian (rule/policy) and aristote-
lian (lawyer dispositional) halves fit together.2 4 4
patterned to take on a law-like quality themselves. In our view, the
so-called gap between law in the books and law-in-action... is grossly
misleading. The differences are differences in kind rather than de-
gree and much too complex to be captured by such a linear concept.
Id.
241. Condlin, supra note 65, at 48.
242. Condlin also views critique as the university's raison d'etre:
Critique is a university's reason for being, its identifying characteris-
tic, and the only one of its multiple functions it fails to perform at the
price of being a university.... [C]ritique is the university's highest
function, its aspiration, the source of its greatest potential and its oc-
casional achievement and it remains the strongest basis of the argu-
ment for the university's existence.
Id, at 50 (footnote omitted).
243. See id. at 47 n.6, 74 n.77. Condlin believes that the clinical externship
model provides the best format for pursuing critique, since externships would
allocate oversight of the functions of lawyering and criticism to two different
persons - the cooperating attorney and the professor respectively. Id. at 53-
59. Although this might reduce certain role conflicts for the professor, if the
goal is to inculcate habits of critique in young lawyers-to-be, shouldn't profes-
sors engage in both activities with students as a model for student behavior?
Ultimately, Condlin's rationale for replacing the conventional clinic with a co-
operating law office alternative founders on his failure to acknowledge that
law .professors can do simultaneously those activities that they urge and train
young lawyers to do simultaneously. This is surprising in light of Condlin's
emphasis on role-model emulation as the basis for clinical teaching of profes-
sional ethics. See Condlin, The Moral Failure of Clinical Legal Education, in
THE GOOD LAWYER 317, 322-28 (D. Luban ed. 1984).
244. Condlin, supra note 65, at 48 (footnotes omitted). I interpret Condlin's
reference to the Kantian aspects of the legal system to mean those aspects
which involve rational moral and policy judgments as to those cases in which
rules will apply. His reference to Aristotelian aspects of the legal system is to
those aspects of judgment that depend on the inculcation of a particular way
of behaving, a moral disposition. Further, the Kantian aspects refer to tran-
scendent notions of rules and obligations whereas the Aristotelian aspects tie a
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Critique is an essential clinical method because a norma-
tive perspective is inherent in all lawyering skills.?45 To under-
stand the difference between an excellent lawyer and an
unethical lawyer, Condlin explains, one must have a tacit nor-
mative framework. Otherwise, one could never draw a line be-
tween counseling and controlling, maneuvering and
manipulating.246 Learning to articulate one's tacit normative
framework is a vital feature of clinical skills training, for it
helps young lawyers to avoid falling hostage to the unarticu-
lated norms of the prevailing practices.247 Without such train-
ing, these lawyers may not develop the inclination to consider
whether particular practices contribute to the furtherance or
the frustration of justice.24
Because lawyers wittingly or unwittingly make political
and moral judgments, good lawyers must evaluate their daily
lawyer's morality to judgments specific to the lawyer's role. I was aided in this
interpretation by reading Luban, Epistemology and Moral Education, 33 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 636 (1983).
245. See, e.g., Simon, Visions of Practice in Legal Thought, 36 STAN. L.
REV. 469, 504 (1984) (theories of how society is structured and what it will al-
low precede lawyers' practical judgments and compromises).
246. See Condlin, supra note 65, stating that:
[W]e do not call a person who fabricates evidence and obtains a
favorable settlement as a result, skillful; we call him dishonest....
The concept of skill has no meaning outside an ever-changing and
controversial normative context and it must be studied in that context
to be understood. Political critique is a necessary not just interesting
part of the study of skill ....
Id. at 52.
247. Id. at 53 n.24 ("[The critical clinical student] tries to understand why
things are done as they are and enlarge his sense of what could be done, rather
than internalize as habit what is commonly accepted."); see also Barnhizer,
supra note 239, stating that:
[P]erceptions of professional responsibility become distorted in re-
sponse to the particular legal environment in which they exist. It is
difficult enough to withstand these forces if the individual has already
developed a clear and strong understanding of his ... fundamental
values. If the individual has not developed a workable system of re-
sponsibility, however, it will be virtually impossible to transcend the
experiences. Because there are no standards by which to judge the
rightness of professional behavior, the measure of responsibility will
be that which is accepted generally.
Id. at 74.
248. See Condlin, supra note 65, stating that:
One can have normative theories about the proper performance
of lawyer practices, and theories about how lawyer practices contrib-
ute to the justice of the legal system as a whole.... The ability to
judge day-to-day law practice against ... standards of justice and fair-
ness is an essential quality of a good citizen and a good lawyer.
Id. at 48, 50-51 (footnote omitted).
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practice against conceptions of justice and fairness.2 9 Rarely,
however, is such an evaluative process explicit in the work-
place. Once students graduate, if not before, they experience
psychological, political, and financial pressures to assimilate
themselves unthinkingly to conventional norms of conduct.3 °
To transcend these pressures and become more autonomous ac-
tors, they must practice critical thinking skills at formative
stages.251
To engage in such a critical process, one must develop a co-
herent perspective on the "nature of a fair and just legal system
and the role of lawyer practices in operating and improving
it." 252 Such a perspective need not represent a fully conceived
normative system, but it should remain open to development in
the light of new experiences323 Only through critical move-
ment in a normative direction will lawyers achieve the capacity
249. See, e.g., Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy: Procedural Justice and
Professional Ethics, 1978 Wis. L. REV. 29, 81-83, and sources cited at Condlin,
supra note 65, at 51 n.19. For a critique of clinical education for largely failing
to address the politics immanent in lawyering and for focusing too intently on
the psychology of lawyering, see Simon, Homo Psychologicus: Notes on a New
Legal Formalism, 32 STAN. L. REV. 487 (1980) [hereinafter Simon, Homo
Psychologicus]. For a clinician's reply that Simon's critique is unfairly reduc-
tive, see Menkel-Meadow, supra note 64, at 565 n.61.
250. See supra note 247; see also Barnhizer, supra note 239, at 73-74.
251. See Condlin, supra note 65, at 53, observing that:
[Ciritique of lawyer practices is pursued for its contribution to the de-
velopment of the individual - not to be unknowingly captive to re-
ceived wisdom is to be more fully autonomous - because it is an
essential element of a law trained person's completed world view, and
as a foundation for reform of the incentive structures within which
lawyer behavior operates.
Id.
Steven Hartwell conducted a modified "Milgram" experiment in his clinic,
asking students to inform a "client" (actually a confederate of Hartwell's) that
she should lie under oath in order to win her case. Deferring to authority in
the clinical setting, most of the students transmitted this patently unethical
advice to the client, just as Stanley Mfilgram's subjects continued to obey the
experimenter's instructions to administer what they believed to be increas-
ingly more painful electric shocks to people who were making "learning er-
rors." See S. MILGRAM, OBEDIENCE TO AUTHoRITY 20-21 (1974). Plainly, the
development of moral reasoning benefits from a capacity to transcend the per-
suasion of perceived authority. Hartwell has experimented with pedagogical
methods - including lessons in empathetic listening and assertiveness training
- that promote this moral reasoning capacity. See Hartwell, Moral Develop-
ment Ethical Conduc and Clinical Education, 35 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 131,
141-43 (1990).
252. Condlin, supra note 65, at 48-49.
253. Id. at 49-50 ('These theories can be incomplete, tentative, or not
wholly (or even in major part) original, as long as they are also coherent, intel-
ligent, and genuinely open to further development.").
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to consider and reconsider how they ought to conduct them-
selves and to imagine and reimagine alternative forms of con-
duct and better institutional arrangements. Because the legal
profession is fraught with fundamental moral ambiguities that
good lawyers must confront,2-4 the process of critique is an es-
sential lawyer's skill that clinical education helps to develop.
Moreover, because the nature of legal practice implicates ques-
tions of social engineering and the pursuit of justice, clinics
must participate in fulfilling legal education's obligation to ex-
amine models of justice in action.2
Law students, like most people, manifest interest in ideas
of justice, fairness and equality, but they have few shared ex-
periences from which to examine the meaning of these ideas.
By engaging in a supervised legal setting in which one's own
and others decisionmaking infuses practical meaning into these
ideas, students find a ground from which to soar toward crucial
systemic questions. In this setting, such questions no longer
seem airy irrelevances, but become vitally important to under-
standing one's experiences and developing personal commit-
ment to one's work.
When clinical educators define the subject matter of
clinical education this broadly, the relationship between profes-
sor and student necessarily changes. Clinical students and
professors then will approach important theoretical questions,
questions about which the professor has no claim to exclusive
expertise or ultimate authority. In doing so, the professor and
students will pool their observations and knowledge to join in a
collective exploration. The clinic classroom thus becomes less
rigidly hierarchical, a place for continual rethinking of the rela-
tionship between experience and theory in a genuine search for
254. Richard Wasserstrom's oft-cited essay formulates the two fundamen-
tal difficulties as those of manipulation and domination. Wasserstrom, Law-
yers as Professionals: Some Moral Issues, 5 HuM. RTs. 1 (1975). As
Wasserstrom states it, these problems arise from the fact that the duty of zeal-
ous representation in the lawyer-client relationship "renders the lawyer at
best systematically amoral and at worst more than occasionally immoral in his
or her dealings with the rest of mankind" and that the lawyer-client relation-
ship is one in which "the lawyer dominates and in which the lawyer typically,
and perhaps inevitably, treats the client in both an impersonal and a paternal-
istic fashion." Id at 1; see also Luban, Paternalism and the Legal Profession,
1981 Wis. L. REv. 454 (arguing that a moral dilemma exists when a client's
wishes do not meet with the attorney's approval or the attorney's assessment
of the client's interests).
255. See Barnhizer, supra note 2, at 123-24.
256. See Bellow & Johnson, Reflections on the University of Southern Cali-




4. Learning from Responsibility
Ethical reasoning is a specific kind of critical reasoning.
Professor Barnhizer has developed a list of concepts which law
students must address to adequately understand professional
ethics: ethical proscriptions, ethical philosophy, personal mo-
rality, professional role, institutional analysis, social conscious-
ness, and systemic reform.259 Students can intellectually attend
to theoretical systems that explore these concepts, but "the
traumatic impact of reality soon assaults much of the system,"
blurring any internalized understanding of personal behav-
ior.260 On the other hand, shouldering the burden of responsi-
bility, as in clinical education, requires students to examine
their personal values and the relationship of these values to
their professional role, which, in turn, compels students to eval-
uate their professional responsibility to clients, legal institu-
tions, and society.261 Participating in events that require ethical
judgments inspires students to scour the enumerated categories
of ethical concepts for material that will assist them in con-
257. I do not claim that the clinic classroom becomes nonhierarchical, sim-
ply less hierarchical than a traditional law school classroom can sometimes be.
See id. at 693-94; cf. Condlin, Socrates' New Clothes, supra note 201, at 223-26,
248-74 (describing a pattern of teacher manipulation and control in clinical su-
pervision, despite claims to the contrary). Condlin's observations may repre-
sent failures of implementation rather than design. See Bellow, On Talking
Tough to Each Other: Comments on Condlin, 33 J. LEGAL EDUC. 619, 620
(1983); Redlich, The Moral Value of Clinical Legal Educatio" A Reply to Pro-
fessor Condlin, in THE GOOD LAWYER 350, 356-57 (D. Luban ed. 1984).
258. See generally J. PiAGET, THE MORAL JUDGMENT OF THE CHILD (L
Gabain trans. 1966). Whether ethical reasoning constitutes a unique kind of
reasoning is unclear. I read many of the neo-Kantian ethicists to suggest that
it is. See, e.g., A. GEWIRTH, REASON AND MORALITY (1978); R.M. HARE, THE
LANGUAGE OF MORALS (1952); J. RAwLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
259. Barnhizer, supra note 239, at 76-77.
260. I& at 74.
261. Id. at 74-75. Kohlberg describes the psychological dynamics underly-
ing such examination. When confronted with a situation that challenges their
values, creating internal conflict about the appropriate response, people must
examine their value structure and advance to a more developed moral stage in
order to resolve the conflict. Experiencing the conflict is necessary to induce
the dissonance that will lead to further moral development. See generally L.
KOHLBERG & E. TURIEL, Moral Development and Moral Education, in Psy-
CHOLOGY AND EDUCATIONAL PRACICE 456 (G. Lesser ed. 1971); RESEARCH IN
MORAL DEVELOPMENT. THE COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENTAL APPROACH (L.
Kohlberg & E. Turiel eds. 1973). Although Kohlberg's developmental theory
may not be universally applicable, see, e.g., C. GILLIGAN, supra note 30, at 18,
these particular observations may have practical value.
1662 [Vol. 75:1599
1991] FEMINISM AND CLINICAL EDUCATION
structing explicit affirmative structures for guiding their pro-
fessional behavior.26 2
To say that making students responsible is the best way to
make them responsible is not the simple tautology that it ap-
pears. It means that actively taking responsibility contributes
to the development of responsible character to a greater extent
than any other approach including the study and analysis of
ethics.263 A person's response to a question about what she
would do if she were responsible in a hypothetical situation is
different from being responsible for acting in a real situation;
not only because the latter situation engages a person at a more
intense, purposeful, and consequential level.2 " A person ad-
262. See I. SCHEFFLER, CoNDIoNs OF KNOWLEDGE: AN INTRODUCTION TO
EPISTEMOLOGY AND EDUCATION 103-04 (1965), stating that:
Practice in professional education is misconceived if assimilated to the
model of drill or the repeated study of standard cases. There needs to
be room for having opportunities which will provide for the genuine
exercise of students' judgment, as well as for critical reflection on the
outcome and strategic principles of such judgment.
Id.
263. That law schools must undertake the responsibility to develop respon-
sibility in students, to nurture the "natural cognitive and emotional capacities
which express our moral nature," is widely accepted. See Richards, Moral The-
ory, the Developmental Psychology of Ethical Autonomy and Professionalism,
31 J. LEGAL EDUC. 359, 373 (1981). As Richards states:
[D]oing nothing in the way of conscious moral education is not ethi-
cally neutral or liberally tolerant: it is not to take seriously the facts
of moral development or the impacts of our educational policies on
moral development. Ethical reasoning is a complex, delicately intri-
cate, inestimably important human capacity which develops in re-
sponse to certain kinds of favorable circumstances. Professional
education, which educates the most powerful class of people in our so-
ciety, receives these people at a crucial age in which, in response to
the circumstances of professional education, they will or will not de-
velop better capacities for ethical reasoning concomitant with their
professional identity. I do not see how we can justifiably deny our ac-
tive responsibility for results we so palpably shape.
d. at 373-74.
264. See Condlin, supra note 65, observing that:
[Flor most students direct experience will add nuance and sophistica-
tion; and for some it will make the questions real for the first
time.... Until they are involved in such events, students do not take
seriously the possibility that the events could happen, or become
aware of all the factors involved in understanding and dealing with
them.
I& at 67.
Carol Gilligan has discerned gender distinctions in degrees of comfort
with hypothetical problems:
Hypothetical dilemmas, in the abstraction of their presentation,
divest moral actors from the history and psychology of their individ-
ual lives and separate the moral problem from the social contingen-
cies of its possible occurrence. In doing so, these dilemmas are useful
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dressing a hypothetical description, even a highly particularized
one, cannot fully grasp what "drives" the event2 65 and is miss-
ing "the thousand intangibles" about the people and the events
involved that establish the conditions for, and the constraints
on, ethical judgment.26 6 Accordingly, although students can
construct what they consider the most just response to hypo-
thetical ethical dilemmas, they may do so in an idealized fash-
ion that bears little resemblance to how they would feel if
responding to actual events.26 7 Under these circumstances,
their talk of what is just will be just talk.268
This view supports the claim that clinical education has
for the distillation and refinement of objective principles of justice
and for measuring the formal logic of equality and reciprocity. How-
ever, the reconstruction of the dilemma in its contextual particularity
allows the understanding of cause and consequence which engages the
compassion and tolerance repeatedly noted to distinguish the moraljudgments of women. Only when substance is given to the skeletal
lives of hypothetical people is it possible to consider the social injus-
tice that their moral problems may reflect and to imagine the individ-
ual suffering their occurrence may signify or their resolution
engender.
The proclivity of women to reconstruct hypothetical dilemmas in
terms of the real, to request or to supply missing information about
the nature of the people and the places where they live, shifts theirjudgment away from the hierarchical ordering of principles and the
formal procedures of decision making. This insistence on the particu-
lar signifies an orientation to the dilemma and to moral problems in
general that differs from any current developmental stage
descriptions.
C. GILLIGAN, supra note 30, at 100-01.
265. Condlin, supra note 65, at 67.
266. Luban, supra note 244, at 643.
267. As Luban has observed, the concerns of a student responding to a hy-
pothetical dilemma may include:
[T]rying to say what the teacher wants to hear, trying to sound smart,
and trying to walk the line between seeming too ruthless and too
tender in the eyes of her classmates. Even a student who wants to
give honest responses to hypothetical moral problems can succumb to
these subliminal pressures. And, supposing that she doesn't, she is
left with no constraints on her judgment. The client is not a real per-
son, nor are the adversar[ies] ... nor is the case.
Id at 643 (emphasis in original). In Barnhizer's words:
Non-clinical methodologies cannot place the burden of responsibility
and outcome squarely upon the individual student. They thus permit
him to stop short of the reality of personal value systems and profes-
sional behavior, and allow the idealization of projected individual atti-
tudes and professional responses.
Barnhizer, supra note 239, at 75 (emphasis omitted).
268. See Condlin, supra note 65, at 66-67 ("[I]f one is interested in a moral
philosophy of lawyering it is necessary to deal with these questions in the first
person.... Without the experience of acting in lawyer role moral philoso-
phizing will be just so many words.").
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cornered the optimal method for teaching and examining pro-
fessional ethics.2 9 Professors Condlin: 0 and Luban7 1 have ex-
plored the Aristotelian foundation for this claim. Aristotle's
belief in an activist moral epistemology suggests that intellec-
tual methods alone are inadequate for attaining a moral per-
spective.272 Rather, Aristotle claimed that one comes to
understand the principles that underlie one's actions only by
reflecting on those actions.273 Because actions flow from one's
disposition to act in such a manner, developing a virtuous dispo-
sition, through repeated participation in virtuous activity, is an
essential precondition to understanding virtue and developing
moral judgment.274 In other words, actively experiencing moral
responsibility precedes understanding moral precepts and de-
veloping moral judgment.
For a law student, the process of internalizing a disposition
for ethical lawyering involves observing ethical instructors and
their manner of responding, and counseling response, to moral
dilemmas that arise in the course of lawyering. By reflecting
on the nature of these experiences with the instructors, the stu-
dent can develop a principled perspective on behaving ethically
as a lawyer. In Aristotle's words, "the virtues we get by first
exercising them .... For the things we have to learn before we
can do them, we learn by doing them."275 The key to unrav-
269. See Barnhizer, supra note 239, at 71-72 ("[E]ffective use of the clinical
method is the only presently available means of consistently facilitating learn-
ing of 'professional responsibility' in a meaningful, internalized way sufficient
to form an affirmative structure capable of guiding behavior .... ).
270. See Condlin, Moral Failure, supra note 243, at 323-24. Condlin also re-
lies on the work of Erik Erikson in support of this claim. According to
Condlin, Erikson asserts that although personality is established in young
adults, identity choices are delayed by students' extended sojourns in protected
educational environments. Late in their education, students desperately want
role models, and professional identity is inscribed by emulation of these role
models. In clinical settings, students have as a model an ethically scrupulous
lawyer-supervisor, and they can experiment with their new identities under
the supervisor's watchful eye. Id. at 322-23. Erikson's developmental theory
underlines the efficacy of such an approach. In his discussion of Erikson,
Condlin relies on Stone, Legal Education on the Couch, 85 HARv. L.REv. 392
(1971), and Watson, Lawyers and Professionalism A Further Psychiatric Per-
spective on Legal Education, 8 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 248 (1975).
271. See Luban, supra note 244, at 647-56.
272. Id. at 650-51.
273. Condlin, supra note 243, at 323.
274. See Luban, supra note 244, at 651 ("[F]irst principles are arrived at by
reflection upon activities we have already experienced pre-reflectively and in-
ternalized as dispositions.").
275. ARisTOTLE, NIcomcHAAN ETHics 2.1. 1103a32-1103b2, cited in
Luban, supra note 244, at 653.
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eling the seeming paradox of this passage is understanding the
need for an ethical exemplar and instructor whom the novice
can consult while performing the acts that inculcate his or her
ethical disposition.276
To morally educate students, instructors must bring them
up in ethical habits when the students are first encountering
professional responsibilities and shaping a professional iden-
tity.277 Only through an active process such as this, one that is
often available only through a clinical experience, can students
learn virtue. And only when students behaviorally experience
virtue with sufficient frequency for it to become a disposition
will they develop the ethical capacity to evaluate complex and
ambiguous situations and exercise appropriate moral
judgments.27 8
The intellectual activity involved in moral judgment is
what Aristotle called "practical wisdom." 79 Practical wisdom
is an ability to judge the particulars of a situation on the basis
of a disposition informed by reflection.280 Although general
rules may inform this judging process, they cannot wholly gov-
ern it because one cannot treat the meaning of rules as forever
fixed apart from the particular situations in which the rules ap-
ply. To the contrary, "the ultimate particular" must sometimes
correct the general rules.2s ' As Aristotle stated:
[A]bout some things it is not possible to make a universal statement
which shall be correct. In those cases, then, in which it is necessary to
speak universally, but not possible to do so correctly, the law takes
the unusual case, though it is not ignorant of the possibility of error.
And it is nonetheless correct; for the error is not in the law nor in the
legislator but in the nature of the thing, since the matter of practical
affairs is of this kind from the start. When the law speaks univer-
sally, then, and a case arises on it which is not covered by the univer-
sal statement, then it is right . .. to correct the omission .... And
this is the nature of the equitable, a correction of law where it is de-
fective owing to its universality.
2 8 2
According to this perspective, one must reason from the partic-
ularities of a context to an ethical judgment. In this way, one
can make a behavioral choice even when the values relevant to
276. Luban, supra note 244, at 653-54 (importance of being brought up in
good habits).
277. See supra note 269.
278. See supra notes 272-76 and accompanying text.
279. See Condlin, supra note 243, at 324.
280. Id.
281. ARISTOTLE, supra note 275, at 6.8. 1142a27, cited in Luban, supra note
244, at 654.
282. Id. at 5.10. 1137b13-28.
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the situation, as is often the case, are incommensurable.
Aristotle's activist moral epistemology provides a philo-
sophical defense of clinical education as a method of learning
moral judgment from the experience of taking professional re-
sponsibility. The same Aristotelian conception of moral judg-
ment that recommends clinical methods also supports and
endorses the methods of individualized judgment that feminists
advocate.2 4 Although reached independently, the methodologi-
cal choices of each movement embody similar philosophical
principles and ethical goals.
III. SUMMARIZING COMPARISONS
Active searching intelligence becomes joined to openness, to a willing-
ness to be surprised and moved, in company with others.
- Martha Nussbaum s
In the foregoing description of clinical methods, one hears
the echo of feminist methods. This section moves beyond
awareness of the echo and elaborates more systematically the
hints of resemblance and distinction contained in the respective
methodological descriptions of each movement. First and fore-
most, the methodologies of feminism and clinical education
both emphasize, as the reading of Antigone illustrates,286 direct
personal experience as theory's starting point, as well as its re-
turning point for testing and rebuilding. To reiterate the meth-
odological premise of both movements, each conceives of the
relationship between explanation and experience, theory and
practice, in the shape of a spiral.287
A. USE OF EXPERIENCE
Clinical education has a predominantly pedagogical iden-
tity, generating considerable attention to the learning process.
283. Luban, supra note 244, at 655; see also T. NAGEL, supra note 147, at
134.
284. See supra note 146 and accompanying text ("feminist practical reason-
ing" as Aristotelian-style deliberation joined with consideration of multiple
perspectives).
285. M. NUSSBAUM, supra note 25, at 72.
286. See supra Section I.
287. See supra notes 61-62, 66-67 and accompanying text. In Always Com-
ing Home, Ursula LeGuin's science fiction vision of future society, all struc-
tural and sculptural forms take the shape of a spiral. U. LEGuIN, ALWAYS
COMING HoME (1985). In LeGuin's world, the spiral is the "inexhaustible met-
aphor .. . the visual form of an idea which pervade[s] the thought and cul-




In the interest of effective learning, clinical students engineer
and participate in events which they carefully analyze, soon
thereafter, and others who observed or participated in the same
events may join in the examination. Feminists, on the other
hand, though concerned with the learning process, generally do
not identify with pedagogy in the same way as clinical educa-
tors. Without the demand of short-term learning objectives,
feminists rely on the delayed retelling of experience to those
who may or may not have shared analogous events, but who
rarely shared the actual events.
Feminists rely on the consciousness-raising process of
storytelling about a broad range of life experiences as one
source of experiential data.28 8 Clinic educators and students
rely on a narrower band of experience, their own engagement
in professional work, as their primary source of data.2 89 Clinic
students, for purposes of learning, deliberately choose this band
of experience, which they could otherwise avoid or postpone.
Feminists, on the other hand, generally examine their own and
others' unavoidable, everyday experiences for purposes of
learning.290
Feminists generally place more importance than clinicians
on acquiring second-order experience, that is on enlarging per-
sonal experience by seeking out stories of others' experiences 291
and discussing these stories in group settings.292 Although a
clinical classroom may sometimes resemble this feminist pro-
cess, dressing for a time in consciousness-raising garb, clinics at-
tend primarily to first-order experience, the students' direct
involvement in events. Feminist methods of interpreting expe-
rience also tend to include more group involvement and feed-
back than do clinical methods of interpretation. Inquiry into a
clinic student's experiences often occurs in a community of two,
in a discussion between supervisor and student.2 93
288. See supra Sections II. A. 1. and II. A. 2.
289. See supra Section II. B. 1.
290. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 99-104.
291. See, e.g., supra note 151 and accompanying text.
292. See supra notes 105-06 and accompanying text.
293. See supra note 208 and accompanying text. Of course, some of these
discussions would take place in the clinic classroom with all of the clinic par-
ticipants involved, but others would occur in individual supervisory meetings.
For an argument that clinical teachers should remove all that is pedagogically
feasible from the supervisory interaction and place it in the classroom setting
and elsewhere, see Keynote Speech by Anthony Amsterdam, AALS National
Clinical Teacher's Conference (May 17, 1986) (unpublished text of speech on
file with author).
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Despite these distinctions, each movement uses its experi-
ential data similarly, generating insight by asking questions
that examine the meanings and implications of the data. The
movements are alike in the essential authority that they accord
to the data of experience in their respective intellectual
endeavors.
B. ROLE OF AFFECT
Because experience contains both cognitive and affective
content, exploring an experience fully requires exploring not
only its cognitive, but also its affective dimensions. Feelings
often provide windows to thought, and analyzing the causes and
consequences of particular affective reactions often is a valua-
ble step toward comprehending experience. When feminism
and clinical education claim that experience precedes explana-
tion, and that explanation must remain open to experience,
they are tacitly recognizing the role of affect in experience and,
therefore, in human understanding.2 5 Feminists and clinicians,
in their respective settings, devote time to bringing this role to
the surface, rather than submerging it, in order to facilitate
understanding.296
C. INTERPERSONAL DYNAMICS
One reason that experience inevitably includes cognitive
and affective dimensions is that experience generally occurs in
an interpersonal setting, and other persons arouse in us both
cognitive and affective responses. Because feminists recognize
the political content of personal interaction, they counsel atten-
tion to the social identity and experience-based points of view
294. The method of inquiry into experience has influenced a number of
disciplines. See A. ScHUTZ, THE PROBLEM OF SOCIAL REAL= (1967), stating
that:
In philosophy, literary criticism, psychology, linguistics, and the
social sciences, there is an emerging concern with the world as lived
and perceived .... Linked to this is an interest in the symbolic con-
structs people use to make sense of their experience. Too, there is a
preoccupation with 'common sense reality' and the structures of
meaning that are shared in particular cultures.
Id, at 55 (footnote omitted).
295. Although feminists recognize the role of feelings in developing under-
standing of self and the world, they do not claim that feelings are an autono-
mous, unmediated source of understanding. Rather, they recognize the
influence of social construction on emotion as well as cognition. See C. MAcK-
INNON, supra note 41, at 52.
296. See supra notes 162, 220 and accompanying text.
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of the persons who are interacting, as one contribution to a full
understanding of the events that the interaction engenders.2
Although the standard clinical vocabulary does not include ex-
plicitly political language to describe the interpersonal dynam-
ics of law practice,298 clinicians frequently study the nature of
these dynamics in at least implicitly political terms, and view
such study as essential to conscious participation in, and careful
evaluation of, the events that transpire.299
D. HIERARCHY AND COLLABORATION
Recognition by clinicians and feminists of the socially
charged quality of interpersonal dynamics has consequences for
the implementation of their respective methods. Clinical edu-
cators not only attend to relationships created by a legal event
such as the attorney-client relationship, but they consider the
student-teacher relationship as well.3°° Because clinical teach-
ers and clinical students are involved in a collaborative enter-
prise, and because they jointly consider and decide issues that
the teacher did not preconceive, the power in their relationship
is less imbalanced than it can be in many teacher-student rela-
tionships.30' Although the teacher's evaluation of students and
her insistence on the completion of certain lawyering tasks es-
sential to effective representation inevitably retain hierarchical
overtones, other more egalitarian features of the clinical pro-
cess diminish their impact.
Likewise, feminist teaching retains as few aspects of au-
thoritarian control as possible. Feminist teachers endeavor to
create a cooperative classroom climate that welcomes students
and other persons to share their life experiences as the basis
for further inquiry and speculation.30 2 In so doing, the feminist
classroom recreates, in part, the collaborative, questioning spirit
of the consciousness-raising method.303 For feminists, the
297. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
298. For a criticism of clinical education on this score, see Simon, Homo
Psychologicus, supra note 249, at 526-31.
299. See supra notes 209-12 and accompanying text.
300. See, e.g., Condlin, Socrates' New Clothes, supra note 201 (exploration
of the relationship between student and teacher in a clinical instruction
setting).
301. See supra note 257 and accompanying text.
302. See, e.g., Cain, Teaching Feminist Theory at Texas: Listening to Dif-
ference and Exploring Connections, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 165 (1988). Although
not all feminists would conduct a class in the manner described, Cain offers
one feminist approach.
303. See supra notes 105-06 and accompanying text.
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teaching medium has ethical weight and is part and parcel of
the learning message.304
Because first-order engagement in lawyering is the central
feature of clinical curricula,305 clinicians need not work as hard
as feminists to shape a climate that invites personal experience
into the learning inquiry. As a result, clinicians are more likely
than feminists to view the collaborative exploration of the
meaning of experiences as indigenous to their teaching enter-
prise, rather than as a conscious outgrowth of an ethical
choice.306 Nevertheless, many clinicians view the less hierar-
chical, more cooperative nature of clinical programs as an im-
portant contribution to law school education.30 7
E. INTERDISCIPLINARY INQUIRY
Feminists and clinicians resist the compartmentalization of
ideas that impedes awareness of their interconnection, and view
wide-ranging thought as essential to truth-seeking. Conse-
quently, both have adopted interdisciplinary methods.308 Each
movement engages the services of many disciplines to further
understanding of their own and others' concrete observations
and experiences.
Feminist legal thinkers can locate interdisciplinary assist-
ance with relative ease because scholars who identify their
work as feminist and share similar values and approaches are
at work in virtually every field. To the contrary, clinical educa-
tors do not constitute a readily identifiable, cross-disciplinary
movement. Because the work of clinical legal educators has no
tidy analogue in other disciplines, legal clinicians comb other
disciplines for whatever assistance they can find. For clinicians,
exploring the relationship of law to society requires such assist-
ance, just as for feminists, comprehensively grasping the perva-
sive impact of socializing forces such as gender requires
interdisciplinary treatment. Real life, the focus and source of
304. Marilyn Webb observes that if feminist teachers recreated hierarchy
within the classroom, their analysis would be "devoid of form." Webb, Femi-
nist Studies: Frill or Necessity?, in AND JILL CAME TUMBLING AFrm SEXISM
IN AMERICAN EDUCATION 410, 412 (1974).
305. See supra note 204 and accompanying text.
306. See supra note 257 and accompanying text.
307. See, e.g., Bellow & Johnson, supra note 256, at 694.
308. See supra notes 98, 232-36 and accompanying text. Carrie Menkel-
Meadow prefers the term "transdisciplinary," suggesting that it connotes a
synthetic endeavor beyond the claims of any single discipline to a greater ex-
tent that the words "interdisciplinary" or "cross-disciplinary." See Menkel-
Meadow, Durkheimian Epiphanies, supra note 75, at 108 n.71.
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each movement's analysis, suffers too much distortion when
viewed though a single disciplinary prism. Rather, understand-
ing and improving real lives compels careful synthesis of all
trustworthy knowledge, no matter its name or disciplinary
address.
F. CONTEXTUAL REASONING
The Aristotelian practical reasoning process employed by
each movement, moving as it does from specific to general,
links the particulars generated and examined by clinical and
feminist methods to the conceptual insights of many disci-
plines.3 0 9 Moreover, Aristotelian-style reasoning links these
particulars to each movement's normative concerns. Clinicians
and feminists worry, as did Aristotle, about the outcomes pro-
duced by applying principles to a limited factual context rather
than developing a full contextual understanding before render-
ing judgment. x"
Attention to context means that feminists and clinical par-
ticipants must explicitly acknowledge as relevant pieces of the
context the norms they bring to the details of events. As femi-
nists and clinicians have indicated, only by examining their nor-
mative structures can people truly comprehend and evaluate
their behavioral choices. Acknowledging one's normative incli-
nations as a facet of the exercise of judgment conforms with
the feminist's concern for candor in decisionmaking and for
persistent appraisal of the soundness of one's judgment. 3 " This
self-conscious examination also conforms with the clinician's
concern for vigilant attention to the ethics of lawyering
practices. 312
G. CRITCAL INQUIRY
Critique is inherent in the feminist enterprise. Feminists
closely scrutinize the norms and ideologies embodied in institu-
tional arrangements and compare these norms to their own
ethical values. 313 Although fewer clinical scholars have risen to
this challenge, such scrutiny is inherent in the clinical project
as well.314 No one concerned with the power allocations in
309. See supra notes 146, 279-80 and accompanying text.
310. See supra notes 281-82 and accompanying text.
311. See supra notes 164, 169-70 and accompanying text.
312. See supra note 263 and accompanying text.
313. See supra notes 104, 138 and accompanying text.
314. The time demands of clinical teaching pose an obvious hurdle to the
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legal process can avoid such critical institutional assessment.315
Taking this obligation seriously frees thinkers to envision and
implement better institutional choices.
For feminists and clinicians, the need to consult the subtle-
ties of varied experiences and a broad array of knowledge
sources emerges from the urgency of knowing. Both clinicians
and feminists find more at stake in this quest than intellectual
integrity alone. The quality of living itself is the weight in the
balance. Clinicians are deeply concerned with the conditions
that trigger the legal process, with the consequences of legal
process for their clients, and with the effect of legal process on
all who encounter it. Feminist legal thinkers are concerned
with these issues as well, because they are issues that implicate
trenchant questions of fairness, justice, and equality. The
concern with consequences, and with concepts that may gener-
ate better consequences, is an animating force of each
movement.3 16
H. MORAL JUDGmENT
From an Aristotelian perspective, feminist methodology
and clinical methodology each represent a species of activist
moral philosophy. Both movements view engagement in an
ethically-conscious practice as a prerequisite to the knowledge
and development of ethical judgment. Although the practices
of each movement are not equivalent, each conceives of an ethi-
cal practice as involving engagement in activity in which one
learns reflectively from and with others. Although perhaps
eliciting and attending to somewhat divergent details, each
views reasoning from the details of real events to principled
resolution as the appropriate manner of engaging and develop-
ing moral judgment.31 7
Insistence on contextual development does not undermine
the capacity of feminists and clinicians to make moral judg-
ments. Rather, this is the feature of feminist and clinical meth-
ods that makes moral judgment possible. It is in this sense that
elaboration of such clinical scholarship. Nevertheless, critique is inherent in
the clinical project, and to some extent, this will be reflected in its scholarship
as well. See, e.g., Cunningham, A Tale of Two Clients: Thinking About Law as
Language, 87 MIcH. L. REv. 2459 (1989) (discussing communication issues in-
volved in the lawyer-client relationship); Ellmann, Lawyeringfor Justice in a
Flawed Democracy (Book Review), 90 CoLUm. L. REv. 116 (1990).
315. See supra notes 245-46 and accompanying text.
316. See supra notes 174, 252 and accompanying text.
317. See supra notes 198, 263 and accompanying text.
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feminists and clinicians, while ethically scrupulous, are the op-
posite of ethical relativists.3 18 They have made a moral judg-
ment that moral judgments must be as carefully and flexibly
tailored as possible to actual lived situations.319 In other words,
feminists and clinicians require elaborate knowledge of the
many-faceted realities and novelties of a situation before pass-
ing judgment and taking action.320 Feminists and clinicians do
not use their sensitivity to the harm that faulty judgments can
unleash to evade making judgments, but to highlight the impor-
tance of taking extraordinary care in developing the requisite
knowledge from which to undertake the task of judgment.321
IV. BREAKING BOUNDARIES
Tihe knowledge with which a true education is concerned is never re-
peatable data, but knowledge that entails a use or activity - a knowl-
edge of practice that is a kind of action, including a kind of invention
or creation. The practice of law is not the application of doctrine
learned in law school to the facts of a client's case, for in one's prac-
tice the doctrine must be learned - and that means rethought, recon-
structed - over and over again.
- James Boyd White3 2 2
Despite apparent differences in form and content, femi-
nism and clinical education share a striking methodological
likeness. The extent of the resemblance is surprising in that
each movement has evolved largely without reference to the
other.3 23 Accordingly, one may ask what each movement could
now gain by explicitly considering the potential contributions
of each to the other. Having examined the existing linkages,
318. Martha Minow and Elizabeth Spelman see the ethically scrupulous as
"epistemologically humble." Minow & Spelman, In Context, 63 S. CAI. L. REv.
1597, 1638 (1990). This epistemological humility leads to an attention to com-
plexity and detail, particularly concerning the structures of domination in soci-
ety, that "can provide grounds for judgment of good and evil and for
descriptions that enable judgments." Id& at 1633.
319. See Friedman, Care and Context in Moral Reasoning, in MORAL THE-
ORY, supra note 91, at 190, 203 ("[A] responsiveness to contextual details and a
willingness to alter moral judgments depending on the context does not ...
imply an abandonment of moral principles."); Held, Feminism and Moral The-
ory, in MORAL THEORY, supra note 91, at 111-12 ("The tasks of moral inquiry
and moral practice are such that different moral approaches may be appropri-
ate for different domains of human activity.").
320. See Friedman, supra note 319, at 203 ("[S]ensitivity to contextual de-
tail... need only be associated with.., a worry that one's principles are too
narrow to deal with the novelties at hand." (emphasis in original)).
321. See Minow & Spelman, supra note 318, at 1638-39.
322. See White, supra note 14, at 161.
323. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
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we have now reached an appropriate moment to undertake
such consideration. What are the implications of applying femi-
nist methods more directly to clinical education? Conversely,
what are the implications for feminism of using clinical meth-
ods? How would each profit by taking the other more seri-
ously? And how would legal education profit in the process? I
will provide some preliminary responses to these questions in
the hope of generating the promising dialogues between femi-
nists and clinical educators that have yet to occur.
A. WHAT FEMINISM ADDS TO CLINICAL EDUCATION
Because clinical education employs relatively inexperi-
enced lawyers on cases of considerable importance in people's
lives, clinical educators are rightfully attentive to issues of ef-
fective lawyering technique. The danger is that clinical educa-
tion will become mired in the transmission of technical skills,
without attending to the inherent normative content and conse-
quences of lawyers' technique.3 24 Another danger is that
clinical educators will focus so intently on the unique demands
of each of a wide variety of cases that they will elide the large
cultural structures that influence and explain the patterns of
results that emerge.325 That clinical education has, at times, re-
alized these dangers reinforces its caricature, contrary to the
image presented here, as an anti-intellectual enterprise.
3 26
Clinic students' perceptions, judgments, strategies, and
communications as lawyers - the components of lawyering
technique - may differ qualitatively from their clients' percep-
tions, judgments, strategies, and communications. In part, these
differences may result from the fact that law students typically
come to clinics from different race, culture, and class back-
grounds than their indigent clients. Students and clients also
may differ on criteria such as gender, physical health, and
324. See supra notes 245-48 and accompanying text.
325. This danger is related to the concern expressed by Cornel West that
some philosophical pragmatists, particularly Richard Rorty, have used their fo-
cus on contextual detail to avoid patterns of power relations between races,
classes, and genders. See C. WEST, THE AMERICAN EVASION OF PHILOsOPHY: A
GENEALOGY OF PRAGMATISM 207-08 (1989). For a thoughtful glimpse at this as-
pect of West's work, see Mfinow & Spelman, supra note 318, at 1612-15.
326. See, e.g., Barnhizer, supra note 2, at 94 ('For clinical faculty to become
a legitimate part of the intellectual life of the university, they must release the
shackles of their latent anti-intellectualism."); Janus, supra note 2, at 464 (sug-
gesting that the previous curriculum of William Mitchell College of Law fo-




mental health. These powerful socializing forces systematically
influence what people come to know and understand about law,
ethics, justice, and the world. As a consequence, the student
lawyer's knowledge, like all knowledge, is partial and value-
laden, and by uncritically applying technical skills that do not
account for such structural influences, the student lawyer will
likely reproduce the dominant and distinctive world view at the
expense of the client's.3 27 Feminist thinkers would rivet their
attention on the impact of professional interaction across pow-
erful socially constructed divides. Their keen sensitivity to uses
of power and their sharply refined analyses of structures of
dominance would bolster clinical education's capacity to iden-
tify and address the technical and ethical problems that these
structures create.
If clinical education borrowed directly from feminist meth-
ods, it would gain an enhanced appreciation of the existence
and consequence of multiple perspectives in a profoundly strati-
fied world.328 Although clinical educators have not ignored this
facet of the clinical experience, 29 neither have they taken good
advantage of the sophisticated feminist literature on the mean-
ing of such differences, the methods for discovering the per-
spectives of those unfamiliar to us, or the moral imperatives of
doing so. 3 3 0 Such literature might help students to interpret
both their affective and cognitive reactions to their clients, re-
actions that may influence a student's behavioral choices and
assessments of the case.33' Feminist literature also may further
327. See, e.g., Alfieri, The Politics of Clinical Knowledge, 35 N.Y.U. L. REv.
7, 15 (1990) ('The notion of generalizable technique susceptible to universal
application overlooks diverse configurations of client class, gender, and race.
Because these configurations represent alternative constructions of client iden-
tity and world, their omission silences whole communities of voice and
story.").
328. See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
329. See, e.g., Eyster, Analysis of Sexism in Legal Practice: A Clinical Ap-
proach, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 183 (1988) (discussing approaches to addressing sex-
ism within the context of a civil litigation clinic). Clinicians have also
analyzed the meaning of differences among their students and the impact on
lawyering practices of the underlying negative attitudes of others. See, e.g.,
Scarnecchia, Gender & Race Bias Against Lawyers: A Classroom Response, 23
U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 319 (1990) (discussing various methods available in a
clinical setting for teaching students about gender and race bias).
330. See supra notes 151, 191 and accompanying text.
331. Condlin points out, for example, that students often do not believe,
until they feel it happening, that "strong personal feelings could affect their
level of effort, or that they would not probe deeply to discover truth if it
would jeopardize other strategic objectives." Condlin, supra note 65, at 67.
Barnhizer observes that clinical supervision involves "extremely sensitive
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sensitize students to how their clients may be perceiving them
and the legal process of which they are a part, and how these
perceptions can affect their relationship. Deeper knowledge of
these dynamics may engender insight into ways of facilitating
communication across apparent chasms.M2
The construction of a legal process in which an attorney
speaks in the client's stead creates an instrumental need for an
attorney to discover how the client understands the situation
that precipitated the legal proceeding and how the client wishes
to portray that situation in a public forum. If, as feminists as-
sert, one's view of the world is related to one's power in the
world, such that what one sees depends, in part, on where one
matters of student attitudes, biases, and basic values" as they affect represen-
tation and notions of professional responsibility. Barnhizer, supra note 239, at
104. This is necessary because:
Many students begin their clinical practice with romanticized ideas
about their clients, projecting some of their own values and expecta-
tions upon them. Other students come into the clinical process with
preconceived negative stereotypes regarding types of clients and/or
cases. In the first setting, when the clients do not respond to the stu-
dents' defined frames of political and social consciousness, resent-
ment, rejection or a rationalized depersonalization of that particular
client or group can occur. Students coming into this specialized edu-
cational experience with strongly developed racial, ethnic, educational
and social prejudices will, when left solely to naked experience, find
many reasons for affirming these stereotypes through cross-cultural
contacts.
Id at 94. Barnhizer then provides an extended example, replete with tran-
scripts, in which a student's racial prejudices seem to be affecting his negative
judgment about the strength of his client's case, and raises questions about ap-
propriate supervision under these circumstances. Id. at 111-24. Feminists
might add to Barnhizer's description an acknowledgment that the supervisor's
values, expectations and biases must be addressed in the clinical process as
well, because all of us are influenced at least unconsciously by stereotypes.
See Minow, supra note 40, at 65.
332. Lucie White's article represents such an effort, speculating retrospec-
tively about her client's experience of the case and about the remedial pos-
sibilities for affording her more meaningful future participation in the
attorney-client relationship and in the legal process more broadly. See White,
supra note 107.
Clinical education adds another layer of complexity to this analysis in that
a relationship forms between clinical teachers and student-attorneys who hold,
at least in the law school world and perhaps in the larger world, different so-
cial locations. The feminist literature on power relations, multiple perspec-
tives, and cross-cultural communication would have direct application to the
teacher-student relationship as well. Although this relationship is not the pri-
mary focus of clinical education, its dynamics must be addressed in order to
facilitate effective pedagogy within the primary learning project. This impor-




stands,33 3 then understanding the respective social locations of
clinic participants becomes an important piece of undertaking
and understanding client representation. If knowledge is al-
ways situated, knowing how to "represent" a client - in both
familiar senses of the word - requires an attorney to under-
stand the client's situation, broadly defined.334 Absent a consci-
entious effort to acquire such knowledge and awareness of the
difficulties of doing so, attorneys are likely to fall prey to unex-
amined assumptions that their understanding of the world coin-
cides with their clients' understanding, an assumption that
negates the clients' humanity.m
Reflecting on the power relations between attorney and cli-
ent and the different backgrounds from which each has come to
know the world is the students' first step toward compre-
hending how their clients cognitively and emotionally perceive
the world. Students might then devise remedial measures in an
attempt to vault the barriers that inhibit their ability to see the
world through the eyes of someone whose experiences and in-
terests they do not share. Feminist methods, such as narrative
and consciousness-raising, offer students help in stretching
their perspectives which, in turn, opens possibilities for examin-
ing and improving the quality of attorney-client relating.1
Every client comes to an attorney with a story and receives
cues on which aspects of the story the attorney finds relevant
333. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
334. Both familiar senses of the word refers to the typical usages of "repre-
sentation" in lawyering, indicative of advocacy on someone's behalf, and in the
arts, indicative of a portrayal of someone. As Edward Said writes, representa-
tions can "bear as much on the representer's world as on who or what is repre-
sented." Said, supra note 122, at 224.
Clark Cunningham describes how the representation involved in lawyer-
ing can mean simply a "re-presentation" of the client's words, or it can mean
the creation of a representation of a client, the latter bearing more closely on
Said's usage. Cunningham, supra note 314, at 2460-61. Cunningham discusses
the dilemmas and limits of each version of representation, preferring instead a
notion of lawyering as translation, even of lawyering as writing subtitles to a
foreign film. These alternative conceptions signify that two persons - legal
decisionmaker and client - are speaking the same experience in different lan-
guages after the client's lawyer has made the nuances and unfamiliar mean-
ings of each language known to the other speaker. I& at 2482-94. Each of
these conceptions of representation, even the least creative notion of "re-pres-
entation," requires a wealth of information about the client's life and
circumstances.
335. See Spelman, supa note 194, at 161 ("When you presume, you are not
treating me as the person I am.").
336. See supra note 188 and accompanying text.
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and plausible.337 The assessments implicit in the attorney's
cues, however, assume a particular audience with a particular
perspective. Relevance and plausibility are contingent charac-
teristics, dependent on one's world view.3 s Moreover, the
world view from which such an attorney is operating is likely
the view embedded in the dominant legal system and may not
be the view that captures or- organizes the meaning that the cli-
ent ascribes to the story.3 9 Accordingly, the likelihood of the
337. For examples of this phenomenon at work, see Cunningham, supra
note 314, at 2463-69, and White, supra note 107, at 21-32.
338. See, e.g., W. BENNETT & M. FELDMAN, RECONSTRUCTING REALITY IN
THE COURTROOM: JUSTICE AND JUDGMENT IN AMERICAN CULTURE 171 (1981)
("People who have different understandings about society and its norms may
disagree about the plausibility of a story.... If legal facts are reconstructed as
stories whose plausibility depends on understandings drawn from experience,
then [those] who come from different social worlds may disagree about the
meaning and plausibility of the same stories."); see also Minow & Spelman,
supra note 129, stating that:
The factfinder asks which version is more plausible, and which is
more compelling. The answers depend on more than the tests of in-
ternal coherence or logical consistency. These judgments emerge
from intuitions that may express both shared understandings in the
community and understandings contested by other members of the
community.
Id at 47.
For an argument that legal reform occurs via expanding notions of rele-
vance, see Bartlett, supra note 95, stating that:
The expansion of existing boundaries of relevance based upon
changed perceptions of the world is familiar to the process of legal re-
form. The shift from Plessy v. Ferguson to Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion, for example, rested upon the expansion of the "legally relevant"
in race discrimination cases to include the actual experiences of black
Americans and the inferiority implicit in segregation. Much of the ju-
dicial reform that has been beneficial to women, as well, has come
about through expanding the lens of legal relevance to encompass the
missing perspectives of women and to accommodate perceptions about
the nature and role of women. Feminist practical reasoning compels
continued expansion of such perceptions.
Id at 863 (footnotes omitted).
Using Gilligan's characters and images, see C. GILLIGAN, supra note 30,
Paul Spiegelman extends this argument to legal education:
A major source of the web imagery's power to energize education is in
the expanded notion of relevance Amy's web engenders. Because
Amy's web is generated from context and experience, she receives a
wider spectrum of input than Jake.... Amy's wider perspective can
make a genuine contribution to the teaching of doctrine, analytical
rigor, and theory.
Spiegelman, Integrating Doctrine, Theory and Practice in the Law School Cur-
riculum: The Logic of Jake's Ladder in the Context of Amy's Web, 38 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 243, 255 (1988).
339. See Spiegelman, supra note 338, at 255-56; see also White, supra note
107. White's story of Mrs. G. illuminates how lawyers can distort the meaning
of a client's experience by translating it into a narrative easily recognized by
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attorney comprehending the client's world is diminished con-
siderably if the attorney assumes, probably unconsciously, a
particular world view, translates the client's story into its
terms, and overtly or subtly conveys this strategy to the
client.340
To understand how an attorney might better hear a client's
story, feminists have looked to anthropology and sociolinguis-
tics. A recent article by Lucie White draws on scholars in these
fields who have documented marked differences in the lan-
guage practices, and in the cultural beliefs about the speech, of
dominant and subordinated groups.341 These scholars found
that members of dominant groups adopted a crisp, logical, de-
clarative speaking style, whereas the members of subordinated
groups chose to speak in a deferential, ambiguous, hedging
manner.-42 Dominant speakers, having the power to influence
others, convey certainty. In contrast, subordinated speakers
convey tentativeness, in recognition of their limited influence
and in an attempt to negotiate non-threatening encounters with
more powerful actors.3 43
White reports on the work of anthropologist William
O'Barr who, in extending these observations to legal settings,
identified two varieties of storytelling logic used by pro se liti-
gants in small claims court and reported on their respective
success.3" Litigants who used "rule-oriented" logic, corre-
the dominant legal system. Id. at 21-32. Mrs. G., however, departs from the
lawyer's script and reasserts her own meaning during her testimony at her
AFDC hearing. Id. at 46-48. By reanimating the legal categories with her own
experience, Mrs. G. critiques the systemic disregard of her point of view and
affirms her dignity and equality. Id at 48-51. At least this is one likely inter-
pretation of the story as supplied by White. Id.
340. This is one of the interpretations of Cunningham's "Case of the Si-
lenced Client." Cunningham, supra note 314, at 2463-65. It is also an interpre-
tation of his "Case of the Silenced Lawyer," with the difference between the
stories resting in the latter client's refusal to permit the lawyers to represent
him in this fashion. Id at 2465-69.
341. See generally White, supra note 107, at 14 n.48 (sources cited). My
cursory two-paragraph discussion of pertinent works from these disciplines
condenses information supplied by White, supra note 107, at 14-19.
342. See, e.g., R. LAKOFF, LANGUAGE AND WOMEN'S PLACE 70-71 (1975).
For responses to Lakoff's work, see White, supra note 107, at 15-16 nn.57-60.
For works considering speech strategies across categories other than gender,
see, e.g., Nichols, Linguistic Options and Choices for Black Women in the Ru-
ral South, in LANGUAGE, GENDER AND SOCIETY 54 (1983); LANGUAGE AND
POWER (C. Kramarae, M. Schulz & W. O'Barr eds. 1984), cited in White, supra
note 107, at 16 n.60.
343. White, supra note 107, at 14-15.
344. Conley & O'Barr, Rules versus Relationships in Small Claims Dis-
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sponding to the structural elements of legal claims, fared better
in court than those who used "relational" logic, organizing the
story around the details of the relationships between the liti-
gants.45 This research suggests that listeners from dominant
groups find the authoritative speaking style and rule-oriented
coding more trustworthy than the deferential speaking style
and relational coding characteristic of subordinated speakers.3
Norms of competency and credibility based on dominant rhe-
torical styles serve to further disadvantage those already
disadvantaged.
Unless student attorneys become conscious of such cultural
patterns and self-conscious about their reactions to client sto-
ries, they may mistrust even their client's truthful narratives,
when the storytelling conflicts with dominant narrative con-
ventions.3 7 If the attorney, through active questioning, im-
poses these conventions on the client's initial telling of the
story, genuine meanings of the underlying events may never
come to light.m If the attorney quickly rejects or reshapes the
putes, in CoNFLICT TALK (A. Grimshaw ed. 1989), cited in White, supra note
107, at 17 n.65.
345. Conley & O'Barr, supra note 344, at 2-3, 29-30.
346. See O'Barr & Atkins, 'Women's Language" or "Powerless Lan-
guage?," in WOMEN AND LANGUAGE IN LITERATURE AND SocIET 93, 102-03
(1980), cited in White, supra note 107, at 16 n.63; see also Lind & O'Barr, The
Social Significance of Speech in the Courtroom, in LANGUAGE AND SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY (1979); Conley, O'Barr & Lind, The Power of Language: Presen-
tational Style in the Courtroom, 1978 DUKE L.J. 1375; Erickson, Lind, Johnson
& O'Barr, Speech Style and Impression Formation in a Court Setting: The Ef-
fects of "Powerful" and "Powerless" Speech, 14 J. EXPERIMENTAL Soc. PsY-
CHOLOGY 266 (1978).
347. See Bennett & Feldman, supra note 338, at 171, indicating that:
The inability to produce a conventional story would leave individuals
vulnerable to having truthful accounts of their actions rejected. Sec-
ond, even the construction of a coherent story may not guarantee a
just outcome if the teller and the audience do not share the norms,
experiences, and assumptions necessary to draw connections among
story elements.
I&.
348. See supra notes 339-40 and accompanying text. Reevaluating in this
context one of the standard texts of the clinical education movement -
Binder and Price's Legal Interviewing and Counseling - raises provocative
questions. D. BINDER & S. PRICE, LEGAL INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING: A
CLIENT-CENTERED APPROACH (1979). For example, Binder and Price advise
student-lawyers to seek a chronological overview of past events from each of
their clients during an initial interview. Id. at 53-54, 72-85. What effect can
following this advice have on the emergence of the underlying story of a
subordinated speaker inclined toward relational logic? Can the lawyer's impo-
sition of a chronology during the initial interview cause important information
about the relationships of various actors in the story to be irretrievably lost?
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original version of the narrative, she forecloses many options
that may have helped her to educate legal decisionmakers
about the life of the person whom they judge - an education
that may have influenced their ultimate decision.349
If the attorney behaves in this fashion, the decisionmaker
may adjudicate the case in a manner that bears little relation-
ship to the client's understanding of what are the important
features of the story and what is a fair response to the story. S
No matter the outcome, a lawyer abandons a client by unilater-
ally and unreflectively enforcing, from a particular bias, a dis-
torted reconstruction of events.351 Although casting events in a
Can this dominant interviewing approach hinder the development of a candid
attorney-client relationship? Does it help explain why some clients become
withdrawn or experience discomfort with their attorneys? Can it undermine
the client's esteem in the attorney-client relationship? Does it feel like a dis-
tortion of the story to some of the storytellers?
349. See Minow & Spelman, supra note 129, stating that:
Converting the perspectives of the parties into the established lines of
arguments within the court hardly addresses the consequences of the
decisions in the lives of those parties. Learning to grasp the self-un-
derstandings of the parties is part of the task of understanding their
legal situation.... Advocates before the court can help by trying to
imbue the briefs and oral arguments with narratives of the parties'
experiences, perspectives, needs, and hopes.
Id at 52-53 (footnote omitted).
350. See, e.g., Cunningham's "Case of the Silenced Lawyer," in which the
client, a federal prisoner, understood his case as a challenge to the constitu-
tionality of the entire prison disciplinary system, whereas the clinic attorneys
understood the case as a more narrow claim that due process notice require-
ments had not been followed in this instance. Cunningham, supra note 314, at
2465-69.
351. See, e.g., Hosticka, We Don't Care What Happened, We Only Care
About What Is Going to Happen: Lawyer-Client Negotiations of Reality, 26
SocIAL PROBs. 599 (1979), stating that:
"[What happened" is not immutably fixed in an objective reality, but
is a social construction based on experience and interaction.... Mhe
primary issue may not be what happened to the client, nor what kind
of trouble the client is in, but who has the power to say what hap-
pened and to define the kind of trouble....
This control over the interaction is reflected in the official defini-
tion of reality that results from the interaction.... [P]ower is exer-
cised through the definition of reality.
Id. at 599-600 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis in original).
Kim Scheppele has indicated that although stories, including legal stories,
have no natural beginning or ending, law confines these stories narrowly and
thereby distorts their meaning, a process working to the particular disadvan-
tage of "outsiders." Scheppele, Foreword Telling Stories, 87 MIcH. L. REV.
2073 (1989). In Scheppele's words:
The claims of outsiders are often not heard in law because the exper-
iences and reactions and beliefs and values that outsiders bring to the
law are not easily processed in the traditional structures of legal nar-
ratives. Drawing the boundaries of legal stories closely around the
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partial light sometimes represents a viable strategy, it qualifies
as such only if both attorney and client consciously choose it af-
ter comparison with alternative strategies. Therefore, a femi-
nist clinical program would include the study of cross-cultural
communication and experiment with methods of building com-
munication bridges.
The narrative and consciousness-raising methods endorsed
by feminists, when applied to attorney-client interactions, yield
a different image than that of the self-appointed reality-defin-
ing attorney described above. Student attorneys would inter-
vene as little as possible in their clients' initial narrations,
encouraging clients to tell comprehensive stories as they view
them. After hearing a complete narration, the attorney would
explore the story to develop a fuller description of the client's
understanding and interpretation of the experiences that she
recounted. The student attorney also might elicit further back-
ground information about the client's life to help her compre-
hend the meaning of the story. When well into the narrative
process, the attorney might test her evolving understanding of
the story by reporting it to the client for validation and
modification.
Through this process, the student attorney becomes a sup-
portive and respectful learner and the client a teacher of her
life.3 2 Attorneys faithful to this process take seriously the ob-
particular event at issue may exclude much of the evidence that out-
siders may find necessary to explain their points of view. But stan-
dards of legal relevance, appearing to limit the gathering of evidence
neutrally to just "what happened" at the time of "the trouble," may
have the effect of excluding the key materials of outsiders' stories.
And this apparently harmless legal habit has effects that are not at all
harmless.
I& at 2097; cf Spelman, supra note 194, at 151 ("Treating persons as the per-
sons they are is trying to see them as they see themselves.").
352. I am not suggesting that attorneys should design this process to work
in the opposite direction as well. Involvement in their own consciousness-rais-
ing should not be the substitute fee for legal services extracted from indigent
clients. Cf. Joselson & Kaye, Pro Se Divorce: A Strategy for Empowering Wo-
men, 1 LAW & INEQUALITY 239 (1983) (developing a client consciousness-rais-
ing approach to representing women in divorce proceedings). On the other
hand, I would not foreclose a reciprocal consciousness-raising project should it
be chosen by clients. Nor am I precluding the possibility that a lawyer's assist-
ance in developing legal claims from a client's concerns might have conscious-
ness-raising consequences for the client. For example, it might be powerfully
transformative for a woman who has suffered her employer's repeated sexual
advances to come to understand that she has a legally recognized cause of ac-
tion for sexual harassment. See C. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF
WORKING WOMEN (1979) (laying the groundwork for subsequent legal recogni-
tion of sexual harassment as a cause-of-action).
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ligation to try to understand the world from another's perspec-
tive. The attorney seeks to create conditions that facilitate the
emergence of the client's story, an effort requiring a realistic
awareness of the barriers to success.* 3 The model for the at-
torney-client interaction is that of conversation, no less authen-
tic for its instrumental quality.s 4 In keeping with feminist
sensitivity to the politics of interpersonal dynamics,m this
model seeks to mitigate, although it surely cannot eliminate,
the distorting effects of power imbalance in the attorney-client
relationship.35 6
Feminists also would seek to reduce the distorting effects
of institutional processes on the events underlying adjudica-
tion.3 57 Following an extended exploration of the client's story,
feminists would have clinic students undertake with their cli-
ents a process of contextual reasoning. Starting from mutual
reflection on the client's lived experiences, attorney and client
would develop even more context. They would inquire about
other perspectives on the original account. What are the stories
of other participants in the process? How do they intersect
with the client's story? How do their stories affect the client's
story?
After reconsidering, perhaps reconstructing, the initial
story through contemplation of the contribution from other po-
tential versions, student and client would explore forms and
strategies available within the legal process for relating the
story so that other participants in the process might come to
understand it. 358 They would pay particular attention to strate-
353. See supra notes 346-47 and accompanying text.
354. See supra notes 191-92 and accompanying text.
355. See Bellow, supra note 257, at 621 ("One of the most important in-
sights of feminism is the degree to which it recognizes that ... the way we
treat each other expresses and, in fact, creates our political reality.").
356. See Wasserstrom, supra note 254, at 1 (suggesting the possibility that
the typical paternalistic treatment of clients by lawyers is inherent in the rela-
tionship, and therefore inevitable).
357. Cunningham explains that distortion is inevitable in that legal institu-
tions operate through language: "Like more familiar forms of language, law
creates knowledge by dividing up the spectrum of human experience into new
basic categories. But this new knowledge, like all forms of knowledge, in-
volves a loss, a reduction of the particularity of experience and the perspec-
tives of other understandings." Cunningham, supra note 314, at 2491 (footnote
omitted). But this distortion is unnecessarily increased by the stylized lan-
guage of legal opinions that impedes connections between the judge and liti-
gants (or others). See Minow & Spelman, supra note 129, at 76 ("The judicial
opinion is too partial and too formal to provide stories that elicit and express
humanity.").
358. This process resembles Cunningham's prescription for lawyering as
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gies for reaching the hearts and minds of those with deci-
sionmaking authority. These strategies would include
contextualization joined with the formulation of interpretations
of law that would be both persuasive as legal reasoning and re-
sponsive to the client's needs and interests.3s9 Presenting the
case in a contextualized but legally recognizable fashion would
enable decisionmakers to respond to the client as a real person
rather than as a stereotypical legal abstraction.360 Such a con-
textualized presentation also might enable decisionmakers to
recognize the partiality of their own perspectives, to reflect on
the limitations this partiality creates, and to realize how differ-
ently the world can look and feel to others.361
In other words, when student and client develop a contex-
tualized presentation of the client's participation in events,
rather than an oversimplified version that avoids the complex-
ity and nuance of real life, they enable clients to retain and
convey their personhood, and therefore their dignity, before
lawyer, judge, and all others involved in the legal process. 36 2
And when judges and other decisionmakers appreciate the per-
sonhood of those on whom they pass judgment, they reach bet-
ter decisions, for they can locate these persons in their
authentic situations, rather than see them as decontextualized
cartoons. 36
3
translation, such that "the lawyer engages both the client and the law-speak-
ing other party in dialogue that enables each to expand what they know so as
to meet on common ground." Cunningham, supra note 314, at 2491.
359. For a creative strategy of this type, see Brief Amicus Curiae, National
Abortion Rights Action League, et. al., Thornburgh v. American College of
Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986) (providing narratives by
men and women about the profound influence of abortion rights in their
lives).
360. See Minow, supra note 40, at 89 ("Besides seeking out unfamiliar per-
spectives and analogies new to the law, all judges should also consider the
human consequences of their decisions... rather than insulating themselves
in abstractions.").
361. See Minow & Spelman, supra note 129, at 52 ("Increasing the self-con-
sciousness of the judge in the act of judgment may ... enlarge the judge's abil-
ity to understand other human beings.").
362. It is intriguing to consider how a lawyer behaving according to these
premises might have interacted with Mrs. G. and how the lawyer might have
facilitated the self-defining, dignified testimony that Mrs. G. ultimately impro-
vised at the hearing, perhaps helping to shape it further to enhance the likeli-
hood of its being heard. If the lawyer had encouraged full discussion of a
broad range of options for this testimony, Mrs. G. might also have made other
choices regarding her self-presentation at the hearing. See White, supra note
107.
363. What a system of justice by computer would lack is not reason,
but understanding. while it can calculate and produce predictable de-
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Clinical programs that represent socially subordinated per-
sons provide a forum for epistemological inquiry into the impli-
cations of personal and institutional awareness of the
multiplicity of experiences and backgrounds from which
knowledge emerges. To feminist thinkers, this feature of
clinical programs also provides an opportunity for empathy.
Not only might students develop empathy, but students and cli-
ents might experiment together with ways to evoke empathy
within legal bureaucracies. 36 Because many competing views
and interests converge in a legal conflict, empathy will guaran-
tee neither a client victory nor a change in the underlying con-
ditions that precipitate the legal predicaments of the
subordinated. Nevertheless, empathy can nourish a more in-
formed decisionmaking process that is mindful of its
consequences. s
In sum, a feminist clinical program would seek to remake,
and study its remaking of, the attorney-client relationship. In
such a program, the student lawyer would not view the client
as dominant norms typically construct her - as a person who
rarely acts but is primarily acted upon, an object of the clinical
program and the legal process. Rather, the client, in conjunc-
tion with the student-lawyer, has an opportunity to engage in
shaping the case and in interpreting its meaning. Remaking
the attorney-client relationship then creates further prospects
for remaking the legal processes that follow. Through their
participation in cases guided by feminist-clinical precepts, stu-
dents uncover extensive material for analyzing the existing op-
portunities for, and obstacles to, remaking legal processes in
this fashion.
The combination of feminist and clinical methods marks a
cisions, given certain laws and provided particular facts, it cannot con-
sider how such decisions will affect individual people nor may it
reconsider its initial judgment in light of such actual or unanticipated
effects. In the justice-by-computer fantasy we have just rehearsed,
people cannot be treated with dignity or respect, for there are no
human agents around who could so treat them.
Minow & Spelman, supra note 129, at 42.
364. Feminists recognize the difficulty of this task, since bureaucracies op-
erate by impersonal standards aimed at achieving efficiency and control. See
Elshtain, supra note 57; Ferguson, supra note 41. But bureaucracies are en-
forced by bureaucrats who are, at bottom, human, and who therefore have em-
pathetic capacities to which litigants can appeal.
365. See Minow & Spelman, supra note 129, at 71-72 ("We do see things dif-
ferently if we look through an opposing perspective. But this sense of a differ-
ent perspective does not mean conceding away a sense of right and wrong, or
better and worse.").
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route to effective and ethical lawyering that coincides with ef-
fective and ethical living. Accordingly, a feminist-clinical blend
challenges the polarity of not just the theoretical and the prac-
tical, but the personal and the professional.-6 The joining of
feminist and clinical methods renders personal ethics and pro-
fessional ethics inseparable.367
B. WHAT CLINICAL EDUCATION ADDS TO FEMINISM
Feminists grapple with the value of litigation for women.s68
Some question whether legal categories, which they see as con-
stituted of and constituting patriarchy, can serve women's in-
terests in the long run. They contend that law embodies the
experiences of its makers, primarily privileged men, and hides
its particularity by divorcing its categories from their contexts
via abstract rules and principles.s 9 One committed to this view
is unlikely to invest heavily in legal processes, for she would
view the processes themselves as skewing the problems con-
fronted and the objectives desired. She would be inclined to
find more direct methods of addressing women's needs, meth-
ods that offer greater hope of achievement.
Yet even if women chose to evade law, law would not
evade them.s70 Given the pervasive presence of law in all of
366. Finley writes that "men have been able, thanks to women, to organize
their lives in a way that enables them not to have to see such things as work
and family as mutually defining." Finley, supra note 125, at 894. Menkel-
Meadow asserts that nearly all reports by women lawyers discuss the interre-
lation of their personal and professional lives, whereas the ethnographies of
male lawyers do not generally raise this discussion. See Menkel-Meadow, Wo-
men in Law?: A Review of Cynthia Fuchs Epstein's Women in Law, 1983 AM.
B. FouND. REs. J. 189, 195.
367. This is one response to the vexing question of role morality that
plagues philosophers of law. See Luban, supra note 244, at 656; Wasserstrom,
supra note 254. The question, according to Luban, is whether occupying a so-
cial role can exempt one from otherwise applicable moral obligations. Id. at
659. A feminist clinic would merge, and examine the merger, of personal and
professional norms, since humans can never separate themselves from the
roles they find themselves occupying.
368. For a taste of the flavor of these debates, see Burns, Notes From the
Field: A Reply to Professor Colker, 13 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 189 (1990); Colker,
Feminist Litigation;- An Oxymoron? - A Study of the Briefs Filed in William
L. Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 13 HARV. WOMEN's L.J. 137
(1990); Colker, A Reply to Sarah Burns, 13 HARV. WOMIEN's L.J. 207 (1990).
This debate is rooted in the dilemma of choosing strategies that might be ef-
fective in the current system, but which reinforce systemic norms to which
feminists object. See Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REv. 1849,
1849-52 (1987).
369. See generally Finley, supra note 125, at 892-906.
370. See C. MACKINNON, supra note 41, at xiii ('This book... recognizes
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our lives, the stance of many feminists, particularly those in-
volved in feminist jurisprudence, has been to reflectively en-
gage legal reasoning and legal processes, to discover the vantage
point from which law speaks, to reveal the exclusion of a diver-
sity of experiences from this vantage point, and to work toward
law's inclusion of broader perspectives in the interests of a
more open, equal, and just society.37' Toward this end, feminist
lawyers seek legal recognition of women's equality and auton-
omy in all spheres of life, while simultaneously examining and
debating the shape and scope of these concepts and the value of
legal modes of achieving them.3 72 Here again, feminist theoret-
ical work guides its practical work and vice versa, shaping and
shedding light on feminist debates about the utility of law
reform.
Clinical education seems an auspicious but rarely acknowl-
edged vehicle for grounding this examination of the promises
and limits of law. Feminist lawyers and feminist law professors
are often different persons, and the quality of their interaction
may directly affect the development and dissemination of femi-
nist legal thought.373 By dissolving the distinctions between
lawyer and professor, clinical programs span potential gaps be-
tween these roles. The programs are structured to involve both
regular engagement in legal processes and intensive reflection
on the nature and efficacy of these processes.3 74 This feedback
cycle between act and thought in law school clinics parallels
the intellectual approach of feminism.375
The clinical methods of learning about law and society
from experience, synthesis, critique, and responsibility in a col-
laborative setting might anchor the research agenda of feminist
the power of the state and the consciousness-and-legitimacy conferring power
of law as political realities that women ignore at their peril.").
371. See, e.g., Bartlett, supra note 95; Minow, supra note 40 (examples of
feminists' efforts to promote change within the existing legal framework).
372. See, e.g., Finley, supra note 125, at 908 ("In engaging the law over the
meaning of women's experiences, people representing women must remain
constantly critically aware of the dilemma of legal language, of its simultane-
ous power and limitations.").
373. I do not mean to imply that lawyers do not contribute to the develop-
ment of legal thought, or that professors do not contribute to legal practice. I
mean simply that some persons engage in lawyering as their primary occupa-
tional identity, and others engage in teaching and writing about law and law-
yering as their primary occupational identity. This results in a difference
between the two groups in their day-to-day lifestyle and focus of attention,
although there is obviously overlap and interplay between these groups.
374. See supra notes 204-24 and accompanying text.
375. See supra notes 197-98 and accompanying text.
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legal thinkers. Feminists could recycle into further uses the in-
sights acquired by collectively reflecting on their experience of
using law, and further uses would nourish greater insight. Ab-
sent regular participation in a group forum for engaging and
evaluating legal processes, feminists miss a rich source of expe-
riential data. Such data is vital to feminist-style theorizing and
bears closely on questions that feminists have raised and on an-
swers which they seek.
Some feminists have joined other thinkers in critiquing the
premises of the adversary process. Using Carol Gilligan's typol-
ogy, they note the relationship of the adversary process to
Jake's problem-solving approach and its divergence from Amy's
method. 76 In other words, feminists see the adversary process
as expressing the values of a problem-solving style more pre-
dominant today among men than women. To these critics, ad-
versariness appears to have a gendered quality, and some are
attempting to reimagine the process from Amy's point of view
with hopes of weaving this view into the prevailing system.3 77
Feminists involved in this project would benefit considerably
from the clinic's regular exposure to law, lawyering, and legal
processes from which they might collectively construct and
consider alternative models.
The data that clinics can offer feminists come from expo-
sure to more than just the legal system itself. Data also
emerges from the stories of the people who walk through the
clinic's doors. The conditions of poverty and its concomitant
problems underlie the typical clinic caseload. The clients stand
on the lowest rungs of many social hierarchies and represent
perspectives disparate from those of many feminist legal think-
ers. The opportunity to work with people of such diverse back-
grounds and to test and refine feminist theories to account for
the infusion of their narratives and perspectives is invaluable to
theorists who seek to push the limits of what they know.378
Moreover, a clinic provides an opportunity to consider various
approaches to ameliorating conditions of inequality, while en-
gaged in a project aimed, in part, at this objective. Clearly, fem-
inist legal thinkers would effectively meld action and inquiry,
the foundation of their methods, if they took part in clinical
376. See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 89, at 50-51.
377. See Karst, supra note 89; Menkel-Meadow, supra note 89; Spiegelman,
supra note 338.




As stated earlier, feminists working in clinics would attend
to the power dynamics of the attorney-client relationship and
seek to negotiate with their clients a less hierarchical, and
hence more humane, interaction.380 Aware of the pitfalls of
unilaterally reconceiving the attorney-client relationship,3 1
feminist clinicians and students would hope to create mutually
with their clients a form for relating and would discuss and ap-
praise with them its evolution. Feminists also would collabo-
rate with their clients to find the best means of conducting
cases and together discuss and appraise their progress. This
work might fuel desperately needed insight into the nature and
difficulties of cross-cultural collaboration, and into the process
for developing such collaboration without turning clients into
objects of study.
Paradoxically, both the powerful promise and the potential
pitfall of feminist theory lie in its already having achieved a
certain degree of conceptual sophistication. Many of feminism's
conceptual breakthroughs, once grounded in a shared under-
standing of concrete phenomena, are defined and debated in
law review articles and classroom seminars in a manner that
has become detached from experiential underpinningss82 Hav-
ing achieved the status of abstraction, these concepts are ap-
379. Some critical theorists have advocated support for clinical legal educa-
tion. See, e.g., Kelman, Trashing, 36 STAN. L. REv. 293, 300 (1984); Klare, The
Law-School Curriculum in the 1980s: What's Left?, 32 J. LEGAL EDUC. 336, 343
(1982). Although the methodological compatibility of feminism and clinical ed-
ucation suggests that many feminists would support clinical education if asked,
feminists have not articulated or developed the reasons for this support in ex-
plicit terms.
380. See supra note 354 and accompanying text.
381. See, e.g., Condlin, supra note 65, at 55 n.31 (Condlin asks, "How is it
possible.., even to describe a nonhierarchical relationship from the perspec-
tive of only one person... particularly the person already dominant.").
382. My Article stands in that paradoxical position, endorsing experience-
grounded theory while not always exemplifying it in my discussion. Although
the ideas that I recount are rooted in the experiences of many people, and my
attachment to these ideas grows out of my own experiences, I have not pro-
vided many of the pieces of this context. Pleading the conventions of law re-
view discourse is inadequate. The choice to provide a sweeping synthesis of
the theory of practice and the practice of theory in two broad-based move-
ments, and to draw lessons from their interaction, created a project of a scope
that seemed to require the limiting of experiential descriptions. Hopefully, the
conceptual material is expressed clearly enough that readers can draw from
their own experiences and imagine how spaces between the lines might be fil-
led. I hope further that this Article is just the beginning of a conversation and
that future work will bring experiential insights directly to bear on these sets
of ideas.
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plied from above to other concrete phenomena. When applied
appropriately so that further ground-up observations supply the
data for theoretical refinement, this process is a search for ver-
ification and a source of insight. The deductive search for ver-
ification is a vital phase of the theory-practice spiral, as long as
the alternate direction of movement precedes and follows it.
The danger that threatens the epistemological integrity3a3 of
feminist theory is that the theoretician's attachment to abstract
developments will change the search for their verification into
a need for their verification, blinding observation of ill-fitting
data that, if incorporated, could redirect and improve concep-
tual understanding.3m
Participation in clinical education would help keep feminist
legal theorists true to their epistemological moorings. Through
involvement with a diverse array of people in a diverse array of
situations in which the problems of the world have intersected
with law, feminists would find the constant source of refueling
and rejuvenation that their project requires, while seeking to
relieve suffering in the process. Although many feminists find
other settings in which to accomplish these goals, they should
not overlook the law school's clinic as one of the fertile grounds
in which to do feminist theoretical and practical work. The
strength of clinical education on which feminists can rely is its
maintenance of the inductive phase of the theory-practice spiral
in top working condition.
C. ENRICHING THE TRADITIONAL LAw SCHOOL CLASSROOM
Those who malign lawyers' character and competence turn
to law schools to help solve both problems.M By exposing stu-
dents to law as it operates through people, processes, and insti-
tutions, and by promoting practices of critical reflection, law
schools can do something about lawyer's competence and per-
haps even more about lawyer's character. By supporting and
383. The term is Marjorie McDiarmid's. See McDiarmid, What's Going on
Down There in the Basement. In-house Clinics Expand their Beachhead, 35
N.Y.L. ScH. L. REv. 239, 287 (1990).
384. See, e.g., C. GILLIGAN, supra note 30, at 24 (describing how "theory can
blind observation").
385. See, eg., Burger, The Special Skills of Advocacy: Are Specialized
Training and Certification of Advocates Essential to Our System of Justice?,
42 FoRDHAm L. REv. 227, 240-41 (1973) (competence); Thomforde, Public Opin-
ion of the Legal Profession: A Necessary Response by the Bar and the Law
School, 41 TENN. L. REV. 503, 503-05 (1974) (character); Wasserstrom, supra
note 254, at 15-24 (same).
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taking seriously both clinical and feminist methods, as this Ar-
ticle describes them, law schools would cultivate habits of at-
tention to matters of ethical consequence and improve the
moral training of lawyers.
Taking clinical and feminist methods seriously might cause
the proliferation of a few, or a few more, courses in clinical ed-
ucation and feminist jurisprudence in the law school curricu-
lum. To my mind, this would be an eminently desirable result.
Another way for legal education to take these movements seri-
ously is to import the lessons of both methodologies into the
traditional classroom. 386
If teaching doctrine is the aim of traditional education,
then teaching "doctrine in a vacuum" frustrates that aim.As7
Legal rules and principles grow out of historical, social, cul-
tural, and ethical contexts. For students to understand funda-
mentally and work creatively with rules and principles, they
must appreciate the contexts from which these rules and prin-
ciples emerged.m Adopting the clinical and feminist emphasis
on the development of context as a prelude to understanding
would enrich the traditional classroom environment.
One way to develop more context for legal rules and prin-
ciples is to diversify the learning materials of the law school
classroom. Feminists and clinicians would urge classroom elab-
oration of the stories of the persons who become the textbooks'
cases, whether through visits to the class of persons involved in
litigation,3s 9 examination of story-illuminating materials such
as case histories, transcripts, and pleadings, 39° or imaginative
386. Karl Klare's enumeration of the absences in the traditional law school
curriculum reads as a prescription for the clinical and feminist methods de-
scribed here:
What is left out of the law-school curriculum? Omitted is systematic
training in how to learn from others; in how to criticize one's own
work and the work of others; in how to learn about lawyering from
practice, that is, in how to acquire the capacity for continuing self-de-
velopment over the span of a career, and in how one might act in the
central relationships that constitute the lawyering process: adversary,
client, coworker relationships, and so on. Omitted also is systematic
training in how to work closely and cooperatively with others in situa-
tions of high vulnerability and high risk and, finally, in how to think
critically about morals and politics based on the best learning avail-
able from the social sciences and from ethical discourse.
Klare, supra note 379, at 341 (emphasis in original).
387. See White, supra note 14.
388. See Klare, supra note 379, at 343.
389. See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 233, at 297 (describing the lessons
learned about a case from a plaintiff's classroom visit).
390. See, e.g., Munger, Clinical Legal Education: The Case Against Separa-
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role-playing by students based on historical materials.391 Stu-
dents could then probe these materials to ascertain whether
they included the positions of all interested persons and com-
munities and, if not, seek to remedy the exclusions.
Use of interdisciplinary tools, as advocated by feminists and
clinical educators, would inform students' thinking beyond the
concrete history of the case itself. With interdisciplinary assist-
ance, a student could consider a number of important questions:
What were the structural forces - historical, social, and cul-
tural - alive in the era and region in which the case was born?
What were the patterns of social conflict and conditions of so-
cial distress that may have affected its birth? How did the con-
duct and outcome of the case affect these conditions? How can
professionals and institutions respond to the individual and so-
cial problems that they encounter?
With this broad and deep contextual background, feminists
and clinicians would require students to reason from the con-
crete reality of the cases to principled conclusions. Feminists,
in particular, would have students consider the reasoning ad-
vanced and the conclusions desired by the full array of inter-
ested persons before making any decisions, encouraging
students to rethink doctrine from a variety of vantage points.
Students then would compare their decisions and decisionmak-
ing processes to the actual reasoning and judgment in the case.
In doing so, they would have to reflect on questions of fairness
and justice. Was the decision and the process of decision in
this case just? From whose perspectives? Can I defend my de-
cision and my process of decision? Can I critique them? What
is my defense or critique of the court's reasoning and holding?
Cross-disciplinary attention to the tools of the humanities,
particularly literature and philosophy, would help students
tism, 29 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 715, 729 (1980) (urging the use of supplementary
documents in a "standard casebook course"); see also J. NOONAN, PERSONS AND
MASKS OF THE LAW (1976) (providing case histories of the persons and
problems underlying well-known cases); IN THE INTEREST OF CHILDREN: AD-
VOCACY, LAw REFORM, AND PuBLic POLICY (R. Mnookin ed. 1985) (offering
case studies of five landmark Supreme Court cases affecting children's
interests).
391. Kohlberg has described the value of "reciprocal role playing," taking
the roles of persons with a variety of perspectives, in facilitating moral devel-
opment. See Richards, supra note 263, at 372 ("To the extent clinics and simu-
lation techniques promote reciprocal role playing, they have, in addition to
their pedagogical rationale in improving skills training, a further justification
in facilitating moral development through stimulating the capacity of students
to take different points of view.").
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think critically about these questions of justice, fairness, and
truth. Wrestling with their internal conflicts concerning ethi-
cal processes and outcomes, an active experience on which stu-
dents must reflect intensively, can help students develop the
cognitive and affective capacities of moral judgment needed to
resolve their conflicts.392 In this way, students, guided by
whatever tools are available, confront and articulate the incho-
ate philosophies by which they live and make choices.393 By do-
ing so, they come to understand themselves and others and can
begin to develop a conscious process of moral reasoning.
Feminists and clinicians might recommend use of Antig-
one, for example, in a law school classroom to help students
consider the relationship between law and morality, a relation-
ship not easily discussed in the abstract. The instructor might
divide the students into groups, one group assigned to prose-
cute, another to defend, and a third to pass judgment on Antig-
one for allegedly violating the law. Alternatively, every
student could rotate through each of these roles. In struggling
with the discomfort that arises from considering their personal
and professional responsibilities while standing in each of these
positions, students would have to engage their intellectual and
emotional resources to make decisions about how to behave and
to articulate reasons that justify their decisions. Coming to
grips with this demanding process would involve coming to
grasp the nature and complexity of moral judgment in a vivid,
immediate, and personal way. It would develop students' ap-
preciation of the interweaving of legal and moral reasoning and
the way in which legal frameworks can capture or distort the
underlying ethical, political, and social problems from which
they grow.
To elicit data that might inform their behavioral choices,
students could simulate interviews with Antigone, Creon, and
other witnesses - Ismene, for example. Through participation
in these interviews, students would develop a variety of per-
spectives on law and morality and imagine themselves inside
these perspectives. The instructors might ask the class to draft
jury instructions on the appropriate standards for adjudicating
Antigone's "guilt" or "innocence," and to reflect on the ambigu-
ous meanings of these terms when considered in this context.
The students might consider which of the many significant
events in the years preceding Antigone's alleged violation of
392. See supra note 261 and accompanying text.
393. See supra notes 237-38 and accompanying text.
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law a judge would find relevant or persuasive in deciding her
fate. In analyzing why particular background details might or
might not be relevant, or how information that each of the in-
terviewees provided might affect their judgments, the students
would be collaboratively inquiring into, and gradually closing in
on, perspectives on the complex relationship of law and legal
actors to circumstances of human moral conflict. Observing
themselves throughout this process would help students to un-
derstand themselves as lawyers and as human beings who are
concerned about fairness and the responsibilities of living in in-
terrelationship with others.
The feminist and clinical movements view the nature of
justice and community as the stakes of education, a sensibility
that the classroom can actively tap.394 To stimulate this sensi-
bility, feminists and clinicians would reduce the traditional hi-
erarchy of the classroom. A teacher wedded to this aim would
not be the omniscient fount of knowledge, but would facilitate
the students' active responsibility for making sense of their ex-
perience of the legal and interdisciplinary materials. Authori-
tarianism conflicts with the values of this project and impedes
its possibilities of success. An atmosphere of open exploration,
where students and teachers exchange their views and insights
on matters of deep and abiding interest, encourages students to
assume responsibility for developing the understanding of self
and others that this classroom approach requires. 395
If legal education followed this methodological course, it
would come to resemble feminist and clinical methodologies in
yet another manner. The classroom would employ particular
intellectual practices, and insight would flow from participation
in these practices.39 These practices involve relating to diverse
texts and materials in a way that brings one's own and others'
perspectives into view, and critically reflecting on these per-
spectives in light of such materials. The experience of the
classroom method would constitute the source of insight, and
the experience of further classes and materials would test and
394. See supra notes 300-07 and accompanying text.
395. Kohlberg's emphasis on "educational democracy" as an important pre-
condition for moral education supports this insight. See Richards, supra note
263, at 372.
396. See White, supra note 14, at 161 ("[Clan we come to see that the law
that we teach... is not a set of rules to be learned but a set of ways of think-
ing and talking and acting together about questions of justice, a method and a
community which it should be our task to exemplify and constitute?").
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develop these insights.397 This classroom methodology link
theory and practice in the spiral that inspires feminism and
clinical education. Plainly, the lessons of these movements can
enlighten legal education generally.
D. REEXAMINING ETHICS
The methodologies of the feminist and clinical education
movements suggest that the story of Antigone, a case in a law
school clinic, or other richly specified narratives represent
promising springboards for inquiry into broad questions about
law and morality. The considerable and sundry details of such
narratives express the subtleties and complexities of the mor-
ally charged situations in which humans find themselves. Un-
like many children's tales, a single lesson does not surface
readily from these narratives. Rarely do these real-life or life-
like contexts provide easily grasped answers to obvious ques-
tions. Rather, they suggest multiple interpretations and
analyses. The narratives contain painstaking renderings of
competing viewpoints that check our natural tendencies to
oversimplify and overlook details and perspectives that unsettle
the neat conclusions that we desire. We must actively engage
the full breadth and depth of these narratives to honestly and
effectively further our analysis. What we will come to know as
a result of this inquiry will be altered by the contextualized
process through which we have come to know it.
I have sought to demonstrate that such a theory-building
397. James Boyd White's vision of legal education supports the vision de-
veloped in this Article:
The heart of this education is learning to be responsible in a new way
for what one thinks and says. The student has to make sense of it all
herself, for no one can do it for her. She has to think for herself in
circumstances forever new, to reach conclusions for which she is re-
sponsible, to decide for herself what is worth saying and what is not.
This constitutes an active education, a learning-to-do, not a passive ac-
quisition of knowledge; when it works well, it tests the limits of one's
mind and the imagination.... What one learns in law school is not
law in the sense of repeatable propositions, but how to learn law -
that is, how to do it and how to make it. In an important sense "the
law" one studies is thus the law that is actually made in the class-
room, made out of the materials of case and statute as the class thinks
and talks about particular questions. A good law school is thus a
school of law-making. This means that the proper focus of attention
is not on what the student is learning to repeat or to describe but
what she is learning to see and to do; on the doctrine or language of
the law not abstracted from experience, but embedded in it, as the ob-
ject and medium of thought, expression and intellectual action.
MeL at 157, 162.
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practice is a distinctly ethical project.3 98 Clinical and feminist
methods represent possibilities for rescuing the morally signifi-
cant details that are systematically excluded from the culture's
storehouse of standard stories. Acute empirical sensitivity -
foregrounding the stories of those whom cultural structures
have generally relegated to the background, and supporting the
voices often rendered barely audible - can help to accomplish
this goal. Working through the cognitive dissonance created by
the infusion of these previously neglected perspectives expands
our understanding and promotes both a critique of the societal
structures that obscured such knowledge and an interest in dis-
mantling these knowledge-distorting structures.39 This is why
Abraham Heschel would have prophets take philosophers to
the slums.4 0 From the feminist-clinician-prophet-philosopher's
vantage point, the distinction between epistemology and ethics
collapses.
From feminists' and clinicians' relentless demand for elab-
orate concrete detail and for special attention to the data pro-
vided by those whom society frequently disempowers comes a
reconceived notion of what qualifies as ethical inquiry. This no-
tion of ethical inquiry is a process grounded in our experiences
of social and institutional interactions and concerned with the
way people actually respond to the moral choices presented by
everyday life and work. The focus of ethical theory is no longer
the justification of actions affecting the "generalized others" of
traditional philosophy, but the justification of actions affecting
the "concrete others" with whom we are enmeshed.401 Ethical
systems emerge from this network of relationships when we
398. See supra notes 188-89, 263-84, 317-21 and accompanying text.
399. See Minow & Spelman, supra note 318, stating that:
Because persistent patterns of power, based on lines of gender, racial,
class, and age differences, have remained resilient and at the same
time elusive under traditional political and legal ideas, arguments for
looking to context carry critical power. In this context, arguments for
context highlight these patterns as worthy of attention and, at times,
condemnation.
Id. at 1651.
400. See Heschel, supra note 199 and accompanying text. This is also why
Cornel West advocates a philosophy of "prophetic pragmatism," which
through the examination of actual human lives and the acknowledgement of
the constraints on, and possibilities for, moral improvement, calls for cultural
challenges to oppressive structures of power. West, supra note 325, at 228-34;
see also Minow & Spelman, supra note 318, at 1612-15 (discussing this piece of
West's work).
401. See Benhabib, The Generalized and The Concrete Other: The Kohlberg-




seek to resolve and explain our resolutions of the quotidian di-
lemmas that we encounter in the complex, nuanced, temporal
context in which they arise. This ethical theory, then, responds
to the experiences central to daily personal situations and re-
quires reflection on such situations to develop moral
consciousness.402
In the hands of feminists and clinicians, ethics becomes a
sustained practice of empirical attention and reflection on the
actions of people in actual situations. Ordinary life expresses
and creates ethical theory, which is understood as having an in-
escapably social character.403 The better our context-sensitive
empiricism, the better our moral deliberations, and the more
precise the articulation of our ethical principles will be.4°"
CONCLUSION
As exemplified by the reading of Antigone, feminism and
clinical education are independent movements that, in response
to different conditions, have formulated reciprocally reinforc-
ing methodologies. In this Article, I have explored the dra-
matic likeness between feminist methods and clinical methods,
a likeness rooted in their independent efforts to foster collabo-
rative critical inquiry into the ethical dimensions of interper-
sonal and institutional experiences. I have sought to enhance
that likeness by considering the implications of a direct applica-
tion of feminist methods to clinical education and, conversely,
of clinical methods to feminist jurisprudence. Although moti-
vated by different aims, each set of methods illuminates the re-
lationship between theory and practice, a relationship conveyed
by the image of a spiral.
The theory-practice spiral of feminist and clinical methods
has profound ethical implications. Indeed the methodologies of
402. See Held, supra note 319, at 112 ("I suggest that we ought to try to de-
velop moral inquiries that will be as satisfactory as possible for the actual con-
texts in which we live and in which our experience is located. ... We [should]
do our best to 'test' various moral theories in actual contexts and in light of
our actual moral experience.").
403. See Addelson, Moral Passages, in MORAL THEORY, supra note 91, at 87-
88 ("[Moral explanation... [is] constructed in social interactions, and... sys-
tematic social and political relations are created and maintained in the process
of construction.").
404. See A. MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE (1981) (arguing that context is nec-
essary for understanding the significance of moral claims and decrying the loss
of context for many of our important moral principles); Kittay & Meyers, In-
troduction, in MORAL THEORY, supra note 91, at 3, 12 ("[G]eneral moral princi-
ples cannot be applied without a subtle understanding of context.").
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feminism and clinical education offer a new ethical vision,
reinventing our understanding of the nature of moral theory
and of the practices that constructing moral theory requires.
According to this vision, moral theory embodies the inductive,
narrative, contextual examination of daily personal
interactions.
The lyrical chorus of Antigone, which comments on the un-
folding events of the play, supports such an ethical vision.
Martha Nussbaum, displaying a lyricism of her own, describes
the model of reflection conveyed by Antigone's chorus:
Each has an internal structure and an internal set of resonances; each
reflects upon the action that has preceded; each reflects upon the pre-
ceding lyrics. Already, then, we find that to interpret fully any single
image or phrase requires mapping a complex web of connections, as
each successive item both modifies and is modified by the imagery and
dialogue that has preceded... The lyrics both show us and engender
in us a process of reflection and (self)-discovery that works through a
persistent attention to and a (re)-interpretation of concrete words,
images, incidents. We reflect on an incident not by subsuming it
under a general rule, not by assimilating its features to the terms of
an elegant scientific procedure, but by burrowing down into the
depths of the particular, finding images and connections that will per-
mit us to see it more truly, describe it more richly; by combining this
burrowing with a horizontal drawing of connections, so that every
horizontal link contributes to the depth of our view of the particular,
and every new depth creates new horizontal links.4
05
Antigone's chorus captures the aspirations of feminist and
clinical methods and theories. To the extent that law schools
embrace feminism and clinical education, these movements
promise to enliven legal education and enhance its capacity to
address questions of justice, fairness, and truth. By espousing
reflective practices as a source of wisdom, feminism and clinical
education remake our understanding not only of the relation-
ship between doing and knowing but between law and life as
well.
405. M. NUSSBAUM, suPra note 25, at 68-69.
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